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Those actors that attempt to influence business approaches to social responsibility 
are typically concerned with preventing businesses from causing harm or holding 
businesses accountable for harmful activities when they occur. In post-conflict 
settings, these twin aims are particularly important given the innumerable instances 
of businesses undermining transitions from conflict to peace through harmful 
practices.  
However, businesses can also be positive agents of change. As an emerging 
discourse on business and peacebuilding is suggesting, businesses can contribute 
positively to transitions from conflict to peace in a range of ways. But can other 
actors influence businesses to engage in peacebuilding processes? Can they 
require, induce and persuade positive business-based contributions to 
peacebuilding? If so, how? 
Examining two case studies on Northern Ireland and South Africa, I will argue that 
different actors can influence businesses to act as peacebuilding agents. I use the 
findings from these case studies to consider opportunities for thinking about a global 
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Mapping the Business and Peace Terrain 
This thesis seeks to examine the ways and means by which different actors might 
require, incentivise, or encourage businesses to contribute to peacebuilding. This 
study suggests that a range of actors, from shareholders to international financiers, 
states to civil society, can all influence business contributions to peacebuilding. To 
substantiate this claim, I examine what some term ‘regulatory pluralism, which refers 
to the broadening of actors involved in the regulation of businesses and the diverse 
methods that these actors use to shape business conduct. I will suggest that 
through different forms of influence, which arise from the pluralisation of regulation, 
different actors can prompt businesses to contribute to peacebuilding efforts.  
I use the findings from two case studies on Northern Ireland and South Africa to 
demonstrate different ways in which various actors have influenced businesses to 
contribute to peacebuilding in these contexts. I argue, in turn, that these examples 
provide opportunity for considering the possibility for a global policy instrument on 
business and peacebuilding. Such an instrument could provide a reference point to 
help inform those that attempt to shape business conduct as to how they can use 
their influence to promote business contributions to peacebuilding. This introductory 
chapter outlines why the issue is important and explains how I will conduct this 
research. It also includes an overview of the methodology and outline of the 
remainder of the thesis. 
1.1. Introduction 
We can understand the relationship between business and peace from different 
perspectives. Firstly, businesses can hinder the realisation of peace. Amongst other 
things, businesses can support repressive governments, helping to sustain 
dictatorial regimes. They can also undermine fundamental human rights, both 
directly through their actions, and indirectly through their relationships with others. In 




is better characterised under the heading of business and conflict because it reflects 
the various ways that businesses can undermine peacebuilding efforts.  
Alternatively, we might see businesses as necessary for peace to be realised.  
Businesses create jobs, widen the tax base, and contribute to the physical 
reconstruction of the state. These contributions are all crucial components of a 
peacebuilding process. Finally, some might suggest that any positive contributions 
that companies can make to peacebuilding processes is subject to the extent to 
which businesses are not causing harm. That is, while in theory, businesses might 
contribute much during transitions to peace by generating prosperity and 
employment, whether these outcomes promote or impede peacebuilding efforts will 
depend on the extent to which businesses act in socially responsible ways.1 
More recently, however, writers and practitioners have begun to examine the 
opportunities for and untapped potential of businesses to contribute to peace in 
ways that extend beyond the limited understandings outlined above.2 Because 
peacebuilding measures involve all levels of society and target all aspects of the 
state structure, peacebuilding requires a wide variety of agents for their 
implementation.3 There are those that contend, in line with this integrative approach 
to peacebuilding, that ‘[t]he relevance of the business sector’s backing of peace 
negotiations and peacebuilding cannot be over‐stated.’4  
Evidence of the increasing importance attached to businesses in peacebuilding 
processes is easy to identify. A small sampling of institutions that work on the topic 
includes the United Nations (UN) Global Compact (UNGC), the United States 
                                                            
1 J. Ford, Regulating Business for Peace: The United Nations, the Private Sector, and Post-Conflict 
Recovery, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2015, at 61. Throughout this thesis, I use the terms 
business, enterprises, firms, and companies interchangeably. 
2 See. J.L. Nelson, ‘The Business of Peace: The Private Sector as Partner in Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution’, International Alert, Council on Economic Priorities, and the Prince of Wales International 
Business Leaders Forum, 2000; J. Oetzel, K.A. Getz and S. Ladek, ‘The role of multinational 
enterprises in responding to violent conflict: A conceptual model and framework for research’, 
American Business Law Journal, vol. 44, no. 2, 2007; 
A. Gerson, ‘Peace building: The Private Sector’s Role’, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 
95, no. 1, 2001; K.A. Getz, and Oetzel, J., ‘MNE strategic intervention in violent conflict: Variations 
based on conflict characteristics’, Journal of Business Ethics vol. 89, no. 4, 2010. 
3 M. Maiese, ‘Peacebuilding’, in G. Burgess and H. Burgess (ed.) Beyond Intractability. Conflict 
Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, July 2003. 
4 A. Rettberg, ‘Peace is Better Business, and Business Makes Better Peace: The Role of the Private 
Sector in Colombian Peace Processes’, GIGA Research Programme: Violence and Security No. 240, 
2013, at 5.  
See also N. Turner, V. Popovski, and O. Aginam, ‘Post-conflict Countries and Foreign Investment’, 




Institute for Peace, the Institute for Economics and Peace, The Hague Centre for 
Global Justice, Business for Peace Foundation, One Earth Future Foundation, 
Peace Research Institute Oslo, and SwissPeace.5 Similarly, policy developments 
have emerged focused on the integration of businesses in peacebuilding efforts. As 
an example, recognising that economic underdevelopment can be conflict 
generating, the UN Security Council (UNSC) included corporate stakeholders in the 
drive to attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), calling for more 
investment in conflict-affected areas to stimulate development.6 More progressively, 
the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) explicitly recognise a central role 
for businesses in helping to achieve development objectives, including the 
realisation and facilitation of peace.7 Institutions such as the UN peacekeeping are 
also bringing businesses centre stage.8 In September 2013, UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon launched Business for Peace (B4P), a multi-stakeholder initiative 
involving governments, business, and civil society.9 The initiative seeks to support 
companies to implement responsible practices aligned with the UNGC principles 
throughout their business operations and supply chains in conflict-affected/high-risk 
areas.10 As a final example, as part of efforts to implement the New Deal, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) continues to 
explore the potential of the private sector in supporting peacebuilding and 
development.11  
                                                            
5 See J. Forrer, and C. Seyle, C. (ed.) The Role of Business in the Responsibility to Protect, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016, at 2. 
6 See, for example, Global Compact Office, The United Nations and The Private Sector, United 
Nations, September 2008. See also, J. Miklian, ‘Mapping Business-Peace Interactions: Five Assertions 
for How Businesses Create’, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2016, at 3. 
7 See J. Nelson and Z. Torres-Rahman, ‘Business and the United Nations: Working Together Towards 
the Sustainable Development Goals: A Framework for Action’, SDG Fund, Harvard Kennedy School 
CSR Initiative and Inspiris Limited, 2015; J. Nelson, B. Jenkins and R. Gilbert, ‘Business and the 
Sustainable Development Goals: Building Blocks for Success at Scale’, Business Fights Poverty and 
Harvard Kennedy School’s CSR Initiative, 2015; Institute for Human Rights and Business, ‘State of 
Play Business and the Sustainable Development Goals: Mind the Gap – Challenges for 
Implementation’, IHRB State of Play Series: Vol. Four, 2015. 
8 J. Miklian and P. Schouten, ‘Business for Peace: The New Paradigm of International Peacebuilding 
and Development’, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Working Paper 8, 2014. 
9 UNGC, Business for Peace, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/library/381 [last visited 15 December 
2017]. 
10 The UNGC is a United Nations initiative to encourage businesses worldwide to adopt sustainable 
and socially responsible policies and to report on their implementation. See further chapter 3.  
11 The New Deal was a key agreement between fragile and conflict-affected states, development 
partners, and civil society to improve the current development policy and practice in fragile and conflict-
affected states. See OECD DAC, ‘A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’, International 
Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2012, http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_ 





Underpinning this increase in activity is, as will be developed, a suite of more 
proactive contributions suggested by scholars and policymakers that business might 
make to peacebuilding. What is less clear, however, is why businesses would 
assume positive roles in transitions from conflict to peace. The same scholars and 
policymakers that tout the potential of businesses to positively contribute to peace 
employ a range of arguments for why businesses ‘ought to do so’. These arguments 
include the ‘business case for peace'- that it is in the economic self-interest of 
businesses to promote peace- as well as arguments that companies have moral and 
social responsibilities to contribute to peacebuilding efforts. As I will suggest, these 
arguments have various shortcomings. Most notably, they do not help to inform if, 
when, and how businesses will contribute to peacebuilding efforts in any reliable 
way.  
Mostly missing from current discussions are the linkages between business, 
peacebuilding and the roles that other actors might play in helping to bring 
businesses into the peacebuilding fold. In response, this thesis explores how 
different actors might require, induce, and/or encourage businesses to contribute to 
peacebuilding efforts. The intention is to move the discussion beyond relying on the 
decisions of individual companies to instead asking how different actors might 
influence business contributions to peacebuilding.  
I suggest that discussions on what some term the ‘pluralisation of regulation’ help to 
show that a range of actors, employing different methods, can influence the 
decisions of businesses. Types of regulation exist across a spectrum, spanning from 
binding law, in the form of legislation at one end, to softer, more persuasive 
approaches, such as guidelines, on the other. In between, there exist myriad forms 
that regulation can take. I argue that because of this spectrum of possibilities for 
shaping business conduct, there are possibilities for thinking about how to use these 
different forms of influence to engage businesses in peacebuilding processes.  
To demonstrate these possibilities, I examine how different actors have attempted to 
engage businesses in peacebuilding processes in South Africa and Northern 
Ireland. The purpose is to draw conclusions, which should help to develop our 
understanding about the various ways that businesses might contribute to 
peacebuilding, and how different actors might influence these contributions. The 




the emergence of a global policy instrument on business and peacebuilding. Such a 
tool could help to inform a range of actors as to the different ways they might 
support business contributions to peace, while at the same time deepening the 
discussion on business, peacebuilding and regulatory possibilities.  
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the gap, which currently exists in the 
business and peace literature before outlining how I am conducting this research 
and the remaining structure of the thesis. The discussion begins by considering 
what it might mean for businesses to contribute to peacebuilding.  
1.2. Business contributions to peacebuilding  
Academics and policy makers offer a broad range of possibilities for how businesses 
might contribute to peacebuilding efforts. For instance, some direct attention to the 
roles of business in maintaining security.12 Drawing on the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) concept,13 scholars have examined the ways that companies might prevent 
the outbreak or re-emergence of conflict.14 Contributions along these lines include 
launching publicity campaigns for peace and lobbying against violence.15 Others 
explore the role of businesses in democratisation processes engaging with ways 
that businesses might influence, both positively and negatively, political elites and 
regime change.16 Those writing on business and peace have also offered empirical 
examples of businesses contributing to peace by helping to broker peace deals 
between conflict participants.17 Referring to examples of such practices in places 
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and C. Gündüz, ‘A Role for the Private Sector in Peace Processes? Examples, and Implications for 
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like Colombia, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Nepal and South Africa, scholars have 
highlighted how firms can facilitate peace negotiations, bringing conflict participants 
to the negotiation table.18 Some concentrate specifically on the roles of businesses 
in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.19 Other studies are more encompassing, 
interrogating the possibilities for companies to contribute to peace through the 
broader conflict-to-peace cycle.20 
Despite these different examinations, many acknowledge that the central task of 
peacebuilding is to create positive peace, understood as a ‘stable social equilibrium 
in which the surfacing of new disputes does not escalate into violence and war.’21 
The signing of a peace agreement is often the genesis rather than the end of these 
efforts.22 Reaching consensus between warring elites on such issues as the 
allocation of political power, the economy, development, and the rights of minorities, 
signals the beginning of a journey, with peace agreements often acting as roadmaps 
for these transitions. This thesis is primarily concerned with business contributions 
to peace in the aftermath of negotiated peace settlements. In situating my 
discussion here, I want to understand how businesses can and have been involved 
in helping to facilitate transitions from conflict to peace by supporting longer-term 
peacebuilding efforts. I, therefore, define peacebuilding in line with Temitope Olaifa 
to mean ‘a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to 
prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict 
through reconciliation, institution building, and political as well as economic 
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Swisspeace Working Paper 2, 2010. 
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Reconstruction’, PhD Thesis, University of London, 2010; P.B. Davis, Corporations, global governance 
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transformation.’23 This consists of a set of physical, social, and structural initiatives 
that are often an integral part of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.24 
Business-based peacebuilding, it follows, refers to the ways in which businesses 
contribute to the emergence of a stable or durable peace, characterized by the 
absence of physical and structural violence, the elimination of discrimination, and 
self-sustainability.25 
It is necessary, at this stage, to add a caveat. A great amount of literature addresses 
the ways in which businesses can play proactive roles in society. For instance, 
political corporate social responsibility (PCSR), as a sub-field of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), examines the ways that businesses assume state-like 
responsibilities, providing public goods such as healthcare.26 In the field of 
development, some have suggested that businesses can be ‘agents of 
development’, purposely helping to tackle poverty, or improving education.27 
Similarly, human rights scholars have argued that businesses have obligations to 
help to realise human rights, pushing beyond those that suggest that businesses 
must merely avoid undermining the enjoyment of rights.28 
Proactivity, however, does not necessarily equate to peacebuilding. Because a 
positive peace requires addressing the root causes and consequences of conflict, 
and because these underlying factors differ across contexts, the ways that 
businesses can and do contribute to peace will depend on the context in question.29 
In other words, because there is no abstract way to do peace, there is no abstract 
way for businesses to contribute to peacebuilding.30 As the methodology section will 
                                                            
23 T. Olaifa, ‘Curbing Violent Extremism Through Peacebuilding in Nigeria’, Journal of US-China Public 
Administration, vol. 14, no. 4, 2017, at 221. 
24 See B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, New York: United Nations 1995. 
25 L. Reychler, ‘From Conflict to Sustainable Peacebuilding: Concepts and Analytical Tools’, in L. 
Reychler and T. Paffenholz, (ed.) Peacebuilding: A Field Guide. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 2001, at 12. 
26 See A.G. Scherer, and G. Palazzo, ‘The New Political Role of Business in a Globalized World: A 
Review of a New Perspective on CSR and its Implications for the Firm, Governance, and Democracy’, 
Journal of Management Studies, vol. 48, no. 4, 2011. 
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United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2010. 
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make clear, a case study approach is necessary when considering how and in what 
ways businesses might contribute to peacebuilding. It helps us to examine how 
businesses have contributed to peace in context-specific ways and to draw 
connections between these interventions and the broader peacebuilding effort in 
question.  
Nevertheless, even in the aftermath of negotiated settlements, there are multiple 
ways that businesses might assist peacebuilding efforts. These contributions can be 
categorised loosely as falling into three broad groups: ‘business as usual 
approaches’; approaches grounded in ‘doing no harm’; and businesses acting as 
agents of positive peace. I develop these in turn below before outlining why it is that 
I am focusing on the latter category. 
1.2.1. ‘Businesses as Usual’: The Bare Minimum 
Milton Friedman famously argued that because businesses belong to shareholders, 
those running businesses owe fiduciary duties to shareholders and shareholders 
alone.31 Friedman criticised CSR arguments by stating that ‘few trends could so 
thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by 
our corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money 
for their stockholders as possible.’32 The starting point of Friedman’s argument is 
that people have responsibilities, but businesses do not. That Friedman advanced 
his ‘shareholder primacy model’, however, was not to suggest that businesses are 
not significant contributors to the welfare of society and citizens. On the contrary, 
Friedman promoted the view that by pursuing individual gains and generating 
economic growth, businesses are already serving critical public functions. 
Advocating this position from the perspective of peacebuilding, proponents adopt 
the same rationale.33 Those advancing the ‘business as usual’ viewpoint suggest 
that while businesses may not, and indeed should not, concern themselves with 
peacebuilding-related activities; there are nevertheless peacebuilding consequences 
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that flow from normal business activity.34 At the core of this argument is a view that 
by operating as they normally would in other, non-conflict-affected settings, 
businesses will contribute to peace. A number of reasons support this argument. 
Firstly, because of conflict, states face significant resource constraints.35 Not only is 
conflict itself a significant strain on state resources, transitioning from conflict to 
peace also requires a significant amount of resources to help address the underlying 
causes of conflict. By generating economic growth, companies contribute to peace 
by growing economies and providing much-need resources. In linking conflict to 
underdevelopment and poverty, arguments arise that through expanding the tax 
base and providing necessary revenue streams for post-conflict governments, 
businesses will already be making valuable contributions to peacebuilding efforts.36 
As Pescka notes: 
Political settlements and processes lay the groundwork for future stability, 
long-term growth and security, but early economic development is what most 
readily translates into tangible differences in people’s lives. These positive 
changes are vital in the course of peace consolidation, where the successful 
implementation of peace agreements is ―often contingent on swift 
materialization of peace dividends.37 
To this end, organisations such as the World Bank (WB) frequently have ‘conflated 
business, peace and development to argue that business ventures stabilize fragile 
states by providing development in areas of poor or non-existent governance.’38 
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Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2016, at 4. 
35 See P. Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, World Bank and 
Oxford University Press, 2003. 
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Secondly, businesses contribute to peace by creating jobs.39 For peace to be 
sustainable, change must reach the ‘everyday lives’ of those affected by conflict.40 
Economic inclusion is viewed as providing a necessary complement to inclusive 
peace settlements, which often involve some form of inclusion at the political level 
but which do not always lead to improvements for the broader population ‘on the 
ground.’41 Employment can, amongst other things, offer hope and economic and 
social opportunities to those at the margins. As Gerson asserts: 
Conflict settlement requires the injection of optimism and hope born of 
employment and economic opportunity. Otherwise, fragile peace 
arrangements can rarely be sustained… [O]ver the long term, only the 
private sector is capable of growing new enterprises, opening investment 
opportunities, and providing employment and enduring economic security. 
The creation of employment and other economic opportunities can nurture 
and sustain fragile peace arrangements.42 
As a final example of contributions that fall within the ‘business as usual’ category, 
some suggest that businesses are necessary to build the physical foundations of the 
state in the aftermath of violence. Conflict or periods of repression often result in the 
complete or partial destruction of a state’s physical infrastructure. In other cases, 
such foundations have never existed. In post-conflict settings, there must often be a 
reconstruction of roads, ports, railway lines and airports.43 Similarly, states must 
improve basic services and access to amenities such as electricity and water. The 
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Security Dialogue, vol. 45, no. 6, 2014.  
41 For a discussion on the meaning of political settlements see, V. Dudouet, and S. Lundström, ‘Post-
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realities are often such that the normative aspirations of peacebuilding require the 
less grandiose but equally important aspects of infrastructural reconstruction. 
Businesses are necessary to build from the ground up. 
Karen McKenna sums up the business as usual position by noting that ‘[t]he logic 
[…] is that economic development, the alleviation of poverty, the rebuilding of 
infrastructure destroyed as a result of violence, as well as livelihood opportunities, 
are crucial elements in building sustainable peace. Importantly, all of these activities 
depend on business.’44 In short, advocates of the business as usual approach to 
business and peace suggest that by being businesses and doing what companies 
do best-making profit- contributions to peace flow consequentially.  
1.2.2. ‘Doing no harm’: asking a little more of Business 
A second set of contributions that business can make to peace is to ‘do no harm.’ 
The importance of ‘doing no harm’ stems from the negative impacts, such as 
environmental degradations or exploitation of indigenous land, that can result from 
business acitivity and links directly with the consequential contributions to 
peacebuilding that arise from businesses pursuing economic opportunities.45 Those 
advocating this position acknowledge that important consequences can flow from 
business activity but also stress that the manner in which commercial activities are 
conducted is just as if not more important than economic growth itself. In support of 
this position, for instance, Timothy Fort and colleagues have proffered the ‘peace 
through commerce’ perspective.46 These scholars assess that contributing to peace 
does not require a wholesale transformation of corporate governance, but rather 
ethical business practices that attempt to avoid causing harm.47 In other words, 
business contributions to peace do not necessarily require an engaged commitment 
to the broader peace process but rather a commitment to ethical business practices. 
When businesses are socially responsible, they inevitably contribute positively to 
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society. Thus, this approach aligns with, but also qualifies, the business as usual 
approach. 
There are derivative consequences to peacebuilding that some suggest flow from 
efforts to do no harm.48 For example, there are those who would argue that when 
businesses comply with international human rights law, this can have the effect of 
inspiring states to follow suit.49 Others claim that when firms are socially responsible, 
employing, for example, based on principles of non-discrimination; this can have the 
effect of bringing previously conflicting communities together.50 Moreover, some 
assert that companies ‘can transfer know-how with regard to private sector 
development especially to local communities.’51  
Doing no harm also merges with the concepts of ‘context’ or ‘conflict sensitivity.’ 
Principally, these concepts suggest that when those running businesses are not 
mindful of the broader surroundings in which they operate and even when not 
intending to do so, they can nevertheless undermine transitions from conflict to 
peace. As Jolyon Ford summarises: 
An enterprise’s actions may often unwittingly aggravate or expose social 
fault lines, compromise land claims, affect ecosystems, discriminate 
ethnically, or result in corruption, resentment and rights abuses, and so on. 
In particular, the close links between natural resources, land, identity and 
insecurity in many regions increase the importance of how business 
operates and how it is governed.52 
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As in the case above, to contribute to peace, businesses must ensure that at the 
very least they are not causing harm.53 Approached from the perspective of 
sensitive business practices, this requires understanding the broader dynamics of 
the context.54 The essence of approaches grounded in ‘doing no harm’ and/or 
context sensitivity, therefore, is that businesses are thought to contribute to peace 
as consequences of context-sensitive or ethical business activity. By doing no harm, 
businesses will inevitably be contributing to peace. 
1.2.3. Businesses as Agents of Positive Peace 
There is a commonality in both of the categories discussed above: business 
contributions to peace arise as consequences of business activity. According to 
business as usual approaches, peacebuilding contributions flow from normal 
commercial operations. In the second case, the same argument exists, subject to 
businesses operating in a socially responsible or conflict/context-sensitive manner.  
However, for numerous reasons, the belief in the consequential impacts of business 
on peacebuilding efforts is often misplaced. For instance, inherent in the business 
as usual approach is a presumption that the economic prosperity of a few can 
generate economic success for the many. In economic theory, it is this logic, which 
underpins Adam’s Smith idea of the invisible hand in free markets.55 Despite these 
claims, however, numerous scholars have challenged ‘trickle down’ economics, 
highlighting instead the growing disparities between those that have and those that 
have not.56 Similarly, in the context of societies undergoing transitions from conflict 
to peace, arguments that, for instance, job creation will necessarily contribute to the 
realisation of peace says little about the realities of pre-existing horizontal 
inequalities between groups.57 It does not address how growth can affect these 
dynamics, such as those instances where jobs created benefit groups previously 
favoured under a particular political regime. Is employment creation conducive to 
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peacebuilding even if it excludes those groups whose grievances lie at the heart of 
conflicts?  
Arguments around the peacebuilding consequences of doing business as usual or 
acting in a conflict-sensitive manner are also often highly anecdotal.58 Scholars 
argue, for instance, that the ‘underlying assumptions of how business practices 
relate to peace are either entirely implicit or remain vague and unexamined.’59 
Jolyon Ford notes that there is a ‘degree of conceptual wooliness accompanying 
much business and peace scholarship.’60 Brian Ganson also highlights that ‘much of 
the analysis [on] causal connections that are asserted about a particular business 
activity and peace positive impacts are premised not on specific case evidence of 
peace outcomes (or lack thereof), but rather on a set of postulates from related but 
distinct perspectives.’61  
In response to the limitations and indeed dangers of assuming that peacebuilding 
consequences necessarily flow from business activity, the third category of possible 
contributions- the businesses as agents of positive peace approach- examines how 
companies might play more proactive roles in peacebuilding processes. This 
category includes those targeted and deliberate efforts undertaken by firms to play 
peacebuilding roles.62 
In deeply divided societies, an example of such an approach could include 
businesses adopting affirmative action policies focused on integrating those 
previously marginalised from the labour market. It might also involve investing in the 
skills development of the same marginalised groups or empowering women through 
the provision of economic opportunities. Even more progressively, it may include 
efforts focused on actively attempting to place sections of a disadvantaged group in 
positions of ownership or management as part of broader attempt to redistribute 
wealth. Through core business activities, socially responsible investment, 
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collaborations, and policy dialogue, businesses have the potential to act as agents 
of peacebuilding in a range of ways. I will develop these categories further in 
chapter 2. In essence, the business as agents of peacebuilding perspective pushes 
beyond arguments revolving around the consequences of business activity to ask 
how the same actors might play more targeted and proactive roles.  
I seek to push this discussion even further. I am particularly interested in 
understanding how different actors have been able to engage businesses to play 
these more proactive peacebuilding roles. To make sense of the importance 
attached to the influence of other actors, it is necessary to engage with some of 
arguments offered for why businesses ought to assume more proactive roles and to 
explain their limitations.   
1.3. Why would businesses contribute to peacebuilding? 
When taking seriously the view that business might play positive roles in 
peacebuilding processes, we must ask why it is that businesses would do so. 
Existing literature offers various reasons. These can be categorised loosely as those 
grounded in the economic costs/benefits associated with conflict/peace, and the 
social and moral responsibilities of businesses to do more in societies in which they 
operate or invest.  
By way of signposting the argument that follows, what I suggest is not necessarily 
that the arguments advanced below cannot and do not influence businesses 
decisions as to whether or not to contribute to peacebuilding. Instead, I contend that 
these arguments often fail to ensure that businesses will do so in any reliable or 
predictable way- a claim that I substantiate below. We might improve this situation, I 
will argue, by focusing on the ways that different actors can influence business 
decisions by requiring, incentivising or persuading businesses to play decisive roles 
in peacebuilding processes. For now, I briefly examine these arguments before 
explaining how a broad understanding of regulation might offer a useful way of 





1.3.1. Conflict is bad for business 
The primary justification that many employ regarding why businesses should 
contribute to peacebuilding is that conflict is bad for business.63 What some label the 
‘reciprocal relationship between business and peace’ suggests that because conflict 
can prevent businesses from making a profit, businesses have an enlightened 
economic self-interest to help bring about peace.64 Timothy Fort stresses, for 
instance, that ‘sustainable peace may be the most powerful existential goal one can 
imagine. Not only is it beneficial for most companies, but it is powerful enough, if the 
relationship between business and peace can be understood, to change the way 
companies behave […].’65 For Oetzel et al., because businesses rely on sound and 
efficient background institutions such as markets for goods and services, stable 
regulatory systems, and effective courts that enforce property rights,’ and because 
conflict erodes these institutions, it is in the interests of businesses to help end and 
prevent conflict.66  
To this end, others cite additional costs associated with violence. These include high 
insurance premiums, loss of insurance coverage, emergency training programmes, 
and threats to employees.67 Scholars have also suggested that in such places as 
Colombia,68 Sri Lanka,69 and Nepal,70 insurgents targeted businesses for their 
perceived connections to particular political regimes. In much the same way, 
directing attention to Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), Kolk and Lenfant argue that 
‘the direct impact of conflict on MNEs includes threats to personnel, installations, 
and supply lines.’71 They continue that ‘MNEs are potential victims of plundering, 
asset damage, or extortion, which sometimes leads to the suspension of 
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operations.’72 On this basis, Kolk and Lenfant assert that it is in the economic self-
interest of MNEs to contribute to the realisation of peace. 
In other cases, and mirroring in many ways the positions described above, some 
claim that there are economic opportunities in peace. This is often what is termed 
the ‘peace dividend’ argument.73 These arguments suggest that peace creates 
economic opportunities. For instance, a peace dividend might include renewed 
investment opportunities in places, which have suffered capital flight because of 
conflict. Peace might also allow businesses to access global markets previously 
denied to them because of sanctions levelled against conflict-affected states.74 
Thus, Forrer and Seyle contend that the economic arguments for stability are 
clear: ‘If a business can effectively invest in the prevention of mass atrocity crimes, it 
can appropriate the commercial advantages of political stability.’75  
In advancing the view that there are economic benefits associated with contributing 
to peace, these arguments align, in some ways, with those who contend that there 
are economic opportunities to be gained through contributing to social progress 
more generally. For example, ‘base of the pyramid’ theories suggest how 
multinational firms might adapt to global drivers for change, such as population 
growth and poverty, to capitalize on the ‘fortune at the bottom of the pyramid.’76 
Similarly, Rosabeth Moss Kanter articulated the notion of ‘social innovation’ as a 
process where companies take ‘community needs as opportunities to develop ideas 
and demonstrate business technologies, to find and serve new markets, and to 
solve long-standing business problems.’77 Stuart L. Hart presented new strategies 
for identifying sustainable products, technologies, and business models that could 
drive urgently needed growth and help solve social and environmental problems at 
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the same time.78 More recently, the concept of Creating Shared Value (CSV) 
developed by Porter and Kramer contends that CSR creates values for both 
business and society.79  
Thus, similar to theories that speculate that businesses can do well economically by 
doing good socially, and while differing in the precise contexts and suggested 
interventions, arguments grounded in the ‘reciprocal relationship of business and 
peace’ or the ‘peace dividend’ perspective reflect the perception that contributing to 
peacebuilding brings financial rewards.  
1.3.2. Businesses owe responsibilities to post-conflict societies 
Some also argue that businesses are now not only economic entities but also social 
enterprises, with responsibilities to wider society. These views depart drastically 
from Milton Friedman’s shareholder primacy model. Stakeholder theories of the firm 
call for a revitalisation of the concept of the shareholder primacy model by replacing 
the notion that managers have a duty to stockholders with the concept that 
managers bear a fiduciary relationship to stakeholders.80 Proponents of stakeholder 
theories argue that different stakeholder groups have a right not to be treated as a 
means to some end, and therefore must participate in determining the future 
direction of the firm in which they have a stake. 
More progressive views and understandings like these create, in turn, expectations 
that businesses should do more for society; expectations which if unmet can lead to 
adverse impacts on the bottom line of businesses.81 As Karen Ballentine states: 
For progressive firms operating internationally and concerned with their 
reputational capital, obtaining a ‘social licence to operate’ among local and 
national stakeholders in host countries is now seen as an essential 
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component of sound business planning. Fiscal transparency, positive 
community relations, environmental protection, and sponsorship of health 
and education initiatives have already become standard elements of today’s 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) agenda.82 
As the latter part of Ballentine’s statement suggests, stakeholder theories of the firm 
submit that business contributions to society should extend beyond limiting the 
harms that they cause to include proactively contributing to the welfare of society, 
including peacebuilding processes. Failing to do so, so the argument proceeds, can 
adversely affect a company’s bottom line.  
Angelika Rettberg summarises these social and economic arguments in the 
following way.83 First, she notes that business needs peace to solve specific 
problems related to their operations in unstable contexts (need). Second, she 
suggests that some business leaders believe that social change is positive and in 
their self-interest and are willing to promote transformations (creed). Finally, 
business participation in peacebuilding, according to Rettberg, may be motivated by 
the anticipation of renewed investment, profit, and growth (greed).84  
1.3.3. Businesses have moral responsibilities to contribute to 
peacebuilding 
In proposing that businesses should assume peacebuilding responsibilities, some 
also argue that those that own and control businesses have a moral obligation to do 
more than refraining from doing no harm. These arguments often seek to challenge 
the legal separation of a company and its shareholders by drawing on the moral 
responsibilities of those behind the ‘corporate veil.’ As Fort outlines: 
I propose the telos of sustainable peace as an aim to which businesses 
should orient their actions both for reasons of the good of avoiding the 
activities that contribute to or make more likely the spilling of blood as well as 
for the good of sustainable economic enterprises, which are fostered by 
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stable, peaceful relationships. Sustainable peace, of course, sounds like 
Mom and apple pie. Yet, I will suggest that a commitment, indeed a militant 
commitment, to peace is one that clarifies ethical obligations in the business 
environment and makes legitimate economic endeavours subject to a 
countervailing moral goal.85 
In some senses, arguments grounded in the moral responsibilities of executives to 
contribute to peacebuilding align with other trains of thought regarding the moral 
obligations of businesses to contribute to development, justice, and the realisation of 
human rights. These arguments often draw on the capabilities of businesses to do 
more for society. Onora O’Neill, for instance, has argued that while states should 
assume the responsibilities of helping to deliver social goods, in cases where they 
are unable to do so, such as in weak or failed states, corporations as ‘secondary 
agents of justice’ should assume these roles.86 Ivar Kolstad departs from a similar 
fragile and context-related basis. He offers the view that when approached from the 
perspective of realising human rights ‘[a]t some point, after the default of a 
succession of duty-bearers, corporations may be next in line, and should hence 
address the task of protecting, promoting or fulfilling human rights.’87 Kolstad 
advances this position on the basis that companies often have significant resources 
with which to help promote the realisation of rights. He argues, essentially, that can 
implies ought. Similarly, Marion Iris Young argued that ‘all agents who contribute by 
their actions to the structural processes that produce injustice have responsibilities 
to work to remedy these injustices’ subject to the ‘power’ that such entities have to 
contribute to addressing structural injustices.88  
The positions of these scholars, while differing in certain respects, depart from a 
similar basis. They suggest that because states often cannot assume their 
responsibilities and because businesses can do more- so then they should.89 The 
tenor among these and other accounts is that remedial responsibility grows 
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proportionally to an agent’s capabilities,90 capacities,91 and leverage.92 From the 
perspective of business contributions to peacebuilding, some have suggested that 
businesses are morally obliged to play more proactive roles, mainly when states are 
unable or unwilling to do so. 
Thus, different arguments support the view that businesses can and should 
contribute to peacebuilding. For some, businesses should contribute to peace 
because it is in their economic self-interest to do so. There are those that also 
suggest that businesses have moral responsibilities to do more. For others, as 
social entities, companies should do more in and for the societies in which they 
operate.  
1.4. Existing Limitations of why-based arguments and persuasions 
There are, nonetheless, shortcomings in current articulations as to why businesses 
should and would contribute to peacebuilding. These include the fact that (1) not all 
businesses will be persuaded in the same way; (2) not all businesses benefit from 
peace; (3) not all businesses wish to be peacebuilders; and (4) relatively few 
businesses have assumed peacebuilding responsibilities. I develop these in turn 
below. 
1.4.1. Not all ‘businesses’ are persuaded by the same arguments 
The ways in which businesses perceive the above arguments will often differ, with 
the strength of these arguments likely to vary according to the types of intervention 
that businesses are being asked to make. For instance, scholars like Ernstorfer et 
al.,93 Nelson,94 Jamali and Mirshak,95 Van Dorp,96 and Iff et al.,97 have 
compartmentalised types of business interventions in peacebuilding processes 
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along a continuum. These include: (1) company risk management in conflict-affected 
areas; (2) do no harm; and (3) peacebuilding. 
This continuum reflects the fact, as outlined above, that ‘contributions to peace’ are 
diverse, spanning from doing no harm, at one end, to direct and deliberate efforts to 
contribute to peacebuilding, at the other. However, arguments focused on why 
businesses would contribute to peacebuilding often fail to acknowledge these 
different levels. For example, many use the same economic rationale to persuade 
companies to do no harm as they do to convince businesses to act as agents of 
peacebuilding. The same moral justifications for asking businesses to curtail 
adverse impacts are also employed to engage businesses to act as facilitators of 
peace negotiations. In other words, despite considerable efforts to differentiate types 
of intervention, discussions on why businesses would do so are often conflated. This 
conflation undermines the reliability of these arguments by failing to address the 
significant differences between doing no harm and actively engaging in 
peacebuilding processes. 
Secondly, there is a tendency to conflate businesses under the one bracket without 
differentiating firms according to size and type. Consider this statement by Berman:   
Understanding how corporations think about war is the sine qua non for 
engaging corporations in nurturing peace. Diplomats seeking to negotiate 
solutions to conflict have potential allies in the corporate sector, but they will 
realize that potential only if they understand the motivations that underlie it. 
NGOs desiring to influence corporate behavior in areas of conflict must 
understand the concerns that motivate that behavior. Governments seeking 
foreign investment to rebuild war-torn countries need to understand how 
corporations will assess the risk from tensions that persist both during 
conflict and even after a truce is signed. By understanding how corporate 
managers think about war, constituencies to peacebuilding will go further 
toward engaging the corporate sector in achieving their goals.98 
While seemingly progressive in contending that we must better understand the 
mindsets of corporate executives, Berman implicitly suggests an overarching 
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mindset that exists. In reality, businesses are far from monolithic and the priorities 
and objectives of those running businesses are often highly diverse. For instance, 
businesses differ in terms of their size and capabilities, with local businesses,99 
small-to-medium sized entities,100 and multinational conglomerates all possessing 
different levels of resources and capacities.101 These differences affect the ways that 
companies might contribute to peacebuilding. Evers et al note, for example, that ‘this 
diversity is noteworthy since it causes variation with regard to how, and with what 
effect, the private sector impacts peacebuilding. Large and resourceful multinational 
companies can be expected to play a different role in a peacebuilding process than 
smaller local companies.’102 
The existence of different types of businesses means that companies are likely to be 
persuaded differently and to respond to these arguments in different ways. In spite 
of this, however, we are nevertheless to assume that the business case or 
perceived levels of moral and social responsibility apply equally to all businesses, all 
of the time. The fact is that the normative strength of these arguments is subject to 
numerous variables, the consequence being that whether and to what extent a 
business might engage proactively in peacebuilding processes is at best uncertain. 
1.4.2. Not all businesses benefit from peace 
Some shortcomings are more specific. One is the assumption that peace is indeed 
good, or that businesses perceive that peace is good for business. Scholars such as 
Joras have argued, however, that conflict often affects different businesses 
differently and that these variations will impact on the extent to which economic 
arguments can convince businesses to contribute to peacebuilding.103 Accordingly, 
Joras assesses that ‘[i]n reverse to the argument that high economic costs may 
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mobilize corporate activities in support for peace, low economic costs may 
negatively influence private companies’ propensity to engage in peacebuilding.’104 In 
other words, not all businesses are persuaded by the argument that conflict is bad 
for business because conflict does not affect all businesses in the same way. 
Secondly, it is often difficult for businesses to assess the costs of conflict. As 
Rettberg notes:  
If we could only document how much the private sector loses from armed 
conflict and could gain from peace, [..]  self-interested organizations would 
prefer investing time and money in peace-building instead of enduring 
ongoing physical devastation affecting trade and exchange of goods and 
services, extortion and attacks by illegal armed actors (including recurrent 
kidnapping of business executives), lack of investment, and uncertain 
markets, which are the most common costs associated with conflict.105 
Moreover, businesses affected by conflict might interpret that the costs required to 
contribute to peace are less than those incurred by the continuation of violence. As 
an illustration, Hayward and Magennis, citing Mees,106 assess that in ‘the Basque 
Country, [while] the business community was keen to see an end to violence, [… it] 
did not go so far as to exert political pressure on policymakers to maintain 
momentum in the peace process.’107 The reason being, according to the authors, 
that a cost-benefit analysis undertaken by businesses suggested that the impact of 
conflict on the private sector fell somewhat short of accelerating the embryonic 
transformation of conflict.108 Sweetman reasons, therefore, that intervention is 
‘necessarily dependent on their assessment of the pragmatic and short-term gains 
for the actors involved.’109 He further claims that the success of private sector input 
depends on a rational assessment of the benefit to accrue to them from engaging in 
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peacebuilding efforts.110 Simply stated, whether or not conflict is bad for businesses 
is often dependent on the ways that different types of business experience it. It also 
depends on how businesses interpret the economic costs associated with conflict 
compared to the costs that might be incurred by contributing to peacebuilding. While 
not contesting the fact that some businesses might consider it to be in their 
economic interests to contribute to peacebuilding, the point is that it is often 
uncertain whether or not they will. 
Thirdly, and as is well documented, it is true that some businesses do well 
financially through conflict.111 Whether in those instances where businesses align 
with repressive elites and benefit from systems of patronage and corruption, or in 
the case of private security firms whose markets depends on the continuation of 
violence, peace is often bad for businesses. Cohen and Ben-Porat note, for 
example, that some businesspeople, especially in less developed states, might 
perceive peace not as a potential benefit but rather as an economic threat that 
endangers their secured position by, for one, exposing them to international 
competition.112 In other words, although there is a tendency to advance 
unequivocally the benefits of peace to business, the realities are often somewhat 
different on the ground. Thus, when in 2014 Julia Roig wrote a weblog entitled 
‘Business for Peace — We Know Why, But How?’113, the why was both implied and 
expressed, a position adopted throughout much of the business and peace 
literature, but one which is rarely substantiated in ways more specific than sweeping 
or anecdotal claims. 
1.4.3. Not all businesses wish to be peacebuilders  
Another set of limitations builds on the fact that business is far from a homogenous 
group. Many businesses are often ambiguous as to what their role in peacebuilding 
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processes could be.114 They may, as Miller notes, lack the understanding of, and 
interest in, sensitive political processes.115 As Cechvala develops: 
Few, if any, companies see themselves as peace actors. When asked about 
peace, they often take the view that peace belongs to the “political” sphere 
and is therefore outside the remit of corporate activities. Time and time 
again, we hear companies assert that when it comes to politics, “we are 
neutral” or “we want to remain below the radar [in politics].” 116  
Moreover, businesses tend to focus on ensuring that they do not cause harm or 
adversely affect conflict dynamics.117 Accordingly, Miller notes that a ‘significant part 
of their time and energy is consumed by their efforts to avoid being drawn into 
conflicts between communities, between themselves and communities, and between 
communities and state actors of various sorts.’118 Similarly, businesses tend to avoid 
becoming involved in highly complex political processes at all costs, not least 
because doing so can be detrimental to their interests in the end.  
1.4.4. Relatively few businesses have been persuaded to act as 
peacebuilders 
Finally, the above arguments regarding why businesses should contribute to peace 
are all, in varying ways, challenged somewhat by the fact that relatively few 
businesses have actually done so. In fact, some claim the great majority of 
businesses have lowered their investment in comparable capacity with respect to 
conflict analysis and practical experience on conflict mitigation and prevention.119 To 
date, most corporations outsource these services to specialized risk analysis and 
mediation outfits when necessary, yet corporate capacities and consequently the 
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sustainability of adopted politics remain limited even in major multinational 
corporations.  
There are, therefore, a number of suggested reasons for why businesses ought to 
contribute to peacebuilding processes. Businesses might interpret that conflict is 
bad for business or that peace is profitable. Businesses might also act out of a 
social or moral sense of responsibility to use their resources to help facilitate 
transitions from conflict to peace. At the same time, factors undermine the strength 
of these arguments. Different businesses are motivated in dissimilar ways and types 
of contributions will require different levels of persuasion. Businesses might not 
perceive peacebuilding to be worth the investment and, in any event, might be 
uncertain as to how to intervene in ‘political matters’.  
We can summarise the difficulties with a statement that reflects the current 
uncertainty of the business and peacebuilding ideal: we simply do not know when 
and if businesses will contribute to peacebuilding processes. So how might we 
attempt to respond to this uncertainty?  
1.5. The Possibilities of Regulation 
This thesis attempts to respond to the aforementioned uncertainties by exploring 
how different actors might require, induce or persuade businesses to contribute to 
peacebuilding efforts. The intention is to move the discussion beyond the decisions 
of individual businesses to understand how different actors might influence these 
choices. I examine how different forms of regulation, emerging because of the 
gradual pluralisation of regulation, might be used to engage businesses to contribute 
to peacebuilding efforts. This approach argues that regulation includes not only 
traditional modes of regulation such as legislation and judicial enforcement, but also 
less binding or formal methods of influencing business behaviour.  
How one receives or interprets this argument, however, is highly influenced by the 
way in which one interprets the concept of regulation more generally. The 
discussion below focuses on some different understandings of regulation to 
substantiate the view that regulation has pluralised and to provide the basis for 
advancing the argument that there are opportunities for thinking about the different 




1.5.1. Orthodox Regulation 
Departing from a position, which suggests that businesses might be regulated to 
contribute to peacebuilding, could be rejected outrightly as spurious. Such a 
response is likely to arise when one understands regulation in a particular, 
formalistic way. The OECD, for example, defines regulation as:  
[T]he full range of legal instruments by which governing institutions, at all 
levels of government, impose obligations or constraints on private sector 
behaviour. Constitutions, parliamentary laws, subordinate legislation, 
decrees, orders, norms, licences, plans, codes and even some forms of 
administrative guidance can all be considered as 'regulation'.120 
This definition of regulation encapsulates the components of what many term 
orthodox regulation or old governance. Regulation, according to this understanding, 
has three primary components: (1) states regulate businesses (2) through the use of 
legal instruments (3) to prevent businesses from causing harm and in some cases 
holding them accountable for practices, which contravene state-based commands.  
The first component is straightforward. For many, regulation is thought of as a ‘bi-
partite process involving government and business, with the former acting in the role 
of regulator and the latter as regulatee.’121 The State, government, or some 
governing institutions regulate the activities of business. 
Secondly, orthodox regulation is synonymous with command and control-based 
regulation. Command and control regulation is the direct regulation of an industry or 
activity by legislation that specifies what is permitted and what is illegal.122 The 
‘command’ is the standards by a government authority that must be complied with; 
‘control’ signifies negative sanctions that may result from non-compliance.123 For 
den Hertog, for instance, regulation refers to the ‘the employment of legal 
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instruments for the implementation of social-economic policy objectives.’124 He 
continues that a characteristic of legal instruments is that individuals or 
organizations can be compelled by government to comply with prescribed behaviour 
under penalty of sanctions.’125 
Thirdly, states, as regulators, focus primarily on curtailing the adverse impacts of 
business or holding businesses accountable when adverse impacts arise. Some 
make a distinction between economic and social regulation.  Economic regulation 
consists of two types of regulations: structural regulation and conduct regulation.126 
Structural regulation regulates market structure. Examples are restrictions on entry 
and exit and rules against individuals supplying professional services in the absence 
of recognised qualifications.127 Conduct regulation focuses on behavior in the 
market. Examples are price control, rules against advertising and minimum quality 
standards. Social regulation, by contrast, comprises regulation in the area of the 
environment, labor conditions (occupational health and safety), consumer protection 
and labor (equal opportunities etc).128 Instruments applied here include regulation 
dealing with the discharge of environmentally harmful substances, safety regulations 
in factories and workplaces, and banning discrimination on race, skin color, religion, 
sex, or nationality in the recruitment of personnel.129  
Different theories underpin orthodox regulation. One example is that of ‘public 
interest theory.’130 In western economies, the allocation of scarce resources is to a 
significant extent coordinated by the market mechanism. In theory, under certain 
circumstances, the allocation of resources by means of the market mechanism is 
optimal.131 Because these conditions are frequently not adhered to in practice, the 
allocation of resources is not optimal and a demand for methods for improving the 
allocation arises.132 In these circumstances, governments must intervene, in the 
public interest, to address market failures. In other words, the government must 
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regulate market activities and actors to ensure that the public interest is not 
undermined by a system of market exchanges. 
For example, public interest theory identifies a role for states in addressing negative 
externalities. A negative externality is a cost suffered by a third-party because of an 
economic transaction. As an example, pollution is termed an externality because it 
imposes costs on people who are ‘external’ to the producer and consumer of the 
polluting product. Governments can intervene to reduce negative externalities in the 
form of legislation mandating that companies reduce, for instance, their carbon 
emissions.  
Public interest theory also helps to summarise the essence of orthodox regulation.133 
Government regulation is the instrument for overcoming the disadvantages of 
imperfect competition, unbalanced market operation, missing markets and 
undesirable market results. This view of regulation holds that government regulators 
will implement rules, which improve the welfare of consumers and society.134 
Orthodox regulation, therefore, comprises a number of elements. It includes a 
government defining legal rules and norms, executing these norms and, if a breach 
occurs, sanctioning businesses for doing so.   
1.5.2. Regulatory Pluralism 
A common dictionary definition of regulation is ‘a rule or directive made and 
maintained by an authority.’135 As recognised by Julia Black, however, ‘Any walk 
through the regulatory literature soon throws up meanings other than the dictionary 
definition.’136 Similarly, Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge, in the introduction to the Oxford 
Handbook of Regulation, assess that ‘[t]he very concept of regulation has evolved 
so that study in this area is no longer confined to the examination of dedicated 
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‘command’ regimes that are designed to offer continuing and direct control over an 
area of economic life.’137  
The idea that regulation has pluralised exists as a direct challenge to the notion that 
there is only one type of regulation- orthodox regulation. MacRaea and Winfield 
describe regulatory pluralism, for example, as: 
A governance regime that embraces a wide range of coordinated and 
integrated instruments (including some traditional command and control 
regulations), well matched to the desired effect and implemented by an 
equally wide range of state and non-state actors.138 
Coglianese refers to regulatory pluralism as: 
A rulemaking process that involves a subset of the broad public with a high 
level of interest in and knowledge about a particular rulemaking. In this 
sense, pluralism seeks more participation by members of the public than 
does insulated or secretive decision-making by a few unelected regulatory 
officials.139 
In most cases, however, rather than defining ‘regulatory pluralism’, scholars opt to 
demonstrate the limitations of a narrow understanding of regulation through 
processes of observation, identifying alternative forms of regulation that exist in 
practice. For instance, proponents of regulatory pluralism do not depart from a 
preordained idea of what regulation is: they do not suggest that regulation is x, 
carried out by (only) y, in order to achieve z. They suggest instead that the 
pluralisation of regulation arises from the different ways that scholars suggest 
regulation occurs. 
Take, as a brief example, the work of Ayres and Braithwaite.140 The significant 
contribution that these authors made to discussions on regulation was to advance 
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the theory of responsive regulation. Despite the state-centric nature of their model, 
they observed a wider number of actors involved in influencing the social control of 
organisations.141 Amongst other things, the theory of responsive regulation suggests 
that states frequently draw on other methods of regulation in order to address 
limitations and difficulties associated with command and control-based approaches. 
This leads to the regulation of self-regulation, itself a reflection of at least two 
understandings of the concept.  
Finding examples of different manifestations of regulation is not difficult. For 
instance, expanding notions of business regulation beyond company self-regulation, 
Scherer and Palazzo speak of ‘a new paradigm, one in which the firm is drawn into 
greater political roles, performing tasks that we traditionally associate with the state. 
These include elements of regulatory functions and the production of public 
goods.’142 Tim Bartley notes that: 
Standard setting and regulation are increasingly being accomplished through 
private means. This includes not only traditional programs of industry self-
regulation but also systems of transnational private regulation, in which 
coalitions of non-state actors codify, monitor, and in cases certify 
compliances with labor, environmental, human rights, or other standards of 
accountability.143 
In ways similar, theories on the hybridisation or privatisation of law,144 
metaregulation,145 innovative uses of public law to provide for private sector 
accountability,146 new governance,147 multi-polar governance,148 and global 
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administrative law,149 all demonstrate variations of regulation. These examples all 
emerge from processes of observation, identifying different types of regulation and 
constructing theories to help explain them.  
Following on, alongside processes of observation, scholars of regulatory pluralism 
also seek to understand why it is that these alternative approaches emerge. For 
instance, the dictionary definition cited above, in line with orthodox views on 
regulation, presumes an overarching or singular ‘authority’ that exists- a state that 
can issue commands and enforce them. Yet, in such places as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), as an example, authors like Lake have noted that ‘in 
some ways, the state's presence has entirely disappeared from Eastern DR Congo. 
No single power controls the entire Congolese territory, leading many scholars to 
conclude that DR Congo represents the archetypal “collapsed state”.150  
This does not mean, however, that such contexts are devoid of regulation. As 
discussions on multiple sites of public authority;151 hybrid forms governance;152 and 
literature on political corporate social responsibility highlight, different forms of 
authority and sources of regulation exist beyond the state.153 These theories all 
reflect the fact that there are multiple sources of authority in any given polity, 
operating at national, regional, international, global and even non-state levels, which 
exist precisely because of the failure of a centralised authority to regulate effectively.  
In other words, while proponents of orthodox regulation identify the importance of a 
single state authority (or some other branch of government), for regulatory pluralists, 
the point of departure for explaining alternative forms of regulation is often that no 
central and omnipresent authority is identifiable. Referring to Phillip Selznick's 
seminal definition of regulation as ‘the sustained and focused control exercised by a 
public authority over activities valued by the community’154, Baldwin, Cave, and 
Lodge argue, therefore, that:  
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The distribution of ‘public authority’ over levels of government and between 
private and state sectors varies and is highly contested, … ideas about how 
to exercise ‘control’ are controversially considered, and what is constituted 
by ‘community’ is similarly problematic in the light of transnational and 
supranational sources of regulation or indeed cross‐border policy issues.155  
Similarly, for Gunningham and Sinclair, it is precisely because of the limitations of 
orthodox regulation that ‘we should focus our attention on understanding such 
broader regulatory influences and interactions, including: international standards 
organisations; trading partners and the supply chain […].’156 As Chapter 3 will 
develop, in post-conflict settings, for a range of reasons, identifying forms of 
regulation that exist beyond the state is critically important, not least because 
defining who or what the state is can be an arduous task.  
Thus, in terms of how the regulatory pluralist addresses the concept of regulation, 
we might distinguish their approach from orthodox approaches in two ways. On one 
hand, proponents of regulatory pluralism do not depart from a pre-existing definition 
of regulation but rather develop understandings empirically, based on the 
observation of the different ways that regulation occurs in reality. Secondly, 
proponents of regulatory pluralism offer narratives and explanations for why these 
different approaches emerge. These explanations are often rooted in discussions 
around the realities of a post-national constellation, coupled with the emergence of 
globally operating companies, where states simply lack the ability to regulate 
through state-based command and control.  
As the discussion below elaborates, from these processes of observation and 
explanation, regulatory pluralists have helped to demonstrate that, alongside states, 
different actors, using different methods, can shape business conduct in various 
ways.  
1.5.2.1. The Pluralisation of Actors 
Whereas orthodox approaches to regulation hold the state as the sole regulator of 
business activity, the study of regulatory pluralism identifies the possibilities that 
different actors can assume regulatory roles and perform regulatory functions. In line 
with the narrative component of regulatory pluralism touched upon above, for the 
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proponent of regulatory pluralism, the reality of globalisation has caused a major 
shift in how we view regulation along Westphalian lines. For instance, Halliday and 
Schaffer assess that ‘[m]odern processes of economic globalisation have blurred the 
basic coordinates of the Westphalian nation-state juridical system.’157 Where once 
states assumed a monopoly on regulatory authority, the realities of globalisation 
have challenged the ability and willingness of states to exercise that authority. 
Kobrin thus emphasizes a loss of the regulatory power of state institutions due to 
‘the fragmentation of authority [and] the increasing ambiguity of borders and 
jurisdictions.158  
In this space, scholars suggest that other actors emerge to fill regulatory gaps. As 
Scherer and Palazzo note: 
The decline in governance capability of nation states is partly compensated 
by the emergence of new forms of global governance above and beyond the 
state. International organizations, civil society groups, and private 
businesses in cooperation with state agencies, or without their support, have 
started to voluntarily contribute expertise and resources to fill gaps in global 
regulation and to resolve global public goods problems.159 
Justine Nolan, in a 2014 paper on private modes of regulation, referred to this 
pluralisation as ‘re-regulation’, stating that ‘[a]ll around the global marketplace, non-
state actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), unions, companies, 
multi-stakeholder groups and industry bodies, have stepped in to fill this gap.’160 
Black explains the phenomenon as ‘decentred regulation’, where ‘regulation 
involves a shift (and recognition of such a shift) in the locus of the activity of 
'regulating' from the state to other, multiple, locations, and the adoption on the part 
of the state of particular strategies of regulation.’161 
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Scholars of regulatory pluralism do not contest orthodox understandings of 
regulation on their own terms. Rather, they suggest that other actors can also 
perform regulatory functions, often explaining the plurality of regulatory actors 
against the broader contextual shifts and limitations of relying only on the state to 
regulate. That regulation both includes and extends beyond the state is captured 
succinctly by van Rooij et al.162 They note:  
To start, this landscape is inhabited by the bureaucrats and legislators 
traditionally associated with the regulatory tasks of gathering information, 
setting standards, and changing behaviour. At the same time, the landscape 
also contains actors whose core roles, goals, and identities were not 
originally regulatory, and who have undergone a transformation. One can 
think, for instance, of citizens or citizen groups, banks, courts, industry 
associations, and civic organizations that now play a regulatory role.163 
Slowly but surely, therefore, scholars identify a paradigm shift where, in the context 
of regulating businesses, the state is being viewed as (possibly) part of the solution, 
but not the solution.164 As chapter 3 will develop, from host states to home states, 
civil society to business, multi-stakeholder initiatives to multilateral institutions, there 
is a range of different actors that seek to shape business conduct in post-conflict 
settings and which many consider to be performing regulatory functions. 
1.5.2.2. Pluralisation of Methods 
The literature on regulatory pluralism also identifies numerous methods of 
regulation. At the state level, for instance, scholars illustrate that regulation can take 
various forms. As an example, Knudsen et al suggest that governments adopt four 
different forms of regulation to promote CSR issues: endorsement, facilitation, 
partnership and mandate.165  
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Other scholars reflect the fact that those regulating businesses are not only states, 
with softer methods emerging as possible regulatory tools to accommodate non-
state actors. Justine Nolan suggests that in contrast to old governance or orthodox 
regulation, the concept of regulation now ‘incorporates formal and informal, legal 
and non-legal mechanisms or techniques [that are] designed to influence or at times 
coerce corporations […] to act […].’166 Julia Black concurs that definitions of 
regulation can range from ‘a type of legal instrument, to any area of law that aims at 
social control, to any intentional process of controlling behavior with reference to 
some standard or purpose, to an outcome of an interaction of forces and actors, and 
even a property of selfcorrection.’167  
For Jolyon Ford, therefore, no common definition of regulation currently exists. 
Regulatory pluralism is instead a ‘social fact… where [alongside states] multiple 
decentred actors modify and mediate regulatory attempts, shaping the agenda and 
affecting intended outcomes.’168 This leads Christine Parker to suggest that 
scholarly understandings of how to define ‘regulation’ are themselves highly 
pluralist:169 
For most, regulation is something done by government actors, e.g. through 
ministries or agencies, but some have also included courts. For many others 
it is something also done by non-government actors (organizations, 
associations, firms, individuals, other specialist bodies, e.g. auditors, 
technical committees). For some regulation can (additionally) be performed 
by economic forces (principally the interactions of buyers and sellers in a 
market, though it can also include macro-economic factors such as inflation, 
foreign exchange rates, money supply, etc.). For yet others, 'regulation' is 
the action of, or outcome of, social forces, this time the usual suspects of 
sociology: norms, institutions, culture, etc.170 
As Chapter 3 will develop, in contrast to the notion that regulation occurs solely 
through commands and sanctions of a state, some suggest that regulation can 
emerge in various guises, such as standard setting, guidelines, public and private 
procurement, multi-stakeholder certification schemes, best-practice sharing, human 
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rights governance, and variations of soft accountability, such as consumer boycotts. 
As the analysis of these initiatives will further suggest, there are great 
disagreements over the efficacy of different initiatives, with some suggesting that 
binding approaches to law are, and should be regarded, as the most efficient way to 
regulate. Challenging the merits and demerits of different approaches to regulation, 
however, should not be confused with discussions over what does or does not 
amount to regulation.  
Thus, discussions on regulatory pluralism help to identify the fact that different 
actors, beyond the state, can shape business conduct in various ways. As I 
elaborate on below, what I seek to explore is whether opportunities exist for using 
these different approaches for the purposes of engaging businesses in 
peacebuilding processes.  
1.5.2.3.  Recognising the Limitations of Regulatory Pluralism 
A final issue to address is confronting (and I suggest accepting) the limitations of 
regulatory pluralism. As noted, orthodox approaches to regulation focus on the role 
of the state, regulating businesses, through formal legal instruments. For all its 
limitations, this approach to regulation is at least definable, providing a degree of 
predictability and certainty, necessary principles for any country underpinned by a 
commitment to the rule of law.  
Understood against these criteria, initiatives that fall within the expanded 
understanding of regulation might be perceived as lacking and incomplete. For 
instance, some suggest that guidelines that help inform businesses as to how to 
approach a particular issue, say, their environmental impact, are a form of 
regulation.171 While we might regard such guidelines as useful in setting out 
processes for businesses to follow, can we really define them as a form of regulation 
in the absence of enforcement mechanisms and oversight? Similarly, civil society 
actors might monitor the activities of business, but there is an abundance of 
normative standards from which they can draw to assess business conduct, and 
thus an ambivalent set of criteria against which to ‘regulate’ the activities of 
business.172 Does this render these forms of influence important, but not quite 
regulation? In other words, while these different initiatives might have certain, 
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regulatory components, does the lack of holistic regulatory characteristics render 
them something else? As Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge note: 
Defining what regulation is and, arguably more importantly, what regulation 
is not, has remained at the centre of considerable debate. A field of study 
that does not know its boundaries could be accused of youthful empire‐
building or unimaginative scholarship: if regulation is everything, then it is 
nothing.173 
Approaching discussions on regulatory pluralism from the perspective of whether 
they meet the criteria of orthodox regulation, however, overlooks the broader context 
and the explanatory component of regulatory pluralism as a field of study. As 
suggested, proponents of regulatory pluralism do not simply seek to identify 
alternative approaches to regulation. They also seek to understand why they exist. A 
central existential claim made by those who embrace regulatory pluralism is that 
regulatory alternatives emerge to fill regulatory gaps. In post-conflict contexts, the 
existence of alternative initiatives is often a response to the realities that post-
conflict governments are unable or unwilling to regulate businesses.174  
We cannot and should not regard fragmented and often partial initiatives as 
optimum regulatory approaches. Yet, few make such claims. Indeed, to do so would 
undermine the narratives that accompany discussions on alternative regulatory 
initiatives- narratives that explain why these alternatives exist- as measures to 
respond to the failures of orthodox regulation. Assessing whether these various 
initiatives are in fact regulation according to the standards of orthodox regulation 
and rejecting any approach that does not meet this criterion, misses the point of 
their existence. Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, orthodox regulation, in many 
cases, would also not be regulation because it cannot meet its own standards. 
Varieties of regulation discussed in chapter three are initiatives that seek to fill, in 
some way, regulatory gaps, and we should assess them on these terms. Thus, 
when we refer to the pluralisation of regulation, we are talking about different types 
of influence, exerted over businesses, to help shape business conduct. They exist 
on a spectrum, from binding orthodox approaches, to softer, less coercive forms that 
often emerge to plug the gaps left when orthodox approaches fail. 
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1.5.3. Possibilities for regulating business to contribute to 
peacebuilding? 
What then is the relevance of discussions on the pluralisation of regulation to this 
thesis? As Chapter 3 will show, despite a number of different types of what many 
consider to be variations of regulation and regulatory efforts, these initiatives are 
often assessed against what Surya Deva terms the ‘twin test of efficiency’ for any 
form of regulation: whether can prevent harms from occurring and provide a remedy 
when they do.175 The literature on different approaches to regulation in post-conflict 
settings is no different.  
For example, Andrea Iff and Andreas Graff have mapped existing conflict-sensitive 
guidelines used in conflict-affected settings.176 They understand guidelines to be a 
form of regulation that guide businesses as to how to act in conflict-sensitive ways. 
Categorised according to standards developed business organisations, international 
actors, civil society and multilateral institutions, this mapping focuses on standards 
and guidelines that attempt limit the adverse harms caused by business prior to, 
during and in the aftermath of conflict. A similar contribution is that of Mark Van 
Dorp’s work on MNCs in conflict-affected contexts,177 and International Dialogue’s 
overview of existing corporate social responsibility standards in fragile contexts.178 
Koerber, for his part, discusses corporate codes of conduct and their strengths and 
limitations in preventing businesses from causing harm in those contexts affected by 
conflict.179 All of these contributions examine forms of regulation that extend beyond 
orthodox understandings but assess their merits or demerits based on how they 
prevent businesses from cauing harm. 
Another example is Jolyon Ford’s seminal contribution to the business and 
peacebuilding discussion, Regulating Business for Peace: The United Nations, the 
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Private Sector, and Post-Conflict Recovery.180 Ford illuminates that the formal 
mandates of UN-authorized peacekeeping missions and the practices of external 
interveners have failed to offer a regulatory framework for the private sector that 
might cultivate peace. Drawing on a number of case studies, including East Timor 
and Liberia, Ford identifies that despite their potential to act as regulators of 
business activity, at present private sector actors have not come within the 
regulatory jurisdiction of UN peacekeeping operations. He proceeds to consider the 
possibilities for future transitional authorities to regulate private sector actors as part 
of their peacebuilding mandates. The primary argument of Ford’s work is that 
peacebuilding authorities can and should regulate the activities of businesses.  
Others focus on whether initiatives are successful in holding businesses to account 
for harmful practices. Scholars such as Sabine Michalowski and colleagues have 
discussed the concept of corporate accountability in the context of Transitional 
Justice (TJ) and have outlined a number of existing accountability-based initiatives 
that can and have helped to hold businesses accountable for their roles prior to, 
during and in the aftermath of conflict.181 Different regulatory initiatives considered 
include the use of Truth Commissions (TCs),182 extraterritorial accountability,183 and 
soft law mechanisms, such as the limited number of accountability mechanisms that 
accompany corporate social responsibility guidelines.184 The discussions all 
question how different initiatives, whether through legal or softer forms of regulation, 
achieve some degree of accountability for victims. 
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Like the contributions of these scholars, I suggest that the pluralisation of regulation 
illustrates that there is a spectrum of types of regulation, spanning from hard law 
approaches rooted in command and control, to softer initiatives that seek to guide 
business conduct. I also argue, however, that we can look beyond how and whether 
different approaches to regulation achieve Surya Deva’s twin tests of efficiency, to 
ask how different forms of regulation or influence might also shape business 
conduct in more proactive ways.  
For instance and as touched upon briefly above, different actors often develop 
guidelines to inform business conduct, with the intention of preventing adverse 
harms being caused by businesses in conflict-affected settings. How though might 
the use of guidelines help to inform businesses as to how to contribute to 
peacebuilding? Might guidelines also inform businesses about the processes they 
could and should adopt to make valuable contributions to peacebuilding processes? 
Might civil society actors exert pressure on businesses to adhere to these 
guidelines? Similarly, shareholders can demand that businesses act in 
environmentally sensitive and socially responsible ways. But can they also 
command that businesses work to contribute to peacebuilding, specifying objectives 
or requiring adherence to peacebuilding guidelines, if developed? When we identify 
a spectrum of regulatory possibilities that exist, what do studies on regulation and 
the pluralisation of regulation tell us about how the same forms of influence might be 
used for alternative purposes? Essentially, I suggest that numerous forms of 
influence exist and that the pluralisation of regulation usefully demonstrates 
possibilities for thinking about using these forms of influence to promote business-
based peacebuilding. 
1.5.4. Towards a Global Policy Instrument on Business and 
Peacebuilding? 
In chapter 3, I examine a number of different initiatives that many suggest are 
variations of regulation. The purpose is to identify different forms of influence that 
exist and to introduce the possibility for thinking about how these forms of influence 
might be used for different purposes.  
To that end, in chapters 4 and 5, I adopt a case study approach to examine how 
different forms of regulation have been used to engage businesses to contribute to 




argue that there is space to think about what a global policy instrument on business 
and peacebuilding might look like. The type of instrument envisioned is one that 
seeks to involve different actors in putting pressure or incentivising businesses to 
contribute to peacebuilding processes. It should respond to the limitations of relying 
solely on the individual decisions of individual companies as to when and how to 
intervene. 
To conclude this section, therefore, I suggest, in line with proponents of regulatory 
pluralism, that there is a spectrum of approaches to regulation that range from 
orthodox regulation to less binding and softer methods of regulation. Thus, I 
understand regulation broadly to refer to the ways that different actors, employing 
different methods, are able to influence the decisions of businesses. The range of 
ways in which these actors attempt to influence businesses suggests that there are 
possibilities for thinking about how we might further advance the role of others 
actors in influencing business contributions to peace, with a global policy instrument 
on business and peace emerging as one such possibility.  
1.6. Methodology 
As touched upon above, the thesis uses a case study method. Case study research, 
according to Robson, is ‘a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical 
investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context 
using multiple sources of evidence.’185 Dissecting this brief statement helps to 
substantiate why it is that I have opted to use this methodological approach and how 
it fits in with the broader research objective of examining the ways that different 
approaches to regulation might be used to engage businesses in peacebuilding 
efforts.  
1.6.1. Different forms of regulation as the phenomenon 
The phenomenon under investigation is, as suggested, that of different forms of 
regulation that can be used to shape business conduct. To identify these variations, 
I examine the concept of regulatory pluralism. Given the range of approaches to 
regulation that will be examined, I adopt a holistic rather than an embedded 
research approach. While the latter would entail focusing specifically on one type of 
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regulation, a holistic approach allows for an examination of the pluralisation of 
regulation and the impact of different approaches in post-conflict societies. This is in 
keeping with the exploratory nature of the study of regulatory pluralism itself. 
To this end, this research is partly exploratory in nature seeking to examine the 
ways that regulation exists to influence the decisions of businesses. The research is, 
however, also partly explanatory and descriptive. I seek to understand the 
possibilities that emerge from the pluralisation of regulation and to use the findings 
to help explain how different forms of regulation might help to advance a global 
policy instrument on business and peacebuilding. 
1.6.2. Case Study Selection  
The particular ‘real-life contexts’ under investigation are post-conflict settings. In 
order to gain a deeper understanding of different regulatory possibilities, I adopt a 
case study approach examining regulation in both Northern Ireland and South 
Africa. I select these case studies for a number of reasons.  
In Northern Ireland and South Africa, conflict formally ended through negotiated 
settlements approximately two decades ago. Given this temporal timeframe, the 
case studies offer the opportunity to examine how businesses have contributed to 
the longer-term peace processes, and how and whether different actors have 
influenced these contributions. Moreover, in both settings, significant peacebuilding 
moments in the peacebuilding processes were impacted by and impacted on the 
development of the regulatory landscape at the state level. Significant peacebuilding 
moments are those milestones that were key to reaching and sustaining peace while 
the significance of regulatory moments derives from the ways that businesses were 
integrated into peacebuilding efforts because of them. These case studies, 
therefore, offer the opportunity to consider how regulation is and can be linked to the 
political peacebuilding process. 
Building on, in both cases, a range of actors and various methods were adopted. In 
regards to state-level regulation, for instance, even in the aftermath of conflict, both 
countries had relatively strong regulatory frameworks. This led to a number of 
different experimental approaches being adopted by post-conflict governments, 
offering useful insights for future post-conflict settings. At the same time, other 




types were present prior, during and after conflict. These business types ranged 
from local businesses at one end of the spectrum to global multinational 
corporations at the other. This diversity created opportunities for actors, including 
other states and international institutions, to influence business conduct in the post-
conflict era through different forms of regulation. The case studies offer the 
opportunity to examine the roles that different types of regulators can play. 
In both Northern Ireland and South Africa, businesses engaged in conflict in different 
ways. In some cases, business benefitted from the repressive policies of a state 
while in other cases businesses help to support and sustain repressive regimes and 
violence. These interactions provided important opportunities for regulators to target 
businesses. Thus, the case studies allow us to explore the relationship between 
business, conflict and regulation and to examine the opportunities that can arise 
when businesses are implicated in supporting or benefitting from a particular type of 
political system.  
As a final justification, in both contexts, by targeting businesses directly, regulatory 
actors were able to force a number of further institutional developments in the 
regulatory landscapes. As such, the case studies allow us to examine the different 
impacts that regulation can have, beyond simply altering the actions of individual 
businesses.  
The case studies have been selected, therefore, in order to help inform the research 
objective of better understanding how different forms of regulation can be used in 
different ways to require, influence and persuade businesses to engage in 
peacebuilding efforts.  
1.6.3. Sources of Evidence  
Finally, Robson identifies the importance of the sources of evidence when 
undertaking case study research. The sources of evidence used in this thesis reflect 
the plurality of ways in which regulation can occur. These sources include peace 
agreements, legal cases, truth commission findings and recommendations, civil 
society reports and corporate social responsibility standards and guidelines. I also 
refer to secondary literature in the form of books, book chapters, working papers, 
policy reports and variations of academic literature. Given the broad spectrum of 




was appropriate in order to ensure that important regulatory moments were 
examined and that the plurality of regulation was properly reflected in the case study 
examination.  
1.6.4. Limitations of the Study 
There are a number of general limitations with a case study approach. While case 
studies can help to provide a detailed overview of phenomena in context, there is 
the persistent problem of representation and transferability. In particular, how the 
findings from one study can and will transfer to another is uncertain. In post-conflict 
settings, given the variations across and within conflict divides, these difficulties of 
transferability are somewhat magnified.  
This overarching problem is arguably present in the case study selection. Both 
Northern Ireland and South Africa are somewhat different to many other post-conflict 
settings. Most notably, while other contexts emerge from periods of violence 
completely or wholly destroyed; South Africa and Northern Ireland had relatively 
functioning institutions even in the aftermath of conflict. This was driven in part 
because these were relatively mid-level conflicts. In this sense, the findings from the 
case studies might appear inapplicable given that the institutional structures that 
existed which allowed for the respective post-conflict governments to adopt a 
number of progressive regulatory initiatives.  
However, the case studies also attempt to respond to this very limitation. By 
focusing on both South Africa and Northern Ireland, contexts in which a range of 
actors have been involved in different ways, these case studies help to illuminate 
not only how states can influence businesses, but also how other actors are able to 
contribute to play important roles. Thus, in exploring the pluralisation of regulatory 
actors, these case studies offer findings that are at least potentially useful to those 
contexts where the state is less able or willing to use its influence to engage 
businesses in contributing to peacebuilding.   
A second limitation is one less capable of being resolved through any particular 
methodological approach or selection and relates to the potential impact of this 
research. Firstly, I am not offering regulation as a panacea or ‘cure all’ for the 




change.  In many cases, it is unlikely that regulation will be able to influence all or 
even many businesses.  
Secondly, there have been great strides made in such places as business schools, 
law firms, industries and individual businesses to increase the consciences of 
business owners and executives as to their social impact. The result has been a 
significant increase in regards to how businesses approach their impacts in and on 
societies and, in some cases, how they contribute to peace. By focusing on 
regulation, I do not seek to undermine these efforts.  
What I seek to achieve is simply to outline a different perspective, one that suggests 
that possibilities exist for other actors to help push businesses in contributing to 
transitions from conflict to peace in different ways. If achieving this objective, I will 
have at least made some contribution to the much more difficult task of integrating 
businesses into peacebuilding processes.  
1.7. Remaining Structure 
Chapter 2 examines a number of ways that businesses might contribute to 
peacebuilding efforts. Drawing on the business and peace literature and a number 
of empirical examples, I explore the contributions that businesses might make to 
peacebuilding efforts according to four categories: core business, socially 
responsible investment and philanthropy; public policy and dialogue, and 
collaborations. The intention of this chapter is to introduce a number of ways in 
which businesses might push beyond doing no harm to help contribute to 
peacebuilding efforts. I conclude this chapter by asking how other actors can 
influence businesses to act in these more proactive ways. In order to identify these 
different forms of influence, I suggest that the pluralisation of regulation has much to 
offer.  
Chapter 3 examines what some consider to be different regulatory initiatives in post-
conflict settings.  I begin the discussion by exploring different ways that businesses 
might undermine transitions from conflict to peace directly and indirectly, through 
their relationships with other actors. I use this discussion as the backdrop against 
which to examine a range of different approaches to regulation that seek to prevent 
and in some case hold businesses to account for harms that they might cause. In 




expanded from coercive legal approaches to less binding forms of regulation. 
Beginning with command and control, I outline the parameters of this approach to 
regulation before identifying a number of limitations of command and control-based 
approaches in post-conflict settings. I then examine three alternative approaches to 
regulation: persuasive regulation, conditionality-based approaches and alternative 
regulatory paradigms, before exploring a number of initiatives that fall within these 
different categories.  
I then examine the impact that these initiatives seek to make in post-conflict 
settings. I will suggest that in different ways, these initiatives are linked to 
peacebuilding efforts by attempting to ensure that businesses do not derail peace 
processes through their deleterious activities. Despite the tendency to examine 
these different approaches according to how they prevent or remedy harms, I 
suggest that we can identify a number of different forms of influence, which could 
also be used to engage businesses in peacebuilding efforts.  
Chapters 4 and 5 examine how different actors have sought engage businesses in 
contributing to the peacebuilding effort in South Africa and Northern Ireland. In doing 
so, I examine a number of significant regulatory moments during the peacebuilding 
processes. The purpose of these chapters is two-fold. Firstly, I seek to examine how 
different actors have directly regulated businesses to contribute to peacebuilding. 
Secondly, I seek to examine how and in what ways the regulation of business has 
contributed to other developments, including institutional change and how these 
efforts have in turn been supported by significant peacebuilding moments.  
In chapter 4, I tell the story of regulation in two parts. The first examines the Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment Framework (B-BBEE), a state-based 
framework that seeks to incentivise businesses to contribute to peacebuilding. The 
second story examines a number of additional regulatory moments, which have 
interacted with the B-BBEE in different ways. I examine how a number of different 
initiatives helped contribute to the emergence of B-BBEE; how they have reinforced 
the objectives of B-BBEE; how they gap-fill for B-BBEE; and how different initiatives 
have conflicted with B-BBEE. The findings of this chapter can be broadly 
categorised in two ways. Firstly, I show the potential opportunities that exist for 
different types of regulation to influence how businesses contribute to peacebuilding 




positive and negative ways. These findings help to inform the discussion in chapter 
6.  
In chapter 5, I tell three stories, all of which relate to the promotion of equality in 
Northern Ireland. The first story examines the MacBride Principles in Northern 
Ireland, a set of guidelines developed by civil society actors and used by different 
actors to change discriminatory businesses operating in Northern Ireland. I also 
examine how these principles led to the adoption of an experimental and creative 
approach to promoting affirmative action under the Fair Employment and Treatment 
Order 1998. The second discussion focuses on the role of the EU, which through its 
PEACE funds has been able to incentivise businesses through offering businesses 
the opportunity to help shape the future development of the economy. The final 
discussion highlights how important potential contributions can be overlooked by 
states. The findings of this chapter are twofold. Firstly, I show the potential 
opportunities that exist for different types of regulation to influence how businesses 
contribute to peacebuilding efforts. Secondly, I suggest how different regulatory 
initiatives can interact in both positive and negative ways and how without a 
centralised and coherent approach important opportunities for engaging businesses 
in peacebuilding can be overlooked. These findings help to inform the discussion in 
chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 examines what lessons can be learned from the case studies for the 
possibilities of developing a global policy instrument on business and peacebuilding. 
Based on these possibilities, I will propose that there are reasons and space to 
consider what a global policy instrument on business and peacebuilding might look 
like; one that seeks to harness these possibilities through the development of 
common approach. In doing so, I will draw on the United Nations Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights (UNGP),186which act as the primary global 
instrument on business and human rights. As I will develop, the UNGP is useful on 
two fronts.  
Firstly, the UNGP help to illustrate the possibility that a global policy instrument can 
attempt to involve numerous actors, all influencing businesses in different ways, to 
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shape corporate conduct. While the UNGP ultimately focus on improving how 
businesses respect human rights, I nevertheless argue that they are a useful 
template for considering what a global policy instrument on business and 
peacebuilding might look like. Secondly, and paradoxically, the UNGP show that 
such a policy instrument can invoke considerable debate and pushback. As I will 
argue, the UNGP have many limitations. However, these limitations have inspired a 
wealth of discussions about how to progress the business and human rights agenda 
and the role of other actors in supporting these developments. This is useful 
because any policy instrument on business and peacebuilding must be developed 
by a broad range of actors, reflecting the complexities of (1) business-based (2) 
peacebuilding in (3) diverse and differing contexts. It should also reflect the (4) 
heterogeneity of business and (5) the diverse range of potential actors involved in 
influencing businesses.  
For all its faults, the UNGP highlight that a policy instrument can galvanise the types 
of conversation that are necessary, with this thesis serving as only a speck on the 
road of what would need to be a much longer journey in formulating a global policy 
instrument on business and peacebuilding. That I push the discussion in this way 
reflects the view proffered by Graf et al that while ‘there is a growing enthusiasm in 
exploring the potential of business contributions to peace,187 ‘future steps ‘will need 
to establish specific instruments and tools to support companies in their 
peacebuilding efforts more effectively.’188 
1.8. Conclusion  
In summary then, rather than focusing on business as usual or consequential 
impacts of socially responsible behaviour, this thesis examines how businesses 
have and might become actively involved in the processes of peacebuilding. More 
importantly, I seek to examine how different actors have required, induced or 
persuaded businesses to do so.  I do this through examining regulatory pluralism in 
order to identify different forms of influence and to examine how different actors 
have sought to influence businesses to contribute to peacebuilding South Africa and 
Northern Ireland. Based on the findings of the studies, I interrogate the possibilities 
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for thinking about a global instrument on business and peacebuilding. I do so to help 
develop how such an instrument might encourage and inform different actors about 




























Businesses as Agents of Peacebuilding 
Drawing on both the business and peace literature, along with a number of empirical 
examples, this chapter explores the potential of businesses to contribute to 
peacebuilding processes.  
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter examines different ways in which businesses might contribute 
positively to peacebuilding. The objective is to expand how we consider the 
relationship between business and peacebuilding in greater detail. As was briefly 
alluded to in the previous chapter, historically, many have understood the 
relationship between business and peace from a number of prevailing perspectives. 
Some consider that businesses undermine peace. Because businesses have 
supported violent non-state actors, colluded with repressive regimes, and 
undermined peacebuilding efforts by violating the rights of workers, women, and/or 
minority groups, many consider businesses undermine peace processes. Others 
contend that businesses are important for the realisation of peace. Because 
businesses create jobs and generate economic growth, they are important players in 
any peacebuilding process. In between, some suggest that in order for the latter 
contributions to be realised, we must focus on preventing businesses from causing 
harm. 
These prevailing views have ensured that considerations regarding how businesses 
might contribute to peace have been rather limited. With the exception of a body of 
literature on business and peacebuilding, discussions either have centred on 
preventing businesses from causing harm or have understood businesses 
contributions to peace to be the consequences of economic pursuits. This short 
chapter helps to introduce a more enlightened view of businesses in peacebuilding 
processes by drawing attention to the possibilities for positive interventions. Through 
different contributions that fall within four broad categories of intervention types, 




below focuses on four categories, namely: core business (section 2.2.1), socially 
responsible investment (2.2.2), advocacy and public policy dialogue (2.2.3.), and 
collaborations (2.2.4.).  
2.2. Examples of business-based peacebuilding  
2.2.1. Core Business 
Businesses can contribute to peacebuilding through their core business activities. 
Core business activities are those corporate activities aimed principally at 
generating profits.1 These activities are central to the operations of a business and 
include such issues as who a business conducts commercial relations with, who a 
business employs, and where and with whom a business sources its materials. 
Various opportunities arise for contributing to peacebuilding through core business 
activities. For now, I focus on possible contributions that can arise from employment 
practices, skills development, supply chain relationships, and community 
reconciliation.  
2.2.1.1.  Employment 
The employment practices of a business can affect peacebuilding. As mentioned 
above, those advancing a ‘business as usual’ approach to business-based 
peacebuilding promote the view that businesses can contribute to peace through 
creating employment. Those that advance the ‘do no harm’ approach tout the 
peacebuilding impacts of employing without discrimination. It is also the case, 
however, in many ways provoking questions regarding what it means to do no harm 
in post-conflict settings, that even well-meaning practices can be either limited or 
counterproductive. For instance, because of the marginalisation of the past, some 
sections of society may lack the skills required to attain gainful employment. Non-
discriminatory employment-practices may have little impact on peacebuilding if 
groups continue to be excluded from employment. In post-conflict contexts, what it 
often required is a more proactive approach to employment. There are a number of 
possibilities for businesses to use employment practices in more proactive ways. 
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2.2.1.1.1. Affirmative Action  
In contexts characterised by histories of repression, peace settlements often attempt 
to accommodate previously marginalised groups through representation in a new 
post-conflict political dispensation.2 Constitutional reform and the inclusion of human 
rights provisions are measures that can strengthen these aims.  While certainly 
important, it is also necessary to ensure the integration of these sections of society 
into other aspects of life, including in the economic sphere. Businesses are well-
placed, as direct market participants, to help integrate different groups into the 
economy. For instance, and as explored in the coming chapters, in both South 
Africa and Northern Ireland, businesses have been at the forefront of helping to 
address inequalities between groups through affirmative employment action 
programmes by integrating sections of these societies that were previously 
marginalised.  
As an illustration from elsewhere, Gündüz et al. draw attention to La Frutera Inc. 
(LFI), a business operating in Mindanao, the Philippines.3 Recognising that the 
conflict had its roots in history and Muslim socioeconomic grievances, such as lack 
of access to education, the loss of land to settlers, horizontal inequalities and 
poverty, LFI actively sought to integrate Muslim’s into the workforce.4 In response to 
an important trigger of conflict in the region, LFI made efforts to actively employ 
Muslim workers alongside Christians to advance the peacebuilding process in the 
region.  
2.2.1.1.2. Reintegrating Former Conflict Participants 
Businesses can also help to reintegrate ex-combatants back into society when a 
conflict ends.5 In Colombia, for example, the “Peace Welders” are a group of 10 
metalworking enterprises joined in a private-public initiative to meet the demand for 
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2016. 
3 C. Gündüz, N., Killick, and J. Banfield, Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential of 
the Domestic Private Sector, London: International Alert, 2006, at 86. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Global Partnership, ‘Partnering with business for peace and development in Colombia’, Global 
Partnership, [web blog], 18 January 2015. Available at 
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welding services in the Colombian state of Santander.6 This group actively employs 
ex-combatants in order to provide an alternative to violence.  
Integrating or helping to facilitate the integration of former combatants back into 
society is important for a number of reasons. Spoilers are those individuals or 
groups that actively undermine peace processes. By offering an alternative to 
violence in the form of economic participation, businesses can help to complement 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. Body and 
Brown, for instance, highlight the importance of entrepreneurial programmes to help 
ex-combatants who cannot find wage-employment.7 They note that because former 
conflict participants frequently resort back to violence in the absence of any 
alternative, businesses, in providing employment to former combatants, can help to 
offer these individuals a ‘different path’, thereby reducing the likelihood of conflict 
relapse. 
In much the same way, businesses can also help to support the reintegration of ex-
political prisoners. In Northern Ireland, for instance, a key aspect of the transition 
from conflict to peace was the release of former political prisoners.8 There is, 
however, quite a difference between prisoner release and prisoner reintegration. 
Whereas the former is a term to describe a moment, reintegration is a much longer 
and more arduous task. It is, nevertheless, an important one. As McKeever notes: 
‘the process of transition must bring political ex-prisoners on board, not despite but 
because they used violence as a means of challenging the state.’9 Businesses can 
contribute to the peace process by supporting aspects of the peace settlement, in 
the case of Northern Ireland, helping to support prisoner reintegration.  
As a final point, businesses can also actively employ those previously displaced 
because of a conflict. A recent article published by the World Economic Forum has 
argued that business can help refugees through training and employment.10 For 
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example, Forest notes that business leaders in Germany have responded to the 
refugee crisis in Europe by calling for the thousands of people arriving each day to 
be given help to find employment.11  
2.2.1.1.3. Promoting Gender Equality  
Businesses can also use employment practices to empower women. The 
peacebuilding literature frequently and correctly highlights the importance of 
including women in peace processes. As is reflected in Security Council Resolution 
1325 on women and peace,12 this refers to inclusion in the processes that establish 
peace,13 and in the post-conflict political settlement and social order.14 The latter can 
be achieved through constitutional provisions protecting women’s rights, along with 
guarantees of women’s representation within political institutions through quotas.15  
Along with facilitating inclusion in these areas, scholars are also highlighting the 
importance of women’s economic empowerment and women’s entrepreneurship.16 
Again, businesses can use employment practices to contribute to this broader 
objective. Scholars such as Gündüz et al. for instance, draw attention to The Three 
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Sisters’ Trekking Agency in Nepal.17 This business chose to adopt inclusive hiring as 
a best-business practice to address the gender and caste-based, socio-economic 
inequalities that are at the root of the conflict. They achieved this by training and 
employing disadvantaged women from the region.18 In doing so and read alongside 
the broader macro elements of peacebuilding and constitutional reform, supporting 
women through employment can help to contribute to and complement broader 
peacebuilding objectives.  
Moreover, and building on the discussion on from the discussion on affirmative 
action above, businesses are well placed to position women in places of 
management. As discussions on political settlements are suggesting, while peace 
agreements often contain provisions focused on gender empowerment, whether and 
to what extent provisions actually materialise is often uncertain.19 One reason that 
provisions such as these are not implemented is that, in spite of the change in a 
particular political dispensation, underlying predispositions regarding the status of 
women can persist. In these circumstances, the transformation of women’s rights is 
not always realised because of underlying patriarchal structures.20 Businesses that 
empower women can help to contribute not only the empowering women but also 
breaking down structural and cultural barriers.  
2.2.1.1.4. Skills Development 
In some senses, a discussion on affirmative action presupposes that those 
previously marginalised groups will be in a position to avail of increased economic 
opportunities when and if they arise. One of the consequences of structural 
marginalisation, however, is those previously excluded often lack the requisite skills 
and competencies to enter the labour market. Businesses can help to increase the 
prospects for future employment through training and education delivery.  
For example, a further consequence of patriarchal systems is that women are often 
uneducated and unskilled, realities stemming from views that understand the role of 
                                                            
17 Gündüz, Killick, and Banfield, supra note 3, at 172 
18 Ibid., at 172-173. See also S.G. Bishnu and R. Upreti, ‘Peace by Corporate Means: How Mature Is 
the Private Sector for Peacebuilding in Nepal?’, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, vol. 9, no. 2, 
2014. 





women solely in terms of familial responsibilities.21 To this end, progressive 
companies such as the minerals Conglomerate Coca-Cola have been at the 
forefront of championing women’s progress, both economically and socially. In 
2007, the company teamed up with the Harvard Kennedy School of Government 
and the World Bank's (WB) International Finance Corporation (IFC) - the private 
sector lending arm of the WB Group. The coalition sought to identify the major 
obstacles for female entrepreneurs in their markets, which included the lack of 
business skills, the lack of access to finance and the lack of peers and mentors.22 
The result was the former of the 5by20 programme. This initiative aims to expand 
economic opportunity for five million women entrepreneurs throughout the 
Company’s global value chain by the year 2020 through a combination of core 
business operations, cross-sector partnership, and strategic social investment.23 
According to Bank, a typical example of the model offers women access to business 
skills training courses, financial services, and connections with peers or mentors 
together with the provision of a business starter kit—three cases of product, a table, 
a cooler, and an umbrella.24 One example of such a programme was launched in 
Nigeria in 2013 when Coke, the IFC and Access Bank signed an agreement to 
provide financing for small and medium enterprise (SME) distributors (the majority of 
whom are women) of Coke in Nigeria.25 
2.2.1.1.5. Community Reconciliation  
Scholars have also cited facilitating ‘community reconciliation’ as an important 
contribution that businesses can make to peacebuilding processes.26 Niva Golan-
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Nadir and Nissim Cohen assess, for instance, that businesses can build bridges 
between different communities by bringing previously at war communities together 
through employment.27 Ernstorfer et al. highlight an example from the Balkans, 
where companies have sought to promote improved inter-ethnic relations in the area 
by bringing people from Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia together to work on rebuilding 
war-damaged electricity infrastructure.28  
Others suggest that businesses can contribute to community reconciliation by 
increasing the interaction of different groups through commercial relations. Thus, for 
Miklian, ‘firms can also provide a neutral space for suppliers/sellers of different 
ethnicities and similar inclusivity characteristics, believing that engaging in such 
activities will promote trust, reduce stereotypes and build inter-personal 
relationships, reducing participation in or support of violence’.29A UNGC report 
entitled ‘Doing Business in a Multicultural World’ details a range of possible 
examples.30  
In contributing to community reconciliation, businesses can again support the 
political peace process. Mueller-Hirth, drawing on the work of Brewer on social 
transformation, highlight the importance of social peacebuilding. They describe this 
as ‘the repair and rebuilding of social relationships, interpersonal and inter-group 
reconciliation, the restoration of community and the social bond, and social and 
personal healing […].’31 Although peace is often made at the elite level, bottom-up 
processes are equally necessary. As Roig notes: ‘As peace agreements are 
conducted by very high-level political leaders, there is always a need to consolidate 
peace at the local level through broad-based reconciliation and societal healing.’32 
Business, by bringing different communities together through employment and the 
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forging of economic and commercial relationships can potentially contribute to the 
social peace process.  
2.1.1.2. Empowering Local Businesses 
Businesses interact with many different groups. A supply chain refers to the different 
businesses that a particular company or group of companies conduct commercial 
relations with.33 They often help a business to deliver a particular service or good. 
Through these relationships, some have suggested that businesses can also use 
their supply chains to empower previously disadvantaged groups in different ways.34 
Anderson and colleagues, for instance, draw attention to Bralirwa, a subsidiary of 
Heinekin in Rwanda. Amongst other things, the company purchases grain from local 
farmers sustaining a number of local farmer communities, their families and 
relatives.35 
Similarly, in Mozambique, the Sunshine Nut Limitada Company adopts a business 
model called the Sunshine Approach, which focuses on financial, environmental, 
social, and transformational issues. The purpose is to develop a market for the 
smallholder farmer communities. The factories employ mainly young men and 
women who were abandoned or orphaned in their youth. 90% of the company’s 
distributed profits (a reverse tithe) go to the poor and orphaned of the country – 30% 
to orphan care, 30% to transformative projects for the farming communities, and 
30% as a growth component to open up other food companies using this same 
philanthropic business model.36 
As will be discussed in due course, in South Africa, empowering black-owned 
businesses through both procurement and enterprise development is one of the 
central roles played by the business community in the peacebuilding process.37 It 
will suffice to note for present purposes that through their economic interactions, 
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businesses can help to include those that are at the margins of society, communities 
and groups who might not necessarily benefit from a new more ‘inclusive’ political 
settlement forged between political elites.   
Thus, through their core business activities, businesses can play a range of 
peacebuilding roles. While the specific nature of these roles will vary, through 
certain core business activities, businesses can help to address the underlying 
causes of conflict and, in the case of former combatants and political prisoners, the 
consequences of conflict.  
2.2.2. Socially Responsible investment and Philanthropy 
A second way that businesses can contribute to peacebuilding is through socially 
responsible investment and philanthropy.38 Distinct from core business activities, 
these contribution types are often external to the primary functions of a company 
and involve businesses opting to direct finances and resources in such ways that 
help support peacebuilding processes. As Micklian and Rettberg assert in regards to 
philanthropy, ‘[p]hilanthropic Strategies include companies’ efforts to provide public 
goods that yield no clear returns on their investments.’39 
In defining the ways in which businesses might contribute to peacebuilding through 
these activities, Jane Nelson has drawn attention to a number of companies that 
have played important roles in peacebuilding processes.40 Examples include Rio 
Tinto, which has established several foundations focused on community-based 
development in South Africa; and Chevron and Citibank, which have supported a 
business development centre run by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) with funding, management support and technical advice in Kazaksthan.41 
In Sri Lanka, work by International Alert has highlighted a number of roles assumed 
by businesses during and in the aftermath of conflict. These have included capacity 
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building of undergraduates and development of schools; and afforestation 
programmes. They have also consisted of sharing best practices with farmers; 
responsible marketing; and raising safety awareness. Along with these 
contributions, businesses have helped in the improvement of local living conditions 
by providing water supply; setting up medical centres; providing entertainment 
facilities; and small business development.42  
Similarly, Gündüz et al. draw refer to Interconexión Eléctrica S.A., the largest 
electricity transporter in Colombia. Through Peace Development Programmes 
(PDPs), community relations and social investment are directed entirely towards 
addressing conflict issues and the promotion of peace. PDP’s are long-term macro-
projects with multiple components (economic development, environmental 
protection, strengthening of institutions, civil society empowerment, the promotion of 
a peace culture, and education, health and housing) that are implemented in several 
municipalities at the same time.43 Miklian contends that interventions of this type 
‘have effectively defused small-scale tensions between local communities, (re)built 
health and education infrastructures, and empowered disadvantaged communities, 
often prioritized by firms through ‘win-win’ profit and peace relationships.’44 
In these examples, businesses have played a number of roles in providing public 
goods. While the state is and must remain the primary obligation bearer of providing 
services to a population, for various reasons, including incapacity and a lack of 
institutional infrastructure, it is often unable to do so. In these circumstances, 
businesses have at least the potential to assist. 
2.2.3. Advocacy and public policy engagement 
Barbara describes policy dialogue as ‘‘political’ peacebuilding involving dialogues 
with local stakeholders.’45 Essentially, under this type of approach, businesses use 
their political and economic influence to help further different aspects of a 
peacebuilding process. Citing work by International Alert, for example, Barbara 
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notes that this more political form of engagement could include participating in truth 
and reconciliation councils, supporting weapons hand-ins, providing capacity-
building support for local governments, including judicial and police forces, 
supporting initiatives to attract foreign investment, and by helping the local private 
sector build capacity and governance systems.46  
Businesses can also use their influence to campaign for change or to put pressure 
on post-conflict governments to implement peace agreement provisions. As Gündüz 
et al. note: 
Given the private sector’s dependence for success on the environment in 
which it operates, it has a natural role and interest in impacting positively on 
a country’s governance architecture and contributing to deeper systemic 
change. Issues of corruption, lack of transparency and accountability, and 
non-existent or discriminatory property and land rights are all ‘economic’ 
issues that affect the private sector directly, but are symptomatic of wider 
conflict dynamics.47 
A number of examples illustrate this potential further. In Colombia, Talisman 
(Colombia) Oil and Gas Limited (TCOG) have advocated and successfully secured 
the implementation of multilateral security agreements (‘convenios’) in the Tangara, 
Niscota and El Cuacho Blocks.48 The results have been security agreements with 
the state security services based on international law in which a written agreement 
is obtained from the security services agreeing to an expected standard of conduct 
coupled with the establishment of grievance mechanisms for any incidents of 
violence potentially associated with TCOG’s activities.49 
Darby and Mac Ginty note the example of the Business against Crime initiative in 
South Africa, which sought to expand existing law enforcement capacities as a 
practical means of establishing peaceful conditions.50 Similarly, Oetzel et al. 
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highlight the Colombian subsidiary of General Motors (GM), GM Colmoteres, which 
collaborated with a nonprofit organization to train and employ former members of 
paramilitary groups as a way to reintegrate them into society.51 GM was awarded 
the US Department of State's Award for Corporate Excellence in 2006 for this 
program.  
Luc Zandvliet offers some additional examples of roles played by business in the 
area of pushing for institutional change.52 For example, when Placer Dome- a large 
mining company specialising in gold and copper- found itself in a region of Papua 
New Guinea without a functioning law and order mechanism, it apparently 
subsidised the arrival of a prosecutor to the area.53 At the same time, it engaged in 
the systematic training of local police forces and set up mechanisms by which 
residents could report incidents of violence to the company, which were then 
forwarded to the local police.54  
Zandvliet further discusses the case of BP Colombia, which used its leverage to 
help establish a House of Justice in their area of operations.55 This building houses 
multiple justice and law and order institutions under one roof and serves as a one-
stop-shop for civilians. As a result, the level of impunity has decreased. BP’s role 
has been to use its leverage to set up a partnership between United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) (who funded the construction of the building), 
the government (responsible for salaries and maintenance), and the company itself 
(who provided office infrastructure).56 
Businesses often hold important positions in society.57 In some cases and as 
already remarked upon, governments, post-conflict and otherwise, depend on 
businesses. This affords businesses with a degree of influence over holders of 
political power. Of course, with this influence come serious dangers. Close 
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relationships can lead to corruption and rent seeking.58 In addition, these close and 
backhand relationships have led to the plundering of the natural resources of many 
countries and have enabled the use of repressive state security forces against 
protesting populations in order to protect company assets.59 At the same time, 
businesses can and often do use their influence for more proactive reasons. The 
brief examples touched upon above help to introduce this possibility. 
2.2.4. Collaboration with other actors 
Businesses can contribute to peacebuilding by collaborating with actors, such as 
governments, civil society and other businesses.60 Partnerships or collaborative 
initiatives can emerge in different forms. In the area of governance and regulation 
and as will be developed in the next chapter, multistakeholder initiatives (MSIs) are 
collaborative efforts between a multitude of actors to address governance deficits. In 
light of the spread of globally operating businesses and the emergence of 
transnational problems such as climate change, which requires global solutions, 
different actors including businesses have come together to help address these 
issues.61 These partnership-based initiatives arguably play an important role in 
peacebuilding, particularly when businesses are linked to conflict because of socially 
irresponsible practices.  
Businesses can collaborate in other ways. To some degree, the discussions above 
have alluded to these possibilities. For instance, Coca-Cola developed the 5by20 
programme alongside UN Women and the IFC. In other cases, collaborations can 
emerge between different businesses. In South Africa, different business collectives 
in the form of, for instance, the aforementioned Business against Crime, the Urban 
Foundation, National Business Initiative, and the Consultative Business Movement, 
are all examples of businesses coming together through collaborations to help 
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contribute to peacebuilding process.62 A similar example exists in Northern Ireland 
through the Confederation of British Industries, which actively campaigned for peace 
in the region.63 
In the South Caucasus, Ernstorfer et al64 examine the collective efforts of local 
businesses organized through the Caucasus Business and Development Network 
(CBDN).65 Based on a shared vision of an economically connected and cooperating, 
peaceful South Caucasus, the network consists of business people, civil society 
activists and academics. In an environment with little interaction across the conflict 
divide, CBDN is the only functional network engaging with private sectors and 
economic actors across the region, including in the disputed territories of Abkhazia, 
Nagorny Karabakh and South Ossetia. Wennmann also highlights a case from 
Tunisia, where business organizations are playing a crucial role in the country’s 
transition to democracy.66 This has been recognized by the Nobel Peace Prize 
Committee which awarded the ‘Tunisian Quartet’ the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015.67 
The Tunisian Quartet focuses on information exchange and on a partnership that 
leverage the assets, skills and networks of different types of business actors to 
advance humanitarian assistance.68  
Collaborations can also emerge between business and civil society. Hayward and 
Magennis assess that collaborations of this nature can provide complementary 
skills, competencies and capabilities to engage in social change and build peace, 69 
an argument, which Oetzel and Doh reiterate.70 Much of the literature has focused 
on various collaborations involving MNCs and NGOs. One benefit of working with 
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civil society actors, they suggest, is that businesses are able to understand how to 
direct their efforts. Read together with the discussion on business contributing to 
social development, collaborations can help to maximise impact. As Kolk and 
Lenfant note:  
NGOs with a presence on the ground and positive engagement strategies 
may help MNEs to build effective community relations, to shape their 
partnership portfolio and focus, and even assist them in integrating a conflict 
lens in their core business. NGOs are usually knowledgeable about the local 
context and have longstanding relationships with local actors, which could be 
used by MNEs as entry points in their community endeavours.71 
As an illustration, in 2005, Chevron Nigeria embarked on a new strategy to support 
the Niger Delta communities in its operating area. The backdrop of this proactive 
approach was a host of accusations levelled against the company for direct and 
indirect human rights violations. As developed in the coming chapters, holding 
businesses accountable for harms committed in the past can be a useful strategy for 
engaging businesses to do more for societies in the future.  
The new strategy that Chevron adopted was termed the Global Memoranda of 
Understanding (GMOU), a model based on community-driven development 
planning. Chevron Nigeria has signed GMOUs with eight Regional Development 
Councils (RDCs). These councils were formed to represent the interests of some 
425 communities with an estimated 850,000 people who live near Chevron’s 
onshore oil facilities and operations. The approach is bottom-up, with communities 
directly involved in deciding the projects umdertaken in their communities based on 
the needs of the people.72 Before the GMOU process, oil companies hired 
development experts to analyse the situation in each community and send the 
analysis to the company’s community development units (CDU). The CDU, in 
conjunction with some influential members of the communities, then designed the 
projects, which were often carried out by selected community members (often the 
godfathers), or companies owned by friends of the CDU members which were not 
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even affiliated with the communities.73 Chevron’s more recent approach attempts to 
facilitate local ownership in the process, an issue often highlighted as deficient in 
peacebuilding processes generally.74  
The RDCs, supported by Project Review Committees, are responsible for planning 
and managing community development projects in their geographic areas.75 Along 
with its new strategy, the company decided to revamp its approach to community 
investment and adopted a Sustainable Livelihoods Assessments (SLA) approach to 
assess the development context within these communities. Each RDC engaged a 
team of local NGOs to conduct an SLA in its geographic area. With fieldwork 
completed in 2006, these SLAs represent the most complete and current analysis of 
the needs of and development opportunities available to communities in the Niger 
Delta. To this end, numerous projects from health care centres to schools, training 
centres for women to the installation of water, housing and infrastructure have all 
been developed.76 
Similarly, Jason Miklian notes  the examples of the Federación Nacional de 
Cafeteros (FNC)77. FNC joined the Spanish Agency for International Development 
Cooperation (AECID) and Spanish NGO Humanismo y Democracia (H+D) for 
several small-scale collaborations on local development and environment issues. By 
2008, Miklian notes that this team sought to leverage lessons learned and scale up 
their joint development initiatives, bolstered by the FNC’s interest in applying ‘Triple 
Bottom Line’ and other best-practice corporate goals to the community level. These 
discussions became the Huellas de Paz (Footprints of Peace) project. From 2011 to 
2015, this $9 million USD initiative, conceived by FNC and H+D and financed by 
AECID, aimed to assist 50,000 people in disadvantaged ethnic groups suffering 
from conflict-related grievances.78 
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2.2.5. Discussion  
Many view businesses solely as deleterious actors that can undermine the 
enjoyment of human or environment rights, as examples, or as economic agents, 
which contribute to society only indirectly through generating growth. The discussion 
above shows that there a number of other potential contributions that businesses 
can make to peacebuilding processes. Drawing on scholarly contributions and 
empirical examples, I have sought to show that business could contribute to 
peacebuilding processes in ways that extend beyond the predominant views on the 
relationship between business and peace. They can achieve this through their core 
operations, socially responsible investment and philanthropy, lobbying and 
collaborations.  
One should resist the temptation to make generalizable claims based on these 
discussions. The examples above illustrate possibilities, not definitive contributions. 
As noted, what amounts to peacebuilding in one context does not necessarily 
translate to another and the complexities of peacebuilding do not allow for broad 
claims. For this reason and as previously mentioned, chapters 4 and 5 consider 
business contributions to peace in two contexts: Northern Ireland and South Africa. 
Nevertheless, this chapter expands how we conceive of business contributions to 
peacebuilding, subject to the caveat of context.  
2.3. Linking Business-Based Peacebuilding to Regulation  
How though does the discussion above fit within the broader trajectory of this 
thesis? As mentioned above and in the introductory chapter, in much the same way 
that one should be cautious about making broad claims based on anecdotal 
evidence about how businesses contribute to peacebuilding, one must be equally 
cautious about assuming why businesses would take on these roles and 
responsibilities. The business and peacebuilding literature often identifies specific 
examples of businesses contributing to peacebuilding processes to support claims 
that businesses could and should be more proactive in peacebuilding processes in 
the future. As Chapter 1 identified, these include such arguments as conflict is costly 
for business; that there are economic opportunities in peace; that businesses have 
moral obligations to contribute to peace; and that businesses, as social enterprises, 
must be part of the peacebuilding solution. As was also suggested, for a range of 




identify the fact that businesses are far from homogenous, experiencing the effects 
of conflict in different ways and motivated by numerous factors.  
Thus, the examples identified above are not reflective of the vast majority of 
businesses that are often far-removed from peacebuilding efforts. Instead, they 
constitute only a relatively miniscule number of businesses that have opted to be 
more proactive during transitions from conflict to peace. For this reason, I suggest 
that the literature is currently suspended in a state of optimistic uncertainty: one 
characterised by an optimistic outlook regarding the potential roles that businesses 
might play but one equally characterised by uncertainty as to when, if, how and why 
businesses would assume these responsibilities in ways that extend beyond a few 
companies.  
It is in this space that this thesis suggests that we must consider how different actors 
can and have attempted to influence business contributions to peacebuilding. For 
instance, while businesses might opt to adopt affirmative action policies, how might 
states, through legislation, require that they do so? Similarly, although businesses 
might opt to contribute through philanthropy, how might shareholders shape such 
interventions? Can project finance be linked to conditionalities that require 
businesses to promote the rights of women? In short, how can other actors shape 
the decisions of businesses to assume the types of roles that have been identified in 
this chapter? 
Considering how businesses might be influenced by other actors to contribute to 
peacebuilding requires understanding how different actors influence businesses. To 
this end, I argue that the pluralisation of regulation offers useful insights into the 
different ways that other actors can shape business conduct, perhaps in the sort of 
ways examined in this chapter. Thus, the following chapter develops the more 
expansive understanding of regulation adopted in this thesis by considering a range 
of regulatory initiatives currently operating in post-conflict settings. I suggest that 
while these initiatives primarily focus on limiting the harms that businesses might 
cause and in some cases holding businesses accountable, we can nevertheless 
identify different methods and forms of influence that might be used for more 
proactive purposes. These approaches can and, I will argue, have, been used to 




2.4. Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that businesses can contribute to peacebuilding in a range 
of ways. Through their core business activities, businesses can help to address 
some of the underlying causes and consequences of violent conflict.  Going beyond 
‘business as usual’ approaches or efforts to do no harm, it was suggested that 
businesses can directly target specific issues and groups, such as helping to 
integrate marginalised sections of the society into the workforce, empower 
businesses from the same communities or contribute to community reconciliation 
between groups. Businesses can also contribute to peacebuilding  through 
investment and philanthropy. In other cases, businesses can contribute to 
peacebuilding by lobbying for reforms or collaborating with civil society or states to 
help address peacebuilding issues.  
The overview presented above largely draws on an emerging body of literature on 
business and peace. One of the primary limitations of scholarly and policy-related 
contributions, however, is the reliance on individual businesses to identify and then 
opt to participate in these types of intervention. That is to say, the literature largely 
relies on businesses assessing that it is in their economic self-interests or that they 
have a moral or social responsibility to contribute to peacebuilding in these ways. 
While it is certainly the case that in some cases, businesses can, do and will come 
to these conclusions, I suggest that we must attempt to understand how other actors 
might influence these contributions. The following chapter engages with a number of 
different approaches to regulation to develop the argument that different actors can 






Sketching the Regulatory Landscape Post-Conflict 
This chapter explores the concept of regulation in post-conflict settings. It examines 
a number of initiatives that many consider are variations of regulation. These are 
namely, command and control, persuasion, economic conditionalities and 
‘alternative regulatory paradigms.’ This chapter also analyses different initiatives that 
fall within these broader groups and discusses how and in what ways they are or 
might be relevant to peacebuilding. I conclude this chapter by suggesting that 
notwithstanding questions regarding whether these different initiatives constitute 
regulation or not, or whether these initiatives do or not successfully prevent 
businesses from causing harm or remedying victims when harms occur, we can 
nevertheless identify that businesses can be influenced in different ways. These 
different forms of influence might be used to engage businesses in peacebuilding 
processes.  
3.1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I outlined numerous ways in which businesses can or have 
contributed to peacebuilding. I suggested that while businesses can play a number 
of roles in post-conflict settings, it is not always clear why it is that businesses 
would. Indeed, the examples presented in chapter 3 of individual businesses opting 
to contribute to peacebuilding are relative anomalies, supported by the fact that the 
vast majority of businesses abstain from peacebuilding efforts. I concluded the 
chapter by suggesting that we should consider examining the roles that other actors 
can play in helping to engage businesses in making these types of contribution.  
This chapter examines different initiatives that many consider to be varying forms of 
regulation. From this point forward and while recognising from the outset that there 
are different views regarding what regulation is or is not, I will refer to these various 




The first objective of this chapter is to examine four broad categories of regulation 
adopted in post-conflict settings. These are namely command and control; 
persuasive regulation; economic-conditionality-based regulation; and alternative 
regulatory paradigms. As suggested in chapter 1, command and control regulation 
refers to the direct regulation of an industry or activity by legislation outlining that 
which is permitted and that which is illegal. Persuasive approaches to regulation 
focus on encouraging rather than requiring businesses to act in certain ways. They 
frequently rely on the market; in particular, consumers and other businesses, to 
either punish or reward businesses that act in socially responsible or irresponsible 
ways. Economic Conditionality-based regulation relies on incentivising businesses 
to puruse specific objectives, through the promise of economic opportunities or the 
threat of economic sanctions. An example in this regard is using public procurement 
as a means to incentivise businesses to promote particular social ends or threats 
from shareholders and institutional investors to divest if they do not. Finally, what I 
term alternative regulatory paradigms are forms of regulation not typically directed at 
business but which have expanded over time to include them. An example is the 
(albeit limited) extension of extraterritorial litigation to include businesses. Through 
these discussions, I seek to illustrate the plurality of regulation and the different 
forms that regulation can take in post-conflict settings. 
The second objective is to examine a number of more specific initiatives that fall 
within these categories, particularly those of a more persuasive and economic 
conditionality-based nature, along with regulatory initiatives with expanded remits. I 
do this by looking at a number of key existing initiatives that apply in post-conflict 
contexts. Key existing persuasive initiatives examined include non-financial 
reporting requirements, guidelines and standards, and certification schemes. The 
conditionality-based initiatives explored include public and private procurement, 
finance delivery, and pressure exerted on businesses by shareholder and investors. 
Finally, the discussion on alternative regulatory paradigms includes international 
criminal law, extraterritorial litigation, and truth commissions. Through these 
discussions, I seek to illustrate that what we term regulation consists of a range of 
different actors and types that, at their core, seek to shape corporate conduct.  
This chapter then examines the potential connections between these different 
initiatives and peacebuilding efforts. Although regulation can take many forms, the 




businesses impact negatively and to hold businesses to account when harms arise. 
The linkages to peacebuilding typically arise in that these initiatives attempt to 
ensure that businesses are not impacting negatively in the post-conflict settings or 
achieving remedies for victims when they do.  
What I seek to question in the case studies that follow this chapter is how and in 
what ways the different approaches that these initiatives use, be they guidelines, 
standard setting, or private and public procurement initiatives, as examples, might 
be and have been used to require, induce, or encourage businesses to play more 
proactive roles in peacebuilding processes. In this sense, I examine different 
approaches to regulation in this chapter to help identify the different forms of 
influence that are being exerted over businesses. This chapter, therefore, acts as an 
important precursor to the case studies, introducing the various approaches to 
regulation that might garner these more proactive interventions. 
This chapter is set out as follows. Section 3.2 begins with a brief discussion on the 
importance of regulating businesses post-conflict by highlighting the harms that 
businesses can cause in conflict-affected settings (3.2.1). I then explore command 
and control-regulation (3.3) before outlining a number of limitations associated with 
orthodox approaches to regulation. These limitations include the unwillingness and 
inability of states to impose regulatory burdens on businesses. I use this discussion 
on the limitations of orthodox regulation post-conflict settings to map a number of 
alternative regulatory approaches (3.4.) and different initiatives that fall within these 
categories that exist in post-conflict contexts. These are namely, persuasive 
regulation (3.4.1.), conditionality-based regulation (3.4.2.) and alternative regulatory 
paradigms (3.4.3.). Section 3.5 engages in a discussion of these different types of 
initiatives and their potential linkages to peacebuilding before suggesting a different 
way to think about using these different forms of influence and initiatives for 
promoting business-based peacebuilding. I finish by summarising the chapter’s main 
points (3.6). 
3.2. The Importance of Regulation 
In post-conflict contexts, preventing businesses from causing harm is particularly 
salient. Because businesses have the potential to undermine transitions from 




the vast majority of regulatory approaches discussed below seek to prevent 
businesses from doing so and in some cases, to hold businesses accountable for 
harmful practices when they occur. It will be useful, therefore and by way of 
introduction to the discussions that follow, to touch upon some of the ways that 
businesses can cause harm in conflict-affected settings. 
3.2.1. The Deleterious Impacts of Business: A Brief Overview 
Direct harms caused at the behest of business are those that result from the direct 
actions of companies. In 2005, for example, Save My Future Foundation (SAMFU) 
issued a publication entitled ‘Firestone: The Mark of Modern Slavery.’1 This report 
documented numerous human rights breaches caused by the rubber company prior 
to, during and even in the aftermath of conflict in Liberia.2 Various violations of 
human rights were identified, including requiring employees to work long and overly 
burdensome hours,3 deplorable living conditions of workers such as inadequate 
housing,4 poor sanitation,5 and a lack of access to drinking water.6  
Along with encroaching on the rights of workers, businesses can also adversely 
affect the rights of those living in close proximity to their operations. Companies can 
undermine environmental rights; cultural rights; rights of a socioeconomic nature; 
and civil and political rights. Indeed, a thorough case study of Spanish-Italian palm 
oil company Poligrow in Colombia was carried out by the Centre for Research on 
Multinational Corporations (SOMO) and Indepaz between March 2014 and August 
2015, based on a combination of interviews, analysis of documents and database 
research.7 The study concluded that land-intensive sectors like palm oil are at risk of 
creating renewed conflict in Colombia, where land disputes have been a key driver 
of the internal armed conflict, and where territorial claims remain highly contested.8 
                                                            
1 Save My Future Foundation, Firestone: The Mark of Modern Slavery, SAMFU, 2005. While specifc 
terms and names are abbreviated throughout this thesis, I include the full names again for ease of 
reference when each previously abbreviated word is mentioned. 
2 Ibid., at 8. 
3 Ibid., 10 and11. 
4 Ibid., 17. 
5 Ibid., at 22. 
6 Ibid., at 23. 
7 M. Van Dorp et al., ‘Reconquering and dispossession in the Altillanura The case of Poligrow’, SOMO 
and INDEPAZ, 2015. See also M. Van Dorp and K. Kuijpers, ‘Multinational Companies, Conflict 
Sensitivity and Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC): The Case of Poligrow in Colombia’, in S. 






The implications for peacebuilding are such that in spite of efforts to break with the 
past, in continuing to undermine the enjoyment of rights, businesses can jeopardise 
peacebuilding efforts, particularly when respecting, protecting and realising rights 
are central facets of the broader peacebuilding effort.9 
More often than not, detrimental impacts caused by businesses are more indirect in 
nature, emerging because of collaborations with other actors, or through supply 
chains. In regards to the latter, the ‘supply chain (sometimes referred to as the 
‘value chain’) includes all the different parties that contribute to the product that is 
sold to the customer. It, therefore, consists of the seller of the end product as well as 
the manufacturer, retailers, transporters and various sub-suppliers.’10 In certain 
cases, businesses sustain conflict through purchasing conflict minerals through their 
supply chains. Well-versed examples include the cases of Angola and Sierra Leone, 
where multinational conglomerates stand accused of sustaining conflict through 
purchasing blood diamonds.11 More recently, Global Witness has issued a report 
exploring how Jade is being used to fund a conflict in Myanmar, which pits the 
central government against the Kachin Independence Army/ Kachin Independence 
Organisation. It is claimed that the industry generates funds for both sides in a war, 
which has claimed thousands of lives and seen 100,000 people displaced since it 
reignited in 2011.12 
In some contexts, businesses align with repressive regimes, helping to sustain 
political systems that undermine rights.13 The theory of the bureaucratic 
authoritarian state, for example, explained the appeal to business of the coups that 
toppled democratic regimes throughout the Americas and elsewhere and implanted 
repressive authoritarian systems. Businesses united forces with the military and 
technocrats to eliminate the perceived communist threat and to advance ‘capitalist 
                                                            
9 Amnesty International, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: Behind closed gates: ethnic discrimination in 
employment’, 26 January 2006, EUR 63/001/2006  . 
10 K. McCall-Smith and A. Rühmkorf, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and Supply Chain Management 
through Corporate Social Responsibility’, in V.R. Abou-Nigm, K. McCall-Smith and D. French (ed.) 
Linkages and Boundaries in Private and Public International Law, Hart 2017, at 2 [page number 
according to a pre-publication version of the chapter]. 
11 Global Witness, ‘A rough trade: the role of companies and governments in the Angolan conflict’, 
London, Global Witness, 1998. 
12 Global Witness, ‘Jade: Myanmar's "Big State Secret": The biggest natural resources heist in modern 
history?’, London, Global Witness, 2015.   
13 I.M. Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model’, Social Philosophy and 




deepening’ projects.14 In Liberia, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), a 
body established to help identify the underlying causes and consequences of the 
conflict, drew attention to the deeply entrenched relationship between business and 
government.15 It noted that Firestone (now Bridgestone) a conglomerate tyre and 
rubber company, was complicit in a forced labour scandal that led to a League of 
Nations investigation.16 The TRC also found that the Liberian government used 
slavery-like practices to supply laborers to Spanish controlled plantations as well as 
to the Firestone rubber plantation.17 The TRC also held that businesses helped to 
sustain the systematic marginalisation and exploitation of the indigenous Liberian 
population.  
Businesses can also enter into corrupt and corrosive relationships with political 
elites. When these relationships emerge, resources that might otherwise be used to 
fund social development programmes are often used to line the coffers of corrupt 
politicians. The Liberian TRC further stated, for instance, that loggers paid the 
Government of Liberia less than 2-3% of taxes due and that logging companies paid 
millions of US dollars in exchange for illegal tax credits and improperly wrote off tax 
liability.18 Moreover, ‘throughout the conflict, smaller logging companies and civilians 
were violently removed from their land and from logging concessions by larger 
logging operations that operated with the support of government militia and rebel 
factions.’19 The case of Liberia highlights that the self-interest of company’s and 
repressive governments can align in such a way that both can benefit, often to the 
detriment of ordinary citizens. 
Businesses also pay bribes to paramilitaries, and in doing so, further sustain 
conflicts and human rights violations. Drummond Inc., for instance, an American 
mining and processing of coal and coal products company, has been accused of 
paying paramilitary groups to violently resolve labour disputes, thereby suppressing 
the unions organising the workforce and generating increased revenue from 
                                                            
14 L. A. Payne and G. Pereira, ‘Corporate Complicity in International Human Rights Violations’, Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science, vol. 12, no. 1, 2016, at 2. 
15 Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume II: Consolidated Final Report, at 5. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., at 244.  
18 Ibid., at 336. 




decreased labour costs.20 Similarly, Chiquita Brands, an American banana 
company, was accused of giving money to armed groups so that they would allow 
Chiquita operations in conflict zones and counter opposition to the company’s 
operations.21  
In the direct and indirect examples discussed above, businesses have been 
involved in sustaining and even contributing to the onset of conflict. With these 
impacts in mind, promoting and facilitating transparency, anti-corruption, and the 
protection of land, human and environmental rights, are often important components 
of broader peacebuilding efforts. We now turn our discussion to a number of 
different types of regulation in post-conflict settings that attempt to respond to these 
dangers, examining some specific initiatives that fall within these categories.  
3.3. Orthodox Regulation  
This section briefly considers orthodox approaches to regulation before outlining a 
number of limitations associated with its application in post-conflict settings. These 
limitations, coupled with the importance of preventing businesses from causing harm 
in the ways identified above, underpins the importance of alternative approaches to 
regulation in post-conflict settings.  
3.3.1. The Post-Conflict State and Orthodox Regulation  
As orthodox approaches to regulation suggest, the primary point of departure when 
considering the concept of regulation is the host state. By host state, we mean those 
states, which host business activity- in our case post-conflict settings. Under what is 
termed orthodox regulation or ‘old governance,’ many understand regulation as a 
‘bi-partite process involving government and business, with the former acting in the 
role of regulator and the latter as regulatee.’22 
We look to the post-conflict state first for a number of reasons. Firstly and perhaps 
intuitively, it is often in host states where business activity occurs. As will be 
                                                            
20 See Business and Human Rights Resources Centre, Balcero Giraldo, et al., Romero, et al., & Estate 
of Valmore Lacarno Rodriguez v. Drummond Company, https://business-
humanrights.org/en/drummond-lawsuit-re-colombia, [last accessed 23 June 2016]. 
21 See O.C. Kahale, ‘Project Finance and the relevant human rights,’ in S. Leader and D. Ong, (ed.) 
Global Project Finance, Human Rights and Sustainable Development, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, at 120. 
22 N. Gunningham and S. Sinclair, ‘Smart Regulation’, in P. Drahos (ed.) Regulatory Theory, Australia 




developed below, in the context of multinational corporations or global supply 
chains, other states become particularly relevant to the discussion of regulating 
businesses in post-conflict states. 
Secondly, under the international legal framework, states are the primary duty 
bearers for regulating corporate conduct. Under international human rights law, for 
instance, while some challenge the state-centric approach that currently 
characterises the system, both as inaccurate and inadequate,23 it is widely 
recognised that states have obligations both to protect against human rights 
violations caused at the behest of businesses and to remedy violations when they 
occur. For instance, human rights treaties place a duty on the state to protect 
individuals by outlining specific positive and negative obligations with which the state 
party must comply.24  
Thirdly, the very texts that end violence and which seek to redefine the state in the 
aftermath of conflict, frequently reiterate the responsibilities of the state to regulate 
the activities of corporations. As documents, which both address the past while 
simultaneously acting as roadmaps for the future, peace agreements can reflect the 
roles played by businesses in the past and underline the salience of preventing such 
occurrences in the future. The Lome Accord in Sierra Leone, for instance, specifies 
that the Government shall ‘take the necessary legal action within a period not 
exceeding two weeks from the signing of the present Agreement to the effect that all 
exploitation, sale, export, or any other transaction of gold and diamonds shall be 
forbidden except those sanctioned by the CMRRD.’25 In Nepal, the peace 
agreement Constitution states, amongst other things, that ‘[n]o child shall be 
employed in factories, mines, or in any other hazardous works, 26 and that ‘[t]here 
shall not be any gender discriminations regarding remuneration for the same work 
                                                            
23 See S.R. Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’, The Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 111, No. 3, 2001. 
24 K. McCall-Smith and A. Rühmkorf, supra note 10, at 5. 
25 Sierra Leone, Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) (Lome Agreement), 07/07/1999, at 6. CMMRD refers to the 
Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development. 
Agreements cited below are taken from PA-X (2017). Peace Agreements Database and Access Tool, 
Version 1. Political Settlements Research Programme, University of Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh. www.peaceagreements.org 
26 Nepal, Constitution of Nepal 2015, 20/09/2015, at 17. For a discussion on different types of peace 
agreement see, C. Bell and K. Zulueta-Fülscher, ‘Sequencing Peace Agreements and Constitutions in 
the Political Settlement Process’, Policy Paper No. 13, November 2016. Stockholm, International 




and social security.’27 In this sense, while states have obligations to regulate the 
activities of businesses under international law by virtue of legal agreements forged, 
there are also political commitments between formerly conflicted elites and groups.28 
In theory, this should help to strengthen the extent to which states adhere to their 
obligations.  
Along with locating the discussion of regulation at the state level, orthodox 
approaches to regulation also define the particular method of regulation. As 
previously remarked upon, command and control regulation refers to the direct 
regulation of an industry or activity by legislation that stipulates what is permitted 
and what is illegal.29 The ‘command’ is the standards by a government authority that 
must be complied with; ‘control’ signifies negative sanctions that may result from 
non-compliance.30 
A few examples help to illustrate this form of regulation in post-conflict environments 
and the salience of adopting legislative approaches in such settings. In the area of 
environmental protection, for instance, the post-conflict Sierra Leonean legislature 
has adopted the Environment Protection Agency Act, 2008.31 It provides, amongst 
other things, that mining projects must include the preparation and approval of an 
environmental impact assessment and the issuance of an environmental impact 
assessment licence.32 Along with various other contributing factors, such as 
corruption and the exploitation of natural resources, environmental degradation of 
indigenous lands was a trigger for the emergence of conflict in Sierra Leone.33 
Commanding and controlling businesses in this way is an important aspect of the 
peacebuilding process, in that these legislative efforts attempt to curtail the adverse 
environmental impacts that once contributed to the emergence of violence. 
                                                            
27 Ibid., at 10. 
28 For debates on the legal status of peace agreement see C. Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex 
Pacificatoria’, in C. Stahn, J. S. Easterday, and J. Iverson (ed) Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the 
Normative Foundations, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2014. 
29 O. McManus, Environmental Regulation, Elsevier Ltd, Sidneat, Australia, 2009 cited in B. Junquera 
and J.A. Del Brío, ‘Preventive Command and Control Regulation: A Case Analysis’, Sustainability, vol. 
8, no. 1, 2016, at 1, note 5. 
30 A. Scanlan et al., ‘Diverging Approaches to EU Environmental Policy: An Explanation of the 
Implementation Deficit’, Maastricht University Journal of Sustainability Studies, vol. 1, no.1, 2013, at 4. 
31 Environment Protection Agency Act 2008, Part IV-Environmental Impact Assessments. 
32 Ibid., at 26. 
33 R. Maconachiea and T. Binns, ‘Farming miners’ or ‘mining farmers’?: Diamond mining and rural 




In other cases, governments use legislation to ensure that companies pay taxes in a 
transparent way, a particularly important issue in settings where corruption is 
rampant. In Nigeria, for example, The Companies Income (Amendment) Tax Act, 
2007, provides for the imposition of tax on companies, and that tax shall be payable, 
for each year of assessment, at specified rates on the profits of any company, 
accruing in, derived from, brought into or received in Nigeria.34 Again, the 
importance of legislation in this area links to the underlying causes of conflict.35 A 
further example is that of labour law. In Nepalese law, for instance, Section 5 of the 
Labor Act 2049 (1992) states that children are not to be used for work in any 
enterprises.36 Similarly, sections 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 address the security and 
health standard for the labours.37 These provisions are particularly important in a 
context where exploitation under the Caste system was systemic.38 With the shift 
towards an equal society in the aftermath of conflict, eliminating discrimination and 
exploitation in and by the private sector is an important component of the 
peacebuilding process.  
Essentially, under orthodox approaches to regulation, the post-conflict state uses 
binding legal instruments and sanctions in an attempt to prevent businesses from 
causing harm in the future.  
3.3.2. Limitations of Orthodox Approaches to Regulation  
As suggested in the introductory remarks, there are a number of difficulties with 
limiting a focus on regulation to orthodox regulation and we can understand 
discussions on the pluralisation of regulation against the backdrop of these 
limitations. As was also noted in chapter 1, theories on regulatory pluralism arise 
based on empirical observations. That is, rather than adhering to existing conceptual 
understandings about what regulation is- the approach favoured by supports of 
orthodoxy- scholars of regulatory pluralism examine different approaches to 
regulation that have arisen. Moreover, scholars of regulatory pluralism do not simply 
seek to observe and describe alternative approaches to regulation; they also expand 
                                                            
34 The Companies Income (Amendment) Tax Act, 2007 [act no. 11]. 
35 O. Fagbadebo, ‘Corruption, Governance and Political Instability in Nigeria’, African Journal of 
Political Science and International Relations Vol. 1 No. 2, 2007. 
36 Labour Act, 2048 (1992), Act No. 9 of the year 2049 B.S. 
37 Ibid.  
38 See for discussion on the Caste system, A. J. Nightingale, ‘Bounding difference: Intersectionality and 





upon why it is that these alternative approaches exist. They further contend that 
over time and for a range of reasons, the power of the nation-state has declined, 
with the parallel rise of the power of other non-state actors, which often assume 
regulatory roles and responsibilities. As Reed et al note: 
The upshot of these structural, institutional and political changes has been 
the rise of new forms of governance where non-state actors play a central 
role in a variety of regulatory functions associated with improving the social, 
environmental and human rights performance of business and holding 
corporations accountable.39 
Alongside these broader realities and changing global and institutional shifts, there 
are a number of additional limitations associated with orthodox approaches to 
regulation when considered in respect of post-conflict settings. For present 
purposes, I focus on two issues: state incapacity and state unwillingness; factors 
that are often relevant in most settings but which are exacerbated in the aftermath of 
conflict.  
3.3.2.1. State Incapacity 
When considering regulation from the perspective of command and control in post-
conflict settings, it is necessary to keep in mind the contexts in question- states 
emerging from periods of violence- and the potential implications of conflict on the 
capacity and willingness of the state to regulate through orthodox approaches. 
Taking the issue of capacity first, in many contexts, post-conflict states often lack the 
requisite ability to hold businesses legally accountable. As the very concept of state 
building implies, institutions such as legislatures and courts are frequently non-
existent. In other cases, particularly those emerging from periods of political 
repression, legislation dealing with such issues as human rights or anti-corruption 
has not featured in domestic legal systems: their promulgation is often part of a 
broader process of institutional and legal reform. A useful example is Myanmar, 
where, during the countries 2011 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) before the UN 
                                                            
39 D. Reed, P. Utting and A. Mukherjee-Reed, Business Regulation and Non-State Actors Whose 




Human Rights Council (HRC), it was recommended that, amongst other things, 
Myanmar ratify the core international human rights treaties.40 
Peacebuilding, while extending far beyond these limited issues, is thus interlinked 
with state-building processes and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.41 As Ford 
notes:  
[S]erious conflict may have significantly weakened local public and social 
capacity to regulate the socio-political and environmental impact and 
influence of business actors.  Conflict or post-conflict political impasse may 
have compromised formal regulatory institutions’ physical and human 
resources, and even if adequate laws technically remain in force, it may be 
difficult to establish their content.42 
The implications of state incapacity are such that while a command and control-
focused approach requires a diligent and involved state, the institutions necessary to 
do so are simply not there.  
Moreover, another impediment facing command and control-based approaches to 
regulation in post-conflict states is that defining who or what that state is might be 
problematic, at least in the immediate post-conflict stage. Along with state-building, 
there is often the need for constitutional and political reform.43 Particularly in the 
post-Cold War era, conflict has ended through negotiated settlements with the use 
of variations of political power-sharing to help broaden participation in political 
institutions through the creation of more inclusive political settlements.44 That is, the 
very concept of the state and the political order that holds power is being redefined. 
                                                            
40 HRC, National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) of the annex to Human Rights 
Council resolution 5/1 Myanmar, A/HRC/WG.6/10/MMR/1. Myanmar has accessed to three core 
international human rights treaties and one optional protocol: the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and 
its Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, and, in 2012, 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Myanmar lodged a reservation against 
CEDAW’s article 29 exempting it from arbitration of disputes between State Parties to CEDAW. 
41 See P.E. Gaston and E. Jensen, ‘Rule of Law and Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Testing Theory’, in 
S. Smith and C. Cookman (ed.) Peaceworks, United States Institute of Peace, 2014. 
42 J. Ford, Regulating Business for Peace: The United Nations, the Private Sector, and Post-Conflict 
Recovery, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2015, at 26. 
43 See V. Dudouet, and S. Lundström, ‘Post-war Political Settlements: From Participatory Transition 
Processes to Inclusive State-building and Governance’, Research Report, Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 
2016. 
44 See T.D. Sisk, Power-Sharing in Civil War: Puzzles of Peacemaking and Peacebuilding’, Journal 
of Civil Wars, vol. 15, no.1, 2013 - Issue sup1: Institutions for Sustainable Peace? Determinants and 




During these political reconfigurations and even for a time after, states are in their 
infancy, and approached from the perspective of regulation, in a process of finding 
their regulatory feet, so to speak. A fundamental prerequisite for command and 
control approaches is the assumption that the state and its institutions are fully 
functioning. Yet, negotiating and developing states and their political systems is 
often part of the very peacebuilding process.  
3.3.2.2. State Unwillingness 
Institutional incapacity and political uncertainty merge, in some ways, with the 
second challenge to command and control approaches- state unwillingness. States 
emerging from periods of conflict must often facilitate a number of transitions, the 
attainment of which shapes the perceived legitimacy of the new political order in 
question. These transitions can include, as examples, those from dictatorships to 
democracy, from conflict to peace, from gender inequality to equality, from minority 
marginalisation to inclusive societies, and from human rights violating regimes to 
human rights compliant ones.45 All of these transitions require the resources with 
which to facilitate them and as the introductory chapter alluded to, many see 
businesses as important players in generating these resources.  
The texts of peace agreements reflect the perceived importance attached to private 
sector-led growth in post-conflict settings. In Afghanistan, for instance, under the 
Tokyo Declaration Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan from Transition to 
Transformation, ‘[t]he Participants shared the view that developing a vibrant private 
sector [was] essential for sustainable development of Afghanistan particularly for the 
long term.’46 The Peace Agreement Constitution47 of Zimbabwe also expresses that:  
(1) The State and all institutions and agencies of government at every level 
must endeavour to: facilitate rapid and equitable development, and in 
particular must take measures to promote private initiative and self-reliance; 
foster agricultural, commercial, industrial, technological and scientific 
development; foster the development of industrial and commercial 
enterprises in order to empower Zimbabwean citizens; and bring about 
                                                            
45 C. Chinkin, ‘The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Post-Conflict’, paper series 
commissioned by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009), at 5. 
46 Afghanistan, Tokyo Declaration Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan from Transition to 
Transformation (Tokyo Conference), 08/07/2012, at 7. 




balanced development of the different areas of Zimbabwe, in particular a 
proper balance in the development of rural and urban areas.48 
Similarly, the Darfur Peace Agreement stipulates that the private sector (national 
and foreign) [will] play a crucial role in development.49 Other agreements are more 
specific highlighting, for instance, the role of companies in creating employment,50 
and even helping the state to fulfil its obligations under international law.51  
The difficulty arises in that to accumulate the necessary resources; states often 
require the presence of businesses. Take, as a brief example of this tension, the 
aforementioned area of human rights. When part of the peacebuilding effort hinges 
on the new political settlement recognising and realising the rights of those 
previously denied them, essential discussions emerge about the materialisation of 
these entitlements.52 Under international human rights law, rights of a 
socioeconomic nature require that the state ‘progressively realise’ these rights with 
this requirement being subject to the ‘availability of resources’.53 To raise resources, 
however, states often need private sector actors to generate growth.  
As a result, a tension emerges whereby states must first entice businesses into the 
context in question. The tension typically involves adopting neoliberal-type policies, 
which favour businesses but which do not lend themselves to the idea of a 
regulatory state. For example, along with specifying the importance of businesses 
presence, peace agreements also outline the steps that post-conflict political 
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dispensations should take to attract investment.54 In the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), an agreement between the Government and Le Congres National 
pour la Défense du Peuple states that ‘with a view to increasing the competitiveness 
of the national economy, the parties agree on the need to privatise public 
enterprises in DRC.’55 In Iraq, the 2005 peace agreement Constitution stipulates that 
‘The State shall guarantee the reform of the Iraqi economy in accordance with 
modern economic principles to ensure the full investment of its resources, 
diversification of its sources, and the encouragement and development of the private 
sector.’56 In Uganda, the government agreed to ‘support business and investment 
initiatives in the conflict-affected areas and shall identify and commit special funds to 
the implementing agency for that purpose’,57 while in Liberia, parties pledged to 
‘ensure an enabling environment which will attract private sector direct 
investment.’58 As a final example, in the Philippines in order ‘to encourage 
investments and other economic activities, the Bangsamoro Government [was given 
express] power to grant tax exemptions, rebates, tax holidays and other 
incentives.’59 
The pursuance of neoliberal policies illustrates the importance attached to growing 
the private sector. When governments place such reliance on bringing businesses 
into the context, a primary objective is creating the right company (friendly) 
environments. As a result, post-conflict states are often unwilling to introduce 
regulations that curtail or deter business activity, seeking instead to support the 
prospects that businesses will invest by deregulating and liberating the broader 
business environment. Against these realities, conventional approaches to 
regulation are mostly aspirational. 
In support of the view that post-conflict states are often unwilling to regulate through 
formal legal instruments, it is also important to recognise that post-conflict states are 
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in competition with others, also attempting to bring businesses to their shores. As 
Sumi Dhanarajan notes: 
Pressures upon nations to compete in the global marketplace, upon 
suppliers to produce ever-cheaper and everfaster, upon workers to accept 
more precarious terms of employment and upon communities to give up land 
and natural resources, all in the pursuit of economic growth have unveiled 
examples of the darker side of business operations within the global 
economy.60 
In short, economic aspects of transitions from conflict to peace can lead to tensions 
emerging between growing the economy and addressing important aspects of a 
more social nature.  
Adding to the difficulties of relying solely on orthodox approaches to regulation is the 
fact that political elites and businesses often align their interests in corrosive ways. 
Alex De Waal, for instance, has developed a concept that he terms, the ‘political 
marketplace.’61 He suggests that political elites depend on resources with which to 
buy public support to sustain their networks of followers. Noting the example of oil 
companies in Sudan, he stresses the dependency of political elites on businesses to 
obtain the necessary resources with which to sustain power.62 Granting licences to 
oil exploration in return for financial backhanders is just one such illustration. 
Because elites depend on the support of business actors, they are often unwilling to 
impose stringent regulations on them. Thus, because political elites benefit from 
close state-business relations, there is less chance of imposing regulations on 
business 
In other cases, it is also true that the divides between public and private are often 
difficult to discern. For instance, political actors can use positions of public power to 
benefit privately through systems of patronage or nepotism. As an example, there is 
considerable evidence that certain sectors in Tunisia—banking, 
telecommunications, and transport—received protection from domestic and foreign 
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competition because the former President Ben Ali’s family had business interests in 
these sectors. The ‘Ben Ali firms’, which accounted for 1 percent of private-sector 
output and 3 percent of employment, had 21 percent of the profits in the economy.63 
Other well-known examples include the Suharto regime in Indonesia, Mobuto in the 
Congo, Marcos in the Philippines, and Abacha in Nigeria. State-business relations, 
in these instances, are not categorised by benign collaborations between state and 
business, but rather the exploitation of public resources for private enrichment. 
Similarly, following the financial crisis in South East Asia in 1997, many 
commentators note that collaboration between business and the state came to be 
described in negative terms as ‘crony capitalism.64 
Thus, for different reasons, the realities are often such that states are unwilling to 
command and control businesses in fear of deterring investment. In the context of 
understanding alternative approaches to regulation in post-conflict states, the 
descriptive and analytical approach adopted by proponents of regulatory pluralism 
assist in explaining the broad approach to regulation adopted in this thesis. On the 
one hand, as the discussion below demonstrates, observation, illustrated through a 
mapping of different forms of regulation post-conflict, challenges the notion that 
regulation is carried out solely by states through the command and control. On the 
other hand, recognising the difficulties facing post-conflict states, not only as states, 
which exist within a broader set of global realities of globalisation, but also those 
emerging from periods of violent conflict, helps to explain why these different 
approaches are, in fact, necessary. 
The discussion below focuses on some different approaches to regulation that exist 
in post-conflict settings. Along with outlining various initiatives and analysing the 
extent to which they are or are not successful, the fundamental purpose of this 
mapping is to display that different forms of regulation exist and to map out the 
different manifestations of regulation that result from them. Ultimately, I will suggest 
that this menu of regulatory options might be considered useful when approached 
from the perspective of asking how the same approaches adopted to prevent harm 
and hold businesses accountable might also be used to influence companies to act 
in more proactive, peacebuilding-focused ways.   
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3.4. Mapping Alternative Approaches to Regulation 
Studies on regulatory pluralism attempt to capture a variety of regulatory forms. 
Along with state-based command and control, regulatory pluralism considers 
regulation at the state level, which includes but also extends beyond orthodox 
approaches to regulation. Covered are such methods as the use of economic 
incentives, like procurement, the issuance of state-based guidelines, or the 
development of certification schemes. Regulatory pluralism also extends the 
discussion of regulation beyond the confines of the territorial state in question. For 
instance, it includes considering the influence of home states, often understood as 
those countries where parent companies of subsidiaries are domiciled, or states 
where companies that source materials in other countries are situated. Home states 
can regulate using non-financial reporting requirements like the UK’s Modern 
Slavery Act, 2015, or through CSR requirements attached to export finance.  
Regulatory pluralism also reflects the fact that regulation is not confined to nation 
states. It examines, as illustrations, the role of other actors like non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), international financial institutions and shareholders.  
This section maps a number of different approaches to regulation, which apply in 
post-conflict settings. This overview is not exhaustive but rather reflective of different 
types of regulation that currently exist. I structure this section according to three 
main types of regulation: persuasive, economic-conditionality-based, and alternative 
regulatory paradigms. 
3.4.1. Persuasive Regulation: Key Initiatives 
Under the heading of persuasive approaches to regulation, regulators of business 
attempt to encourage companies to behave in certain ways. Through various 
mechanisms and approaches, different actors attempt to persuade businesses 
either by creating a set of circumstances whereby acting in socially irresponsible 
ways may lead to economic losses or where socially responsible behaviour leads to 
commercial gain. The discussion below focuses on some key existing persuasive 
oriented approaches to regulation, namely non-financial reporting requirements, 




3.4.1.1. Non-financial Reporting Requirements 
Non-financial reporting is described as a process of communicating information on 
social and environmental impacts of business to interested stakeholders.’65 The 
broad logic is that if businesses are required or asked to communicate how they 
approach non-financial issues such as respecting human rights, then they must 
have policies and procedures in place to report on.  
In post-conflict settings, the particular approach adopted is often ‘a comply or 
explain’ or voluntary one. Voluntary reporting initiatives take many forms and may 
be facilitated by either governmental or non-governmental entities that can focus on 
the national, regional or international levels.66 Businesses are encouraged to report 
or risk facing market sanctions such as consumers opting to purchase from more 
socially responsible businesses.  
Non-financial reporting can also be both mandatory and extraterritorial in nature, 
blurring in some ways the distinction between hard and soft forms of regulation. For 
instance, when in 2012 the Obama administration lifted economic sanctions 
on Myanmar, encouraging American investments after decades of treating the 
nation as a pariah, it did so with a significant caveat. Since 1 July 2013, the United 
States requires U.S. companies investing over $500,000 in Myanmar or investing 
with the country’s energy monopoly, Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), to 
disclose information on their policies and procedures. These include those relating 
to human rights, worker rights, anti-corruption, land acquisition, grievance 
mechanisms and the environment.67 The purpose of the public report is to promote 
greater transparency and encourage civil society to collaborate with US companies 
toward responsible investment. These requirements were subsequently diluted by 
raising the threshold and moving to a voluntary basis.68  
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Similarly, section 1502 if the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (2010) requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)  to 
promulgate regulations requiring listed companies that offer products containing 
conflict minerals to disclose on an annual basis whether any of those minerals 
originated in the DRC or an adjoining country.69 As a further example, the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) Modern Slavery Act (2015) mandates transparency in supply 
chains.70 The Act requires companies to prepare an annual statement describing the 
steps that the company has taken to ensure that slavery and human trafficking is not 
present in the company’s operations or in any of its supply chains.71 The statement 
may include information about the company’s policies, due diligence processes, 
risks, performance indicators and training relating to slavery and human trafficking. 
Different views emerge about the impact of non-financial reporting. For some, 
mandatory reporting has the power to ‘cast a broader net to include companies that 
have resisted private regulation and also include sanctions for non-compliance that 
go beyond reputational sanctions most commonly associated with private 
regulation.’72 In respect of s. 1502 of Dodd-Frank, for instance, Anthony Ewing notes 
that while some have criticised the Conflict Minerals Rule (CMR), the disclosure 
provisions may already be changing purchasing behaviour. He refers to the ways 
these requirements are prompting Chinese buyers to ask African minerals exporters 
to provide information on mineral sourcing.73 At the same time, he notes the 
shortcomings of the CMR, in particular, the way in which it limits disclosure to due 
diligence steps taken, without requiring companies to report any corporate actions 
flowing from that due diligence, such as concrete efforts to prevent or mitigate 
adverse human rights impacts once they are identified.74 
Others have criticised softer CSR reporting initiatives as mainly public relations 
efforts that remain merely on a ceremonial level with little practical consequences.75 
Mehra and Blackwell also note that the sheer number of reports being produced and 
the diverse topics that such reports aim to cover have created cottage industries for 
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CSR consultancies while, at times, burdening in-house practitioners and overloading 
the consuming public.76 Thus, ‘with the rise in corporate reporting on human rights 
issues, however, comes critical concern over its utility in improving a company’s 
human rights performance on the ground.’77 
3.4.1.2. Guidelines and Standards 
One of the most widely used methods of persuasive regulation is that of guidelines 
and standards.78 The purpose of guidelines and standards in post-conflict contexts 
is to help direct businesses as to how to act so as not to impact negatively on post-
conflict societies, whether in regards to the environment, human rights or some 
other related issue. Actors from states to civil society, industry organisations to 
multi-stakeholder groups, have developed variations of guidelines and standards in 
post-conflict settings.  
3.4.1.2.1. State-based Guidelines and Standards 
Post-conflict states can develop guidelines and standards that limit the harms that 
businesses might cause in the wake of violent conflict. For example, the Ivorian 
Code of Corporate Governance – Decree 2012- 1123, aims to ensure companies’ 
sustainable growth through a management system based on the principles of 
transparency, accountability, independence and fairness.79 The code promotes 
awareness of the social responsibilities of business, including the environmental and 
social interests of communities. It takes into account the disclosure of non-financial 
information through the publication of the Charter of Corporate Governance on the 
company’s website and the corporate governance chapter of its annual report. 
Information is often linked to economic incentives associated with wider stakeholder 
theories of the firm, and particularly the importance of acting in a socially 
responsible manner for reasons pertaining to social licence to operate, reputation 
etc.  
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Home states can also develop guidelines. As an example, in October 2014, the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce for Minerals, Metals and Chemicals Importers and 
Exporters (CCCMC), under the auspices of the Ministry of Commerce, took concrete 
action to tackle the links between companies registered in China and conflict 
minerals when it established Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound 
Mining Investments.80 The Guidelines’ purpose is to reduce operating risks for 
mining and minerals trading companies overseas and to ensure companies prevent 
their operations from causing harm. The Chinese Guidelines reflect supply chain 
due diligence guidance established by the UN Security Council and the OECD,81 
which sets out how companies can carry out checks on the sourcing of natural 
resources from conflict-affected or high-risk areas.82 While these guidelines are not 
mandatory, scholars like Anthony Ewing contend that they are likely to influence the 
business practices of Chinese companies.83 
3.4.1.2.2. Civil Society Guidelines and Standards 
Civil society actors have also developed a range of standards and guidelines that 
promote CSR in conflict-affected settings. Some focus on particular issues such as 
human rights. The Red Flag Portal developed by International Alert and Fafo, for 
example, lists activities, which should raise a 'red flag' of warning to companies of 
possible legal risks, and the need for urgent action.84 The activities identified draw 
from a review of existing international law and court cases in more than a dozen 
jurisdictions and relate primarily to potential human rights violations that businesses 
might cause or contribute to.85 Similarly, the Global Witness Do No Harm Guide for 
companies sourcing from the DRC guides companies on how to apply due diligence 
and attempts to respond to the linkages between human rights violations within 
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supply chains.86 According to Global Witness, the due diligence that companies 
using minerals or metals originating from eastern DRC need to undertake consists 
of: 
 A conflict minerals policy supply chain risk assessment, including on the 
ground checks on suppliers; 
 Remedial action to deal with any problems identified; 
 Independent third-party audits of their due diligence measures; and  
 Public reporting.87 
Guidelines also encourage businesses to adopt context-sensitive practices. As a 
general characterisation of these types of guidelines, the intention is not to outline 
particular standards to meet, but instead, to specificy the types of processes that 
businesses should follow. These can include guidelines as to how to understand the 
broader contexts within which they operate. As an example, International Alert’s 
Conflict Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries’ contains 
guidelines that outline a process for companies in the extractive sector to improve 
their impact on host countries.88 The purpose is to prevent businesses from 
contributing to violent conflict.89 Focusing on core business, social investment, and 
policy dialogue,90 the document provides extensive practical guidance on conflict 
risk and a procedure for impact assessments. It also specifies nine flashpoint issues 
of particular relevance.91 The tools include an introduction to conflict-sensitive 
business practice, a Screening Tool for early identification of conflict risk and 
Conflict Risk and Impact Assessment tools. These include the Macro-level Conflict 
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Risk and Impact Assessment tool and the Project-level Conflict Risk and Impact 
Assessment tool during subsequent stages of the project cycle. 
3.4.1.2.3. Multilateral Institution Guidelines and Standards  
At the international or multilateral level, various organisations have also developed 
standards and guidelines. For instance, the OECD,92 the UN,93 and the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO),94 have all developed corporate social responsibility 
standards that are of general application. That is, these guidelines apply in all 
contexts. One particular initiative, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights (UNGP), is explored in detail in chapter 6.  
In other cases, guidelines address conflict-affected settings more specifically.  The 
OECD Risk Awareness Tool, as an illustration, is designed for businesses operating 
in what are termed ‘weak governance zones.’95 The purpose of the guidelines is to 
help companies that invest in countries where governments are unwilling or unable 
to assume their responsibilities to address how to ensure that they are not causing 
harm. It includes risks and ethical dilemmas that companies are likely to face in such 
weak governance zones, including obeying the law and observing international 
instruments, heightened care in managing investments, knowing business partners 
and clients and dealing with public sector officials, and speaking out about 
wrongdoing. Regarding content, the OECD Risk Awareness Tool covers such 
issues as disclosure; human rights; employment and industrial relations; 
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environment; combating bribery, bribe solicitation and extortion; consumer interests; 
science and technology; competition; and taxation. 
Similarly, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of 
Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas attempts to guide businesses 
in respect of sourcing conflict-free minerals.96 The purpose of the guidelines is 
expressed in the introductory remarks:  
In conflict-affected and high-risk areas, companies involved in mining and 
trade in minerals have the potential to generate income, growth and 
prosperity, sustain livelihoods and foster local development. In such 
situations, companies may also be at risk of contributing to or being 
associated with significant adverse impacts, including serious human rights 
abuses and conflict.97 
It also attempts to help companies respect human rights and avoid contributing to 
conflict through their sourcing decisions, including the choice of their suppliers.98 As 
in other guidelines discussed below, the focus on mineral supply chains reflects the 
adverse roles that businesses can play in perpetuating conflict by funding non-state 
and state actors involved in conflict-affected contexts.   
3.4.1.2.4. Business/Industry Guidelines and Standards 
Business associations can also develop industry codes of conduct to induce socially 
responsible behaviour. For instance, the International Petroleum Industry 
Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) is the global oil and gas industry 
association for environmental and social issues. It’s Guide to operating in areas of 
conflict for the oil and gas industry endeavours to provide risk assessment and risk 
management in conflict settings that oil and gas companies might face.99 It 
guidelines that help companies to assess ‘the potential risks, community impacts, 
and reputation and ethical dilemmas they might encounter when first looking to 
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invest in geographic regions of conflict, and when planning new investments in 
countries where companies have existing operations.’100 Risk management includes 
practical guidance on how to manage conflict in ways that do not compromise their 
ethics and reputation or contravene national laws and international norms and 
standards. These risk management approaches range from ‘doing no harm’ in 
operations to active measures to prevent and manage conflict.’101Again, the purpose 
of these guidelines and standards is to limit the adverse impacts that businesses 
might cause in post-conflict contexts by promoting context sensitivity. 
3.4.1.2.5. Discussion 
Standards and non-specific guidelines are a helpful way of informing businesses as 
to how to ensure that they are not doing harm. However, guidelines promoting 
context sensitivity are also useful for informing businesses as to how to ensure that 
they are not exacerbating conflict dynamics. By outlining salient issues and 
elaborating on the processes that businesses should undertake, such initiatives as 
the IPIECA’s guidelines help businesses to develop processes and approaches that 
better recognise how and in what ways a company’s actions can negatively impact 
the societies in which they are operating. The guidelines can do this by stressing the 
importance of local involvement, participation and dialogue.  
At the same time, there are a number of limitations. In most cases, guidelines are 
voluntary. In only a few instances are there monitoring procedures and even then, 
these are limited. For example, OECD Members and adhering states are obliged to 
set up National Contact Points (NCP) to promote the OECD Guidelines. Individuals, 
workers, and communities can file a complaint or a ‘specific instance’, as they are 
referred to in the OECD Guidelines. However, only a fraction of the final statements 
includes a rigorous analysis of the implementation of the Guidelines, most NCPs do 
not make findings regarding compliance with the Guidelines, and a few do not 
publish final statements at all.102 In the case of uncooperative companies that are 
willingly and knowingly profiting from conflict or contributing to conflict, voluntary 
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international standards, therefore, may not be the most effective way to change 
a company’s behaviour.103 
Most of these instruments also focus on the extractive or finance industry, while 
other vital sectors such as tourism or agribusiness remain without specific 
guidance.104 A further difficulty is that there is no single guideline or standard for 
holding companies accountable in conflict-affected areas, and the existing 
guidelines are not tailored to the specific context of particular conflict settings.105 
Nevertheless and notwithstanding these limitations, the flexibility of guidelines is 
particularly important when considering how to influence corporate conduct in ways 
that are also reflective of the conflict. Moreover and as developed later, guidelines 
can and should be understood alongside other approaches, which have the potential 
to influence businesses adherence to them.  
3.4.1.3. Certification Schemes 
Another persuasive form of regulation is that of certification schemes. 
Product certification or product qualification is the process of certifying that a certain 
product has passed performance tests and quality assurance tests, and meets 
qualification criteria stipulated in contracts, regulations, or specifications.106 While 
complying with certification schemes might arise from a genuine belief in the 
importance of a particular initiative, in most cases, the broad logic is that in 
complying with certification requirements, the market might reward these businesses 
or, alternatively, punish businesses when they opt not to do so. Certification 
schemes can arise in a number of ways.107 
3.4.1.3.1. State-Based Certification Schemes 
States can attempt to induce socially responsible behaviour by requiring that 
businesses adhere to certain certification requirements. While in some cases, states 
adopt a command and control-based approach, in other settings, the approach is 
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softer, again drawing on market-driven rationales associated with consumer 
preferences in order to induce enterprises to certify, for example, the origins of the 
minerals used in their products.  
For instance, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region Mineral 
Tracking and Certification Scheme (ICGLR – MTCS) is a government led initiative. It 
requires that economic actors involved in the chain of custody in the DRC exercise 
due diligence to ensure that they do not contribute to human rights abuses or 
conflict in the country.108 The DRC Government developed the initiatives, which has 
support from other member states of the ICGLR.109 It started as a voluntary scheme, 
yet some elements (such as the Regional Certification Manual) exist in the national 
legislation of the DRC.  
Amongst other things, the scheme aims to ascertain that the mineral chain does not 
benefit non-state armed groups or public or private security forces who:  
(a) illegally control mine sites or otherwise control transportation routes, 
points where minerals are traded and upstream actors in the supply chain; 
 (b) illegally tax or extort money or minerals at points of access to mine sites, 
along transportation routes or at points where minerals are traded; and/or  
(c) illegally tax or extort intermediaries, export companies or international 
traders.110  
The scheme provides for mine inspections, certification mechanisms, and for 
independent audits. Consequently, the DRC Mining Ministry published a list of green 
and red mining sites in North and South Kivu. Minerals from sites flagged red are 
not conflict free and cannot be traded.111 By creating a system where minerals must 
be certified, this approach to regulation is indicative of approaches that rely on the 
market to respond to companies that are certified, thereby inducing compliance.  
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3.4.1.3.2. Industry-Based Certification Schemes 
Business organisations have also attempted to develop certification schemes. 
Again, these schemes seek to certify that certain products or commodities adhere to 
specific standards of expected conduct and in doing so have sought to create 
market advantages for compliance. For example, the Conflict-Free Gold Standard 
(CFGS)112 is an industry-led initiative to combat the potential misuse of mined gold 
to fund armed conflict. It was launched in 2012, mainly to support the industry’s 
compliance with the Dodd-Frank-Act section 1502 which, as mentioned, requires 
companies to state whether the gold sourced in the DRC and used in or for their 
products is conflict free.113 The system is based on two draft standards to track gold 
from the mine to the end of the refining process. These consist initially of a Chain of 
Custody Standard and a Conflict-Free Gold Standard. Both standards are subject to 
independent audit.114  
3.4.1.3.3. Discussion  
There are different views on the success of certification schemes. Given the 
importance attached to company reputation, scholars like Potoski and Prakash 
contend that while certification schemes require participants to incur specific costs to 
produce public goods, participants receive benefits that are excluded from non-
participants, thereby creating incentives to join the programme.115 Some also 
suggest that certification introduces positive changes in management practices and 
improves social and environmental performance116 and that certifications aid 
companies in their attempts to tackle sustainability challenges because certifications 
can serve as invaluable learning tools.117 
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Alternatively, others are less optimistic. For instance, addressing conflict mineral 
certification schemes in Eastern DRC, Radleya and Vogel note that certification 
schemes are often technical approaches (due to the ahistorical and apolitical 
analysis of underlying theories), which overlook the actual impact of these schemes 
on the ground.118 They continue that certification schemes overlook the impact on 
employment and the fact that in many cases, there is little evidence linking minerals 
to conflict. Moreover, because certification schemes depend on other actors 
responding, whether the pressure exerted by them is significant enough to influence 
business decisions to join certification schemes is often wholly uncertain.  
3.4.1.4. Variations of Civil Society Pressure 
As well as developing standards and guidelines, civil society actors can play a 
number of roles in persuading business to act in a socially responsible manner. 
Indirectly, civil society organisations frequently conduct research on how business 
entities, operating in conflict-affected settings, have or are contributing to rights 
violations. Some refer to this process as ‘information gathering.’119 Examples include 
reports on the practices of businesses in such places as Angola, Colombia, DRC, 
Indonesia and Sudan by international NGOs like Human Rights Watch;120 Global 
Witness;121 Friends of the Earth;122 ‘Save My Future Foundation’;123 and SOMO.124  
The findings of these reports can be used as the basis for campaigns against 
businesses, another important form of civil society regulation. Civil society actors 
can also use boycotts and various forms of pressure to induce socially responsible 
behaviour.125 For example, Global Witness has focused directly on the diamond 
conglomerate De Beers in contexts like Angola and Sierra Leone, through a series 
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of report and campaigns to highlight the complicity of the company in funding 
conflicts.126 The result was that not only did De Beers cease operations in Angola in 
2001, but also went on to become a founding member of the Kimberly Certification 
Scheme.127 
As will be discussed in the case study section, in both Northern Ireland and South 
Africa, civil society organisations were alsoable to develop codes of conduct for 
businesses and to target investors, including a number of US States, to promote 
their uptake. A recent incarnation of these codes is the Holyland Principles (HP), 
developed by Father Sean McManus.128 Amongst other things, the HP ask that 
companies ‘adhere to equal and fair employment practices in hiring, compensation, 
training, professional education, advancement and governance without 
discrimination based on national, racial, ethnic or religious identity’,129 and ‘maintain 
a work environment that is respectful of all national, racial, ethnic and religious 
groups.’130 Adherence to the HP has been achieved by the efforts of civil society 
actors to pressurise investors and shareholders to comply with them. 
Civil society actors also perform fundamental functions in putting pressure on states 
to improve their legislative frameworks. For instance, in the case of Northern Ireland, 
as developed further below, through the MacBride Principles, US States were able 
to exert pressure on the UK Government to strengthen protections against 
workplace discrimination. This pressure subsequently led to greater protections in 
the form of the Fair Employment Order 1989.131 
Reports and investigations into corporate misconduct and corrosive relationships 
between businesses and states can also serve as the basis for other actors to put 
pressure on businesses.132 For example, they provide the basis for epistemic 
communities to interrogate the linkages between businesses and human rights 
violations, provoking, in turn, the advancement of theoretical arguments as to the 
roles and responsibilities of business actors. Indeed, civil society reports, which flag 
the detrimental impacts of business, have been instrumental in catalising creative 
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responses from the academic community regarding how to address business and 
human rights related issues.133 
Given the multitude of ways that civil society actors can shape business activity, 
many see civil society regulation as an important component of filling regulatory 
gaps. Zadek, for instance, notes the ability and willingness of society to create 
collective pressure on business beyond the rule of law by threatening the 
productivity” of businesses.134 This reflects the persuasive qualities of civil society 
regulation, in particular, the ability of civil society groups to affect a company’s 
bottom line through such initiatives as consumer boycotts. As stakeholder theory 
shows in detail, this usually means that stakeholders, i.e. those who contribute to 
the wealth-creating capacity of a firm and that are therefore ‘its potential 
beneficiaries and/or risk bearers’, confront businesses with social and/or 
environmental claims.135  
At the same time, some might argue that NGOs often pursue objectives that align 
with their own. Civil regulation builds on networking among civil society actors. 
However, we should not overlook that the effectiveness of their networking relies 
ultimately on the ability to harness stakeholders representing market forces (such as 
consumers or small-scale investors) and/or governmental actors for their purposes. 
Whether civil society actors are successful might depend on the strength of these 
networks and their ability to influence opinion within them. In the context of 
influencing shareholders, for instance, the success of civil society regulation often 
depends on their ability to influence those that own or invest in companies.136  
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3.4.1.5. Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives  
The term multistakeholder initiative (MSI) refers to voluntary initiatives where two or 
more stakeholders cooperate to address some area of sustainability, CSR, the 
environment and or human rights.137 Such stakeholders include some combination 
of companies, industry associations, NGOs, trade unions, government agencies, 
investors, academics and international organisations. There are various sub-types of 
MSI, defined by Baumann-Pauly et al. as best sharing MSIs, certification schemes 
and human rights governance.138  
3.4.1.5.1. Best Sharing Practices MSIs 
Some MSIs convene stakeholders across industry, civil society and government to 
promote principles of sustainability, or to provide a forum for companies to share 
best practices and self-report on their sustainability activities. The United Nations 
Global Compact (UNGC), for instance, includes more than 8,000 corporations, in 
addition to governments and labour and civil society organisations. The UNGC 
engages the private sector to collaborate with the UN—in partnership with global 
labor, NGOs, and academia to identify and spread good corporate practices in the 
areas of human rights, labour rights, protection of the environment, and 
anticorruption.139 The primary objective of the initiative is to provide a platform for 
best-practice and information sharing across the four primary areas.  
Based on these collaborative, information-driven approaches, the UNGC has 
developed context-sensitive guidelines, such as those defined above. The UNGC’s 
‘Guidance on Responsible Business in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas’, for 
instance, aims to assist companies in implementing responsible business practices 
in conflict-affected and high-risk areas consistent with the Global Compact Ten 
Principles.140 As such, they address human rights, environment, corruption and 
labour. Much like the examples cited above, the Guidelines state that ‘for companies 
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of all sizes, operating a business unit in a high-risk area poses a number of 
dilemmas with no easy answers.’141 Amongst other things, the Guidelines seek to 
‘help reduce corporate risks and (importantly) enhance the capacity of companies to 
make a positive long-lasting contribution to peace and development’ and 
categorises responsible business practices into four areas: Core Business; 
Government Relations; Local Stakeholder Engagement; and Strategic Social 
Investment.  
Central to the guidelines provided is the need to engage with context. Under Core 
business, for example, Guidance Point #1 asks companies to take adequate steps 
to identify the interaction between their core business operations and conflict 
dynamics, to ensure that they do no harm. They are also encouraged to adapt 
existing due diligence measures to the specific needs of conflict-affected and high-
risk contexts. Moreover, companies are also asked to engage in stakeholder 
consultations to better inform how they conduct their activities.142 
There are different outlooks on the UNGC. For instance, some suggest that the 
initiative constitutes ‘a win-win solution to the problem of world poverty.’143 As state-
centered policies have failed, the cooperation with the private sector would be able 
to play an important role in the fight against poverty. In addition, some argue that the 
UNGC adds ‘social legitimacy’ to the global markets, as the corporate sector is in 
strong contact with the UN and NGOs and thus more transparent and visible to the 
public.144 The voluntary approach is also considered to have two specific benefits. 
One is the need to operationalise the ten universal principles implies trial and error 
and mutual learning from experiences, even in the context of a highly dynamic 
environment. This approach makes it impossible to define ex ante-operationalised 
criteria and hence requires more flexible and less hierarchical governance 
strategies.145 Secondly, it is believed that a voluntary approach may enhance CSR 
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above levels that could be negotiated upon in the case of a regulatory framework, 
among other things due to the stimulation of dialogue and learning.146 
At the same time, the UNGC are limited in some fundamental respects. Deva, for 
instance, notes that the principles hardly provide concrete guidance to corporations 
about the expected conduct.147 Similarly, the voluntary nature and lack of 
accountability are frequently cited as significant limitations of the UNGC.148 The 
principle accountability mechanism of the UNGC is an annual mandatory reporting 
requirement. By participating, companies agree to incorporate the principles into 
their day-to-day operations and issue an annual Public Communication on Progress, 
which reports on their progress in implementing the 10 principles.149  Others note 
that joining the UNGC is a blue-washing strategy, adopted simply to improve a 
company’s public-image without any real commitment to improving its approach to 
CSR.150  
3.4.1.5.2. MSI Certification Schemes  
Multi-stakeholder initiatives have also attempted to develop certification schemes, 
similar to those defined above. For example, the Forest Stewardship Council’s 
(FSC) certification process assesses individual farms’ compliance with the FSC 
forest management standard.151 Compliance can be aggregated to a chain-of-
custody certification for a global retailer or brand. Similarly, Social Accountability 
International (SAI) assesses and train individual factories in the manufacturing 
supply chains of large multinational brands and retailers against its SA 8000 
standard for decent work.152 
Perhaps the most well known MSI certification process is the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme (KPCS). The KPCS is a joint government, industry and civil 
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society initiative to stem the flow of conflict diamonds.153 The process emerged as a 
result of the growing evidence in the 1990s that diamond trade was fuelling wars in 
countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone or Angola.154 The KPCS aims at inhibiting trade 
in so-called conflict diamonds through a system of certificates determining the 
provenance of diamonds.  
The KPCS imposes extensive requirements on its members to enable them to certify 
shipments of rough diamonds as ‘conflict-free' and prevent conflict diamonds from 
entering the legitimate trade.155 Under the terms of the KPCS, participating states 
must meet minimum requirements and must put in place national legislation and 
institutions; export, import and internal controls; and also commit to transparency 
and the exchange of statistical data. Participants can only legally trade with other 
participants who have also met the minimum requirements of the scheme, and a KP 
certificate guaranteeing that they are conflict-free must accompany international 
shipments of rough diamonds.156 The KPCS currently has 54 participants, 
representing 81 countries, with the European Union (EU) and its Member States 
counting as a single participant and has been credited with helping reduce the 
market for illicit diamonds.  
Despite these requirements and trends, the initiative has faced strong criticism in 
recent years, including from stakeholders who played key roles in its early stages of 
development.157 For instance, Nadia Bernaz notes that notwithstanding the 
collaborative nature of the process as a whole, states are the sole participants in the 
system. The original NGO participants, Global Witness and Partnership Africa 
Canada, as well as the industry body, the World Diamond Council, are simply 
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observers. Their role is ‘to monitor the effectiveness of the certification scheme’ and 
‘to provide technical and administrative expertise’,158 but their powers are limited.159  
Moreover, in 2011, Global Witness announced that it was withdrawing from the 
KPCS over what it viewed were a series of initiatives failures in specific country 
situations, most notably Zimbabwe. The withdrawal of Global Witness followed a 
decision by the KPCS to authorise exports from two companies operating in the 
Marange diamond fields in Zimbabwe, despite widespread violence and repression 
of opponents of Zimbabwe’s Robert Magabe. Critics have also raised strong 
concerns about the KPCS’s functioning, for example, pointing to evidence of corrupt 
bureaucrats providing KPCS certificates without proper procedures and urging more 
direct links between state human rights obligations and the implementation of 
commitments made under KPCS.160 
3.4.1.5.3. MSI Human Rights Governance  
Human Rights Governance MSIs include three primary functions: legislative, 
executive and judicial. Baumann-Pauly et al. note that when they work well, 
industry-specific, standards-based MSIs support these functions by concretely 
defining human rights standards in a specific industry context.161 MSIs also 
operationalise the standard into measurable benchmarks that allow for independent 
and public assessment of a member company’s performance against the standard; 
and establish processes for sanctioning non-compliance and providing access to 
remedy. There are various types of MSI’s of this nature. 
For example, US and UK governments, NGOs and major extractive companies 
established the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) in 
2000.162 This initiative attempts to respond to the realities of businesses 
collaborating with state and private security forces in ways detrimental to the 
enjoyment of rights. Companies participating in the VPSHR essentially state their 
support to a number of principles in the three categories of (1) risk assessment, (2) 
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relations with the public security providers (police, military) and (3) private security 
providers.163 The VPSHR include:  
 practical guidelines to help extractives companies manage risk effectively at 
the international, national, project level;  
 a platform for mutual learning, joint problem-solving, and building best 
practices on security and human rights challenges with companies, 
governments, and NGOs;  
 and a framework to build capacity of key players to address these issues in 
complex environments.164  
A tripartite steering committee made up of between two and four representatives of 
each stakeholder group- corporate, government and NGO- serves as the main 
executive body of the VPs initiative.  
However, the VPSHR have been criticised on numerous fronts. For instance, 
Hoenke and Börzel assess that the local production sites of MNCs are often hosted 
by states, which only loosely adhere to global rights themselves and are neither 
willing nor capable of making non-state actors comply with them.165 Home states 
have been reluctant to foster binding regulation for the human rights behaviour, with 
a voluntary set of principles doing little to alter corrosive relationships between 
states and security forces.166 Lack of enforceability of the VPSHR is a recurring 
theme throughout the literature. For example, the NGO Rights and Accountability in 
Development (RAAD) assess that the VPSHR allow companies to capitalise on the 
normative endorsement of the instrument concerned: it is good business to make a 
strong policy statement endorsing respect for universal human rights.167 According 
to RAAD, this public endorsement does not, however, translate into any discernible 
improvements in how companies approach human rights issues.168  
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By contrast, other MSI’s have more robust monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms. In August 1996, President Clinton convened industry, labour, trade 
union, consumer, NGO and government leaders and challenged them to come up 
with a system to prevent human rights violations in apparel factories. The group 
formed into the Apparel Industry Partnership, which negotiated a workplace code of 
conduct.169 The Fair Labour Association (FLA)170 was set up to conduct those 
external audits.  
The FLA Charter sets out ‘Obligations of Companies’ that join the FLA, the 
requirements for accrediting independent external monitors, and the ‘Principles of 
Monitoring’ that should guide the independent external monitoring (IEM) events 
organised by FLA staff.171 At the beginning of every year, member companies are 
required to submit their factory lists to FLA staff who draw a random, risk-weighted 
sample of 5 percent for independent external monitoring conducted by accredited 
auditors selected and paid by the FLA.172 Once an IEM has been conducted, a 
member company is required to work with the supplier concerned to develop a 
remedial action plan that has been approved by FLA staff. Companies have to 
update FLA staff on their progress in implementing the action plans and the FLA, in 
turn, updates the information published on the website. The FLA also arranges 
verification audits up to 1% companies in the original 5 percent sample to ensure 
that the actions plans were indeed implemented and to assess the degree to which 
the remedies were effective.173 
The FLA Board of Directors exercises oversight of the MSI, which comprises 
representatives from six companies, six NGOs, and six university representatives, 
as well as an independent chair. The Board is a governing body, not merely an 
advisory one.174 Independent monitoring organised by FLA staff tests the degree to 
which companies have implemented the FLA Charter at the supplier level.175 Public 
reporting on company performance include the publication of company monitoring 
and assessment results, third-party complaint reports and the FLA’s annual report. 
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Third-party complaint mechanism and the Special Review clause in the FLA Charter 
allows the Board to place a company on a 90-day notice of expulsion if it fails to 
remedy violations in monitoring or third-party complaint reports. 
The UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie, has 
held up the FLA as a model multi-stakeholder initiative. He defines it as ‘The gold 
standard among voluntary initiatives, I think, is the Fair Labor Association. It leads 
the way precisely because its Secretariat is encouraged and even mandated to cast 
a critical eye on performance and to recommend practical innovations—to stay 
focused like a laser on the effectiveness and legitimacy of the effort as a whole.’176 
Justine Nolan concurs, underlining the regulatory importance of the FLA, that:  
In this form of re-regulation, private actors are delivering public goods such 
as labour inspections; traditionally a state function but the assessable 
standards are a mix of public and private regulations. This acceptance (albeit 
often reluctantly) by (some) businesses of their human rights responsibilities 
is indicative of the transformation of the rules of the game and an 
acknowledgement that the rules can no longer be framed in narrow and 
legalistic terms.177 
At the same time, the FLA faces criticism. For example, van Heerdan notes that 
while the system of tripartite Board representation depends on creative tension 
between company, civil society and university representatives, the NGO bench has 
often been weakened because of vacant seats or overstretched directors who 
cannot fulfil their Board obligations.178 He also notes that the specific timeframes for 
submitting monitoring reports, corrective action plans and updates, and publishing 
tracking charts, have proven hard to maintain and all parties often run well behind 
schedule.179 Critics question both the Association’s accountability and its 
effectiveness, highlighting what they perceive to be its corporate-dominated 
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governance structure, and its ongoing failure to achieve compliance with 
international labour standards within the supply chains of many FLA members.180 
Elsewhere, criticisms have been stronger. For instance, student organisations have 
criticised the conflict of interests that arise from powerful companies sitting on FLA’s 
Board.181 On January 25, 2012, the New York Times published an extensive exposé 
of labor conditions at a supplier factory for Apple iPads in China called Foxconn.182 
The report revealed widespread violations of worker rights, including the use of 
excessive overtime, crowded dorms, and the use of poisonous chemicals causing 
worker fatalities. Before the expose, the FLA has praised Foxconn for its excellent 
working conditions. The scandal led to much criticism over the effectiveness and 
impartiality of FLA as an organisation. 
Nevertheless, advocates of the FLA regard it as a leader in developing innovative 
approaches to promoting compliance with international labour standards, pointing to 
the progress made toward building independent auditing and complaints processes, 
and the FLA’s efforts in recent years to strengthen the capacity building dimensions 
of its compliance program.183 It is regarded as much more rigorous than other MSIs 
and includes industry labor standards and metrics. 
A second example of a more robust MSI is that of the International Code of Conduct 
for Private Security Service Providers Association (ICoCA).184 The impetus for this 
initiative came from the growing rise in private security companies often operating, 
in a legal lacuna, outside of the usual oversight of state security services.185 As 
guardians of the Geneva Conventions, the Swiss government had already led and 
concluded the Montreaux Document, which clarified governmental obligations vis-à-
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vis private and security companies in times of armed conflict.186 Swiss government 
launched the International Code of Conduct (ICoC) initiative in 2009. According to 
Buzatu, the initiative emerged in two distinct standard-setting phases:187 
1. Development of the ICoC,188 which articulates human rights-compliant 
principles and standards for the provision of private security services, as well 
as specific commitments by management to support the implementation of 
the ICoC into a company’s operations and policies.  
2. Development of the ICoCA, or the framework for the multi-stakeholder 
governance and oversight body tasked with overseeing the ICoC.189  
Areas covered by the ICoCA include the use of force to defend people and property 
and a prohibition on the use of torture.190 The Code also requires private security 
companies to adopt and implement broader management policies to ensure that 
they operate in compliance with human rights norms, for example taking measures 
against harassment, sexual abuse and trafficking, training personnel appropriately 
and, crucially, thoroughly vetting new hires.  
The oversight mechanisms were adopted as the Articles of Association for the 
ICoCA, launched in September 2013. The ICoCA created three tools to oversee and 
hold PSCs accountable:  
1. Certification is a process where the ICoCA verifies that a member company’s 
systems and policies meet ICoC requirements.191 
2. Reporting, Monitoring and Assessing Performance describes the processes 
through which the ICoCA oversees the performance of member companies, 
including gathering data on their activities and conducting field visits, as well 
as receiving information from the companies themselves on their 
performance according to a transparent set of criteria.192 
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3. The Complaints Process sets out a procedure where the member 
company’s internal grievance mechanisms are the normal forum of first 
instance to hear complaints.193  
In cases where the complainant alleges that the company’s grievance mechanisms 
does not offer effective remedy, or is otherwise not compliant with the ICoC, the 
ICoCA Secretariat will review of the internal grievance process. According to 
Bazutu, this could have several follow-on effects, including recommending other for 
alternatives such as mediation, or offering the ‘good offices’ of the ICoCA to help 
resolve complaints.194 The Board is empowered to suspend or terminate a 
company’s membership if it fails to act in good faith to remedy non-compliance with 
the ICoC, including when it fails to offer effective remedy.195  
For some, the ICoCA marks a significant step forward, both in efforts to address the 
human rights responsibilities of the private security industry, and in the wider 
development of MSIs that seek to advance respect for international humanitarian 
law and human rights standards.196 Thus, some suggest that this model can “be 
useful to promote respect for international humanitarian law as a supplement to 
other legal instruments, (... / ...) cannot make up for the absence or inadequacy of 
national or international legislation’.197 
For others, the fact that the initiative is not a state enforcement mechanism and 
therefore does not have the powers of arrest or to conduct criminal investigations 
remains an issue.198 In 2017, a UN expert panel called for new international 
standards on private military and security companies’, a voluntary initiative that did 
not feature accountability or enforceable remedies for victims.  
Nevertheless, despite the relatively nascent stage of the ICoCA, some believe that 
MSIs such as the ICoC initiative can play an important role in filling some of the 
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governance gaps arising out of the activities of these actors, helping to prevent 
human rights abuses and to improve accountability.199  
3.1.1.2.1. Discussion on MSIs 
As the discussion above shows, MSIs emerge in different forms. It is, therefore, 
difficult to appraise the success or failures of MSIs generally. This is because MSIs 
function in very different ways, employ different approaches, and address different 
issues.200 Nevertheless, some broad observations can be made.  
Firstly, some see MSIs as particularly useful in filling governance gaps. Where 
states are unable or unwilling to regulate, MSIs fill ‘institutional deficits or 
governance gaps that have arisen under globalization and the expansion of global 
value chains, often to un- or weakly regulated sites, and in contexts of retrenchment 
or ‘failure’ associated with multilateral regulation, the state or trade unions.’201 
Others suggest that multistakeholder regulation responds to the failure of self-
regulation to address both coordination and political problems related to capitalist 
development under globalization and liberalization.202 MSIs, therefore, respond to 
weaknesses and contradictions apparent in both self-regulation and orthodox 
regulation. Some hold the view that MSIs compliment state-based regulation. 
Studies have documented a ‘California effect’ wherein public regulation can help to 
‘ratchet up’ private standards, and private standards can fill gaps where state 
capacity falls short.203 In this way, LeBaron, and Rühmkorf argue that MSIs can 
strengthen government enforcement of labour law and that a combination of public 
and private initiatives is required to govern labour standards in supply chains.204 
At the same time, there are numerous critiques of MSIs. For example, Bernaz cites 
Cynthia Estlund who, in reference to the FLA and the Ethical Trading Initiative,205 
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another MSI, suggests that these organisations efforts to improve corporate 
accountability are in chronic conflict with their effort to gain voluntary corporate 
adherents. This tension constrains efforts to improve enforcement of these voluntary 
private regulatory undertakings, and maybe the Achilles heel of private transnational 
regulation.’206 In other words, the increasing number of MSIs makes it difficult for 
companies to assess which to join, with the possibility that to attract adherents, 
MSIs begin to lower their standards and enforceability mechanisms.  
Despite the governance and enforcement mechanisms that some MSIs have 
developed, the voluntary nature of MSIs continues to be criticised.207 Albin-Lackey 
notes, for example, that because compliance is optional, it is unlikely to result in 
lasting change.208 Others also develop more nuanced critiques. Le Baron and 
Rühmkorf, for instance, highlight that there is a need for more considerable attention 
to the political agency of business in debates about public and private regulatory 
interactions.209 Drawing on scholars such as Kinderman210 who has argued that 
industry actors tend to reject and oppose new state-based regulations, favouring 
instead voluntarism and soft law without hard sanctions, they suggest that MSIs are 
often promoted only to prevent binding initiatives being adopted.211 This calls into 
question the commitment to MSIs, a criticism raised by others.212 Some also note 
that MSIs are mainly global initiatives, with major international institutions and 
Western NGOs dominating, and which operate through a top-down approach.213 For 
some, therefore, MSIs must be localised, increasing local buy-in and participation.214  
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3.4.1.6. Summary of Persuasive Approaches to Regulation 
The examples discussed above are not exhaustive. However, although existing in 
different forms, they help to outline the basic essence of persuasion as a form of 
regulation. Fundamentally, persuasive approaches to regulation seek to convince 
businesses to act in specific ways, often by drawing on the power of the market to 
do so. Non-financial reporting, initiatives, when not mandated through law, attempt 
to promote socially responsible behaviour by outlining to stakeholders how a 
company is attempting to act in a socially responsible and sustainable manner. 
Certification schemes try to project the same image, albeit through a process of 
certifying whether a company is compliant with a particular issue. Guidelines are 
more informative, arguably providing guidance on how to go about acting in socially 
responsible ways. Critically, in many cases, these guidelines focus on context 
sensitivity, developing processes to help businesses minimise adverse impacts in 
specific settings. MSIs are collaborative. While varying in structure and nature, they 
are fundamentally about different actors coming together to pursue particular 
objectives. Their voluntary nature ensures that they continue to rely on persuasion 
as the ultimate form of regulation. Nevertheless, there have been some important 
developments, most notably in the more robust initiatives of the FLA and ICoCA.  
Read together; these initiatives demonstrate that regulation can occur through 
different forms of persuasion. As the discussions also briefly alluded to, and as will 
be developed in due course, there are very different views on the efficacy of these 
approaches. It is enough to note for now, that while many view with sceptimism 
these softer forms of regulation, perhaps when we shift the objectives from 
preventing harm to engaging businesses to contribute to peacebuilding, these more 
flexible, collaborative and at times context-sensitive approaches, are useful forms of 
influence to engage businesses in peacebuilding processes.  
3.4.2. Conditionality-Based Regulation: Key Initiatives 
Along with the more straightforward command and control approaches to regulation, 
persuasive approaches often rely on perception: businesses must perceive that it is 
in their economic interests, whether for reputational reasons or otherwise, to comply 




regulation is that of economic conditionalities.215 While similar and often difficult to 
distinguish from persuasive approaches to regulation, we can loosely differentiate 
this approach in one primary respect- the likelihood of accrued benefits. This 
approach also relies on the ability of potential economic opportunities to induce 
businesses to act in a socially responsible manner.  
Conditionality-based approaches differ, however, in that compliance with particular 
social objectives links to, in some cases, a contractual obligation. Economic 
conditionalitiies can include gaining access to an economic opportunity, such as a 
government contract, or in the form of potential economic sanctions such as 
shareholders divesting. At the core of this approach is a deliberate use of economic 
instruments to induce businesses to act in socially responsible ways. The discussion 
below briefly touches upon a number of different types of conditionality. These are 
namely, public procurement, private procurement, export credits, finance, 
shareholder and investor activism, and stock exchanges and listing requirements.  
3.4.2.1. Public Procurement  
States often procure services and products from business actors. Governments 
have used procurement as a means to draw on the economic motivations of 
business and induce businesses to make welcome contributions in post-conflict 
settings.216 The primary way of doing so is linking government opportunities to 
certain stipulations. In these instances, companies that pursue state contracting 
opportunities must meet specific mandatory requirements, many of which are 
related to CSR practices. These requirements concern (1) standards of 
responsibility, and (2) eligibility; they are the mandatory ‘‘rules of the game’’ for a 
firm to follow if it wishes to pursue any government contract.217 Snider et al. note, 
therefore that CSR requirements are the means by which public procurement 
potentially influences the CSR of all firms that sell to the government.218  
Procurement can also be used in an extraterritorial sense. Indeed, both Northern 
Ireland and South Africa stand as important examples of the roles that states can 
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play in utilising their position to direct the actions of businesses in conflict-affected 
settings. As Avery notes: 
[a] number of selective purchasing laws have been enacted in the U.S. by 
state and city governments. Most prevent those state and city governments 
from dealing with companies doing business in Burma (Myanmar) because 
of the human rights situation in that country. The states with selective 
purchasing laws on Burma are Massachusetts and Vermont…. And Burma is 
not the only target: Berkley, Oakland and Alameda County adopted selective 
purchasing laws on Nigeria during the period of military rule in that country, 
and Berkley also targets companies doing business in Tibet if their 
operations have been criticised by the Tibetan government-in-exile.219 
By economic relationships between business and states, procurement is described 
by Christopher McCrudden as an extraordinarily adaptable tool, which can be used 
to meet a regulatory need when other methods of regulation are not considered 
acceptable, available or effective.’220 McCrudden continues, however, that the 
relationship between public procurement and the pursuance of social ends cannot 
only be seen as a compliance gap-filling measure.221 Because governments operate 
both as regulators of the market as well as participants, they are well placed to offer 
market incentives as a mechanism for ensuring compliance with Corporate Social 
Responsibility standards.222 I develop these discussions further under the case 
study section.  
The use of public procurement is not without difficulties. For one, Mares assesses 
that socially responsible public procurement has trailed developments in responsible 
supply chain management with which large private companies have experimented 
since the mid-1990s.223 As a practice, it has not attracted the most explicit support 
from public authorities around the world.224 Moreover, selective purchasing can have 
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an adverse impact on smaller companies and employees in the targeted companies, 
which are excluded when they cannot reach the benchmarks set by government 
institutions. 
3.4.2.2. Private Procurement 
Business can also regulate other businesses through their supply chains in what is 
often termed ‘private procurement’. Similar to the concept of public procurement, 
private procurement involves firms utilising their position and influence to shape the 
business conduct of businesses further down the supply chain through contractual 
stipulations.  As Crouch assesses:  
[I]n its contracts a large transnational enterprise dealing with a large number 
of small, local contractors- as in a supply chain- acquires something of an 
authority role. These contracts are asymmetrical, with the large customer 
firm having many more options than the local suppliers. This enables the firm 
to impose conditions on the suppliers and therefore to act in a hierarchical 
relationship to them.225 
McBarnett and Kurkchiyan also assess that ‘[l]egal control of the social impact of 
business can be exercised through private law as well as through state regulation,’ 
and can be exercised by the business itself.’226 They note specifically that 
‘contractual control can […] be seen as a potential mechanism for implementing 
international norms, with multinational’s private law potentially compensating for 
state failures.’227 
According to Vandenbergh, the discussions on supply chain management are 
premised on the leverage that influential companies have over their suppliers and 
distributors, leverage that can be formalised in contractual provisions.228 As such, 
Mares contends that CSR provisions have found their way into contracts through 
which one party communicates its codes of conduct and expectations, outlines due 
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diligence measures, and provides that non-compliance can be a ground for 
termination of contract.229In doing so, businesses, particularly those higher up a 
supply chain, can act as regulators, filling regulatory gaps through the use of private 
law to promote public goods.  
According to Coglianese et al, self-regulatory schemes possess a number of 
potential advantages over command and control regulation. These include i) 
proximity (being closer to the industry being regulated); ii) flexibility (absence of 
political and administrative constraints); iii) greater compliance; and iv) greater 
potential to mobilize resources. Potential disadvantages include conflicts of interest, 
inadequate enforcement and accountability, and insufficient monitoring of 
compliance.230 Moreover, for businesses to include social and environmental 
stipulations, businesses must often decide that they are willing to do so.  
3.4.2.3. Export Credit Agencies  
Expert Credit Agencies (ECA) are public agencies and entities that provide 
government-backed loans, guarantees and insurance to corporations from their 
home country that seek to do business overseas in developing countries and 
emerging markets.231 As with public procurement, the logic of considering the 
potential opportunities of ECAs is similar. By linking the granting of credit to 
compliance with particular standards, states can influence the extent to which 
businesses act in socially responsible ways.  
In 2012, the OECD Council adopted a Recommendation on environmental and 
social due diligence which refers to the UNGP and encourages states to take ‘social 
impact’ into consideration when assessing applications for officially supported export 
credits.232 Practically, states are encouraged to put each application in one of three 
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categories. Category A projects are those that have ‘the potential to have significant 
adverse environment and/or social impacts, which are diverse, irreversible and/or 
unprecedented.’233 Category B projects have environmental and social impacts that 
are ‘less adverse than those of category A projects. Typically, these impacts are few 
in number, site-specific, few if any are irreversible, and mitigation measures are 
more readily available.’234 Finally, Category C projects have ‘minimal or no 
potentially adverse environmental and/or social impacts.’235 
Nevertheless, there again limitations. For instance, some ECAs report that they 
undertake human rights assessments as part of their project due diligence. 
However, scant information is available about these assessments. ECAs frequently 
operate on the grounds of client confidentiality. It is unclear exactly how ECA 
assessments are undertaken, against which human rights standards projects are 
assessed, and whether project modifications are required to bring clients into 
compliance. NCPs have also been criticised by civil society organisations (CSOs) 
for their lack of independence because they are often housed in government 
ministries such as finance or trade, whose mission is to support and encourage- not 
regulate- corporate investment abroad.236 
3.4.2.4. Finance  
Another possibility and one that has attracted more attention involves attaching 
conditionalities to the provision of finance. International organisations such as the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) have developed guidelines to encourage 
socially responsible business. The Performance Standards on Environmental and 
Social Stability of the IFC were introduced in 2006 and adapted in 2012.237 
Essentially, the Performance Standards require that clients of the IFC who enter into 
project finance, equity investment, corporate finance or intermediary finance deals 
with IFC must comply with a number of standards. These standards include, Labor 
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and Working Conditions,238 Community Health, Safety and Security,239 Land 
Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement,240 and Indigenous Peoples.241 Similar 
requirements are stipulated by the African Development Bank Group’s Integrated 
Safeguards System: Policy Statement and Operational Safeguards;242 The Asian 
Development Bank’s Safeguard Policy Statement;243 The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development’s Environmental and Social Policy;244 and the 
Inter-American Development Bank’s Environment and Safeguards Compliance 
Policy245 
Similarly, the Equator Principles (EPs) were launched in 2003 and are a credit risk 
management framework for determining, assessing and managing environmental 
and social risk in project finance. Participating institutions commit themselves to 
implement ten basic principles for all projects they finance with a volume of USD 
10,000 or higher.246 The EP’s are based on the aforementioned IFC Performance 
Standards. These approaches differ in some respects from other business-related 
approaches in the sense that businesses are incentivised to comply with corporate 
social responsibility standards to attain finance. Like the project finance approach of 
multilateral IFC, and the examples of procurement, and export credit, they are a 
stronger basis for engaging CSR than market-based persuasion.   
However, there are numerous limitations. For one, Dowell-Jones notes that given 
the scale and complexity of today’s financial markets, investors can easily 
circumvent social responsibility requirements in different ways.247 These include 
using products of funding strategies that so far have not been brought within the 
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ambit of human rights due diligence. Moreover, it is not always clear how and 
whether social and environmental conditions are enforced. For instance, The 
Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) is the independent recourse mechanism 
for the IFC.248 The IFC created the CAO to serve monitoring and accountability 
functions for IFC-funded.249 As ombudsman, the CAO's major objective is to provide 
an accessible and useful mechanism for handling complaints from persons who are 
affected (or are likely to be affected) by the social and environmental impacts of IFC-
sponsored projects. The aim is to identify problems, recommend practical remedial 
actions and address systemic issues that have contributed to the issues, rather than 
to find fault.250 
Authors such as Altholz and Sullivan note, however, that CAO’s emphasis on 
mediation rather than accountability 'has led many complainants to conclude that 
CAO was ‘untrustworthy’, acting simply as a ‘buffer’ between the community and the 
bank, or as ‘window dressing.’’251 They also note the organisations lack of authority. 
In the context of an entirely voluntary process, CAO must convince bank and 
company officials to address community concerns case-by-case and issue-by-
issue.252 Thus, some question whether environmental and social impact 
assessments are taken seriously or whether they serve merely as public relations 
tools.  
3.4.2.5. Shareholder and Investor Activism 
Shareholders can also use their influence as part owners of a company to pressure 
businesses to adopt socially responsible practices. This example sits precariously at 
the intersection of persuasion and economic incentives. Given that the ability of 
shareholders to use their influence to shape the ways companies operate is subject 
to the particular moral predispositions of investors and shareholders, relying on 
shareholder action is a relatively uncertain basis. However, once engaged, as partial 
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owners of a company, shareholders can lean on businesses to adopt socially 
responsible practices.  Activism, according to Amann et al, ‘is the expression of a 
governance mechanism used by companies which allow all shareholders to express 
their voices in numerous domains, regardless of their participation in the capital.’253 
The starting point for linking investors and human rights was the recognition that 
because investors control a huge pool of global funds, their influence over 
corporations could be a valuable avenue in defending human rights from harmful 
business conduct and an important source of leverage in fostering respect for 
human rights.254 To this end, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) has developed a 
human rights reporting guide and analysis of human rights reporting trends.255 
Similarly, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Finance Initiative has 
created a ‘Human Rights Guidance Tool for the Financial Sector.’256 
As an example of how investors can shape business conduct, a joint publication by 
GRI and UNEP- Responsible Business Advancing Peace: Examples from 
Companies, Investors & Global Compact Local Networks’- outlines a number of 
such examples.257 One such example is that of Robeco Asset Management. Robeco 
Asset Management manages €188 billion in assets for retail and institutional clients.  
UNGC’s and PRI’s case study profiles Robeco’s engagement with Royal Dutch 
Shell and its operations in Nigeria. In particular, it highlights the role of institutional 
investors leaning on companies to demand that they act in socially responsible 
ways, employing strategic social investment to secure a licence to operate in the 
Niger Delta.258 The issue arose after Robecco commissioned independent research 
that identified that Shell was exposed to risks in its operations in the Niger Delta. 
Robeco engaged with Shell to understand the risks and the company’s management 
of them, and to share the new Guidance with Shell. During its engagement with 
Shell, Robeco commissioned further external research to evaluate 16 companies 
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that Robeco determined to be operating in areas defined as high-risk or 
controversial.259 This resulted in a shortlist, based on criteria that included human 
rights issues, community relations, labour issues, corruption, transparency, and 
partnerships with government. The criteria-based research served as a baseline for 
understanding Shell’s activity in the region and for stipulating changes that were 
necessary prior to investment.260 
Others are less optimistic about the prospects of shareholder or investor activism. 
For instance, Millon assesses that many institutional shareholders pursue short-term 
investment strategies.261 These investors hold broadly diversified portfolios and buy 
and sell frequently to realize trading profits. Among all shareholders, the average 
holding period for particular stocks is now concise, perhaps as low as five months. 
In turn, short-term-oriented investors can put pressure on corporate managers to 
produce short-term results in a number of ways. Because shareholders are not 
necessarily interested in the long-term sustainability of a company, they are less 
inclined to focus on social and environmental issues. Moreover, Millon also 
assesses that in addition to pressure from institutional shareholders, corporate 
managers are also subject to other incentives that encourage short-term horizons. In 
what is often-termed the principle-agent problem, executives can be incentivised to 
pursue quarterly gains rather than long-term growth.262 
3.4.2.6. Stock Exchanges and Listing Requirements 
A stock exchange is an exchange (or bourse) where stock brokers and traders can 
buy and sell shares of stock, bonds, and other securities. In some cases, Stock 
Exchanges stipulate that to be listed on a particular exchange, businesses must be 
socially responsible. For instance, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) expects 
all issuers to address the principles set out in the King Code of Corporate 
Governance, which currently covers 75 principles, including on sustainability and 
integrated reporting, disclosing how each principle has been applied or explain why 
or to what extent they were not applied. Besides, the assessment of the principles 
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must be documented in the form of a register that must be made available on the 
website of the issuer.263 
Recognising the potential to influence the social and economic impacts of business 
through listing requirements, in 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched 
the Sustainable Stock Exchanges initiative, an effort co-organized by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNGC, the United 
Nations-supported Principles for Responsible Investment and the UNEP Finance 
Initiative.264 Amongst other things, the initiative has developed Toolkits aimed at 
helping stock exchanges to better interact with their investors and issuers. As an 
example, the Best Practice Guidance for Policymakers and Stock Exchanges on 
Sustainability Reporting Initiatives includes current best practices from around the 
world, with practical options for policymakers and stock exchanges based on real-
world experience as such reporting.265 
In 2010, the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) conducted a survey among the 
30 largest exchanges in the world to assess the efforts made in promoting CSR 
practices among companies listed.266 The results showed that some exchanges 
have developed and/or adopted guidelines/principles of CSR and corporate 
governance principles. It also noted, however, that fewer exchanges plan to change 
the criteria for listed companies by introducing additional elements of social 
responsibilit, the most exchanges like to recommend some good practice rather than 
to impose conditions for listing. 
For Matei and Cibotariu, one of the fundamental difficulties is that, despite 
developments, CSR issues are regarded as ‘a utopian problem or incompatible with 
efficiency and profitability criteria, companies declaring their self-cynical pursuit of 
profit at any cost, regardless of the negative externalities they create.’267 They are, in 
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other words, a problem that they agree to consider, but which rarely lead to practical 
changes.268 
3.4.2.7. Summary of Conditionality-Based Approaches to Regulation 
The use of conditionalities as a regulatory method focuses on different economic 
instruments that can induce businesses to act in certain ways or to pursue certain 
objectives. While often difficult to distinguish from persuasive approaches, the 
difference lies in the fact that the potential advantages or disadvantages are more 
tangible. While in the case of persuasive approaches to regulation, reliance is often 
placed on the market, in the present examples, different actors, in different ways, 
can leverage their economic position to offer opportunities or impose sanctions. 
States can stipulate that businesses adhere to certain conditions to gain access to 
government contracts. The same applies in regards to private procurement, in this 
case, through businesses demanding that companies throughout the supply chain 
adhere to certain requirements. Those providing finance to businesses, such as 
export credit agencies or financiers, can, in theory, adopt similar approaches. In 
these examples, those regulating businesses can incentivise companies to pursue 
particular social policy or developmental objectives. Alternatively, shareholders and 
investors can undermine economic opportunities by threatening to divest or refusing 
to invest if businesses do not act in specific ways. To this end, stock exchanges and 
listing requirements also have the ability, again, theoretically speaking, to influence 
corporate behaviour.  
Read together; these initiatives demonstrate that regulation can occur through 
different forms of economic instruments. As the discussions also briefly alluded to, 
and as will be developed in due course, there are very different views on the efficacy 
of these approaches. It is enough to note for now, that while many view sceptically 
on these softer forms of regulation to prevent businesses from causing harm or to 
hold businesses accountable when damages occur, perhaps when we shift the 
objectives, economic conditionalities can prove useful forms of influence to engage 
businesses in peacebuilding processes.  
                                                            





3.4.3. Alternative Regulatory Paradigms: Key Initiatives 
While the initiatives discussed above often differ, both regarding the broader 
categories to which they belong and the particular individual characteristics of each 
sub-group initiative, they nevertheless share a common trait in that they are all 
focused on regulating businesses. Whether in regards to guidelines, certification 
schemes, procurement, or legislation, businesses are primarily the intended targets 
of regulation. There is one additional set of initiatives that must also be addressed- 
those that are not traditionally business-focused but which have either expanded to 
include businesses or which apply to businesses indirectly. For present purposes, I 
briefly touch upon some of these alternative regulatory paradigms: international 
criminal law, extra-territorial liability, and truth commissions (TCs).  
3.4.3.1. International Criminal Law 
International criminal law is a subset of international law. The origins of this 
international framework lie in the post-World War II era. After World War II, the Allied 
powers set up an international tribunal to try not only war crimes but crimes against 
humanity committed under the Nazi regime. The Nuremberg Tribunal held its first 
session in 1945 and pronounced judgments on 30 September / 1 October 1946. A 
similar tribunal was established for Japanese war crimes (the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East). It operated from 1946 to 1948. International criminal law 
has since expanded to include a number of different institutions, all of which relate to 
post-conflict settings.269 The ultimate institutionalisation of international criminal law 
emerged in 1998 with the signing of the Rome Statute, enacting the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).270 
To a limited extent, international criminal law has attempted to hold business people 
accountable for their involvement in conflict and/or repressive regimes.271 For 
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instance, at its inception at Nuremberg, international criminal law addressed the role 
of business executives in the commission of international crimes.272 I.G. Farben, as 
an example, was a German manufacturer of chemical products which profited from 
the policy of the Nazi regime during the Third Reich.273 Of 23 company officials, 13 
were convicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity, relating to the 
plundering and spoliation of foreign property and participation in the slave labour 
programme while the rest were acquitted.274 
At the same time, international criminal law has also proven relatively insignificant in 
holding business entities to account for their commission in international crimes.275 
The I.G. Farben case involved holding individuals rather than a business to account. 
This is largely the position of international criminal law more generally. The Rome 
Statute, for instance, does not apply directly to businesses. The difficulties 
associated with extending international criminal law to businesses are highlighted in 
the travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute. The drafters of the Statute had the 
opportunity to include jurisdiction over ‘legal entities’ and indeed included a 
bracketed text within the 1998 Draft Statute for the ICC, which covered the 
possibility of trying ‘legal persons.’276 It was subsequently decided not to include 
legal persons within its jurisdiction as a reflection of the fact that the ICC is based on 
the principle of ‘complementarity’.277 Owing to the reality that many domestic legal 
systems do not recognise legal persons as subject to criminal law, including legal 
entities would have meant, in effect, that the ICC would have become a court of first 
instance, thereby eroding the very principle of complementarity on which it was 
founded. 
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At present, international criminal law is of relatively little use in regulating 
businesses. The glimmer of hope that might be identified is the possibility that 
individual business people might be held accountable at the domestic level, as 
discussed below. 
3.4.3.2. Extraterritorial Liability 
In a limited number of circumstances, States have extended criminal law 
extraterritorially, often to try corporate executives for their roles in violating rights 
during conflict. In The Netherlands v van Kouwenhoven, for instance, Dutch 
prosecutors charged and tried Guus Van Kouwenhoven, a Dutch national and 
Director of Operations of the Oriental Timber Company and Royal Timber Company 
in Liberia.278 The charge concerned his alleged violations of UN Security Council 
(UNSC) resolutions establishing an arms embargo in Liberia in 1992.  
Van Kouwenhoven was accused of having delivered arms to Liberia and of 
involvement in war crimes committed in that country. The prosecution also charged 
him with having breached the embargo decreed by the UN concerning Liberia.279 He 
was ultimately acquitted because it was not established whether he was aware of 
the actions of the security forces. i.e. the mental element was not present.  Hitherto, 
there has apparently been no conviction of a company for an international crime. 
However, individual employees and corporate officers have been convicted. 
Examples include the Blackwater prosecutions in the US,280 and Public Prosecutor 
v. van Anraat in the Netherlands.281 In the former case, four former security guards 
for Blackwater USA were found guilty of charges stemming from the Sept. 16, 2007, 
shooting at Nisur Square in Baghdad, Iraq, while escorting a US embassy convoy.282 
The shooting resulted in the killing of 14 unarmed civilians and the wounding of 
numerous others.283 Frans van Anraat was a Dutch businessman who, from 1984 
until 1988, purchased large quantities of the chemical thiodiglycol from the US and 
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Japan. This chemical was then sold, through a number of different companies 
located in different countries, to Saddam Hussein’s government of Iraq. After 1984, 
Van Anraat was the government’s sole supplier of the chemical. On 23 December 
2005, the District Court of The Hague acquitted the accused of complicity in 
genocide but convicted him for complicity in war crimes. He was sentenced to 15 
years’ imprisonment. On 30 June 2009, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
upheld the 2005 conviction of Van Anraat for complicity in war crimes. However, the 
Court reduced his sentence by six months due to the length of the proceedings.284 
States can also regulate extraterritorially through legislation, giving rise to possible 
litigation against companies in civil law. One such example is the US Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS), initially passed by the First Congress in 1789.285 While adopted in the 
context of addressing territorial issues about piracy on the High Seas, beginning in 
the mid-1990s, a class of ATS suits have emerged that aim to hold multinational 
corporations accountable for complicity in human rights abuses.286 
A few examples help to illustrate the circumstances that have led to ATS cases 
involving businesses. In Doe v Unocal Corporation,287 Unocal plaintiffs alleged that 
while being forced to work for Unocal’s benefit, they were subjected to rape and 
other forms of torture, murder, and forced relocation by the military in Burma. The 
plaintiffs in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy claimed that the oil 
company had aided and abetted in the commission of genocide and war crimes in 
Sudan.288 The company built roads that the military used when carrying out military 
strikes, provided fuel for military aircraft, and paid royalties to the government. The 
case of Sarei v Rio Tinto involved allegations that the mining giant’s exploitation of 
copper in Papa New Guinea destroyed the environment, inculcated a policy of racial 
discrimination, incited a ten-year armed conflict that amounted to genocide, and 
facilitated the commission of crimes against humanity and war crimes.289 The case 
of Wiwa v Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Company relates to the execution of 
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indigenous activists from the Niger Delta by the Nigerian government following riots 
and protests over pollution in the Niger Delta.290 Shell was alleged to have 
‘instigated, orchestrated, planned, and facilitated’ the arrests, torture and 
executions.’291 Similarly, in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, the court also 
addressed issues of co-operation between Shell and the Nigerian government, 
though it involved a greater number of plaintiffs.292 Claimants alleged that Shell 
aided and abetted numerous human rights violations throughout the Niger Delta, 
principally through assisting the military.  
Nevertheless, favourable outcomes are difficult in ATS cases. For one, the fact that 
MNEs often operate through locally incorporated subsidiaries can make them hard 
to sue in the US.293 In Kiobel, for example, the parent companies ran their oil 
operations in Nigeria through a Nigerian subsidiary, which was removed as a 
defendant at an early stage because it did not have sufficient contacts with the US 
to subject it to its personal jurisdiction. Even where personal jurisdiction is 
established, a court would have to find either that the parent company itself engaged 
in conduct giving rise to liability or that the subsidiary’s conduct was attributable to 
the parent.  
Another difficulty is the doctrine of forum non-conveniens.294 According to this 
doctrine, courts have the discretion to grant a stay on proceedings despite a real 
and substantial connection between the forum and the subject matter of the claim, in 
favour of a forum where the case may be ‘tried more suitably for the interests of all 
parties and the ends of justice.’295 Another limitation is the difficulty of establishing 
the necessary mens rea of corporate complicity. Before Kiobel, the Courts of 
Appeals had held that claims for aiding and abetting human rights violations could 
be brought under the ATS, but had divided on whether liability required a showing of 
knowledge or purpose. The Second Court adhered to the purpose standard,296 the 
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Eleventh Circuit adhering to its knowledge standard and the Ninth Circuit continuing 
to reserve the question.297 The uncertainty regarding the particular test that courts 
will invoke makes it difficult to determine outcomes. 
Moreover, the potential reach of the ATS has been significantly reduced following 
the decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.298 In this case, the US Supreme 
Court found that there is a presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction under the 
Statute, which may only be rebutted if the alleged tort sufficiently touches and 
concerns the United States. Four Circuits have had occasion to apply the ‘touch and 
concern’ test to corporations since Kiobel.299 The Second Court held that ‘neither the 
US citizenship of defendants nor their presence in the United States is of relevance 
for jurisdictional purposes.’300 Therefore, ‘if all  the relevant conduct occurred 
abroad, that is simply the end of the matter under Kiobel.’301 The Fourth, Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, have held that the US nationality of the 
defendant is relevant to the touch and concern analysis but not sufficient by itself.’302 
In Doe v Drummond, the Eleventh Circuit weighed the alleged planning in the US 
against the execution of those plans in Colombia and concluded that ‘the domestic 
location of the decision-making alleged in general terms here does not outweigh the 
extraterritorial location of the rest of the Plaintiff’s claims.’303 At best, therefore, the 
decision in Kiobel suggests that whether an alleged tort is deemed to sufficiently 
touch and concern the United States is wholly uncertain. 
Additional barriers include those of international comity.304 International comity is 
one of the principal foundations of U.S. foreign relations law. The doctrines of 
American law that mediate the relationship between the U.S. legal system and those 
of other nations are nearly all manifestations of international comity—from the 
conflict of laws to the presumption against extraterritoriality; from the recognition of 
foreign judgments to the doctrines limiting adjudicative jurisdiction in international 
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cases.305 The political question refers to the fact that Federal courts will refuse to 
hear a case if they find that it presents a political problem. That is, if an issue is so 
politically charged, federal courts, which are typically viewed as the apolitical branch 
of government, should not hear the issue.306 For these reasons and others, few 
decisions have gone in favour of the claimants.307  
3.4.3.3. Truth Commissions  
Transitional Justice (TJ) is often described as ‘the full range of processes and 
mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of 
large-scale past abuses to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation.’308 One such TJ mechanism, as touched on above, is the 
aforementioned TRC (also sometimes referred to as a Truth Commission (TC). 
These mechanisms can be loosely understood as bodies set up to investigate a past 
history of violations of human rights in a particular country, which can include 
violations by the military or other government forces or armed opposition forces.’309  
In some cases and as discussed further in the South African case study, these 
mechanisms have examined the role of corporate actors during periods of conflict.310 
The Sierra Leone TRC, for instance, decided that ‘perpetrators may be both natural 
persons and corporate bodies, such as transnational companies or corporations.’311 
It further noted that its mandate ‘is not confined to violations of human rights that 
might constitute crimes, under either national or international law, nor is it limited to 
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violations committed by States or governments.’312 Similarly, the Liberia TRC found 
that ‘all… corporations including shareholders and corporate officers and their 
agents affiliated with or who aided and abetted warring factions or armed groups 
share responsibility for the commission of those human rights violations including 
violations of international humanitarian, international human rights law, war 
crimes.’313 
Some TCs have also included recommendations that directly or indirectly target 
business. A study conducted by Payne and Pereira at Oxford University found that 
23 out of 27 countries’, truth commissions acknowledge corporate complicity in 
human rights violations, and most of those name specific companies responsible for 
abuses, with around 250 companies named.314 For instance, in summarising the 
research findings, Payne draws attention to the case of the Brazil National Truth 
Commission (Comissão Nacional da Verdade, CNV) of 2012, which mentioned 78 
companies specifically for their involvement in , detention; detention centers; 
financing repression; killing; displacement; and labor.315 It recommended further 
investigations.316 In Chad, the Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and 
Misappropriations Committed by Ex-President Habré, 1990, highlighted the role of 
businesses in contributing to economic crimes, recommending that the restitution of 
Property.317 In Sierra Leone, the TRC recommended Labor reform, Tax reform, 
Recovery of assets, Transparency, Anti-corruption.318 
However, TRCs have proven relatively ineffective in the context of impacting 
corporations. Payne assesses, for instance, that TCs have rarely made serious 
efforts to promote accountability or remedy mechanisms for corporate violations in 
                                                            
312 Ibid. See R. Carranza, ‘Transitional Justice, Corporate Responsibility and Learning from the Global 
South’, Manifesto, [web blog], 28 April 2015, http://jamesgstewart.com/transitional-justice-corporate-
responsibility-and-learning-from-the-global-south/. 
313 Liberia TRC, supra note 15, Title VI, Section 11.4. 
314 L.A. Payne and G. Pereira, ‘La complicidad corporativa en las violaciones de derechos humanos: 
¿una innovacion de la justicia transicional en Argentina?’, in Los derechos humanos y las empresas: 
Reflexiones desde America Latina, ed. H Cantu Rivera. San José, Costa Rica: IIDH, cited in L.A. 
Payne and G. Pereira, ‘Corporate Complicity in International Human Rights Violations’, Annual Review 
of Law and Social Science, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 63–84, at 74. 
315 L.A. Payne, Report on Truth Commissions and Corporate Complicity Report, JusticeInfo.net [web 
blog], 4 January 2017, https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/justice-reconciliation/31545-report-on-truth-
commissions-and-corporate-complicity.html. TRC Report available at 
http://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=571  
316 Ibid., Payne. 
317 TC Report available at 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Chad-Report.pdf  




their recommendations.319 She contends that such an outcome is consistent with the 
plodding progress of prosecutions of companies for human rights abuses that have 
been initiated at the domestic, foreign, and international level.320 For example, TCs 
can entirely omit any recommendations towards business. In Chile, the National 
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Comisión Nacional de Verdad y 
Reconciliación, 'Rettig Commission') directly named 15 companies involved in 
various human rights violations but issued no recommendations.321 The same can 
be said of Guatemala’s Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and 
Acts of Violence That Have Caused the Guatemalan People to Suffer (or 
Commission for Historical Clarification – Comisión para el Esclarecimiento 
Histórico), 1999,322 and Haiti’s, National Truth and Justice Commission (Commission 
Nationale de Vérité et de Justice), 1995.323 Nevertheless, as I will develop in 
Chapter 6, TCs might be useful in helping to involve businesses in peacebuilding 
processes.  
3.4.3.4. Summary of Alternative Regulatory Paradigms 
There are a number of ways, therefore, that paradigms not traditionally focused on 
businesses have expanded (if only incrementally) outwards to include companies. 
These include the possibility for holding individual business executives responsible 
under international criminal law, finding businesses liable for complicity in human 
rights violations in particular jurisdictions like the US, and TCs, which can 
sometimes include businesses within the remits of their investigations and 
recommendations. 
There are, however, a number of limitations with these approaches. Most notably, 
they have all proven relatively unsuccessful in holding businesses accountable. In 
the context of international criminal law, only a small number of executives have 
been held to account by any international mechanism. Extraterritorial litigation faces 
numerous constraints, while TCs findings and recommendations to date have had 
little impact on the activities of businesses post-conflict.  
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At the same time, these paradigms intersect with the above discussions in different 
ways. For instance, in holding the potential to hold business people accountable, 
international criminal law can be understood as a form, albeit limited, of command 
and control- regulation. Similarly, given that there is at least the potential for 
extraterritorial litigation under ATS, it can also be understood as a form of command 
and control. While findings in favour of plaintiffs have been spare, we might 
nevertheless argue that bringing a business before a court can have a particular 
impact on how they approach such issues and human rights in the future.  
3.5. Regulatory Pluralism in Action  
3.5.1. How successful are alternative approaches to regulation? 
How then might we assess the initiatives discussed above? As outlined at the 
beginning of this chapter, businesses, both directly and indirectly, can contribute to 
conflict and can undermine peacebuilding efforts. Different forms of regulation are, 
therefore, relevant to peacebuilding to the extent that attempt to deter businesses 
from causing harm and, in some instances, to provide victims with a remedy. In the 
case of human rights, for instance, their denial to certain sections of a population is 
often one of the primary causes of conflict. As such, regulatory initiatives that seek 
to prevent or limit businesses adversely impacting rights are important parts of 
peacebuilding efforts. The importance of accountability-based mechanisms maps 
onto discussions on transitional justice, and in particular rights to justice and 
remedy. In both instances, how and to what extent different forms of regulation 
contribute to peacebuilding depends upon the extent to which they are able to 
achieve these two aims. This helps to explain the lens through which we examine 
the efficacy or efficiency of different approaches to regulation.  
There are different views on the extent to which the different forms of regulation 
discussed above can achieve these aims. For instance, some suggest that 
‘command and control regulation has the virtues of high dependability and 
predictability (if adequately enforced),’324 ‘but commonly proves to be inflexible and 
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inefficient’,325 or ‘unworkable, too slow or outmoded.’326 Some view public 
procurement to be an ‘extraordinarily adaptable tool, which can be used to meet a 
regulatory need when other methods of regulation are not considered acceptable.’327 
Others contest such claims, citing the relative lack of procurement being used as a 
tool for shaping business conduct.328 For others, civil society actors successfully 
draw on and shape ‘the ability and willingness of society to create collective 
pressure on business beyond the rule of law by threatening the productivity’ of 
businesses.329 Others see civil society groups as pursuing various agendas, 
complicating the regulatory landscape in unhelpful ways. To this end, while some 
believe guidelines can be useful methods in helping to inform business conduct, 
often in complex contexts, others suggest that because there is no single guideline 
or standard for holding companies accountable in conflict-affected areas, alternative 
forms of regulation such as these are often confusing.330 
Some view MSIs as essential and influential forms of co-operative regulation. In the 
context of the UNGC, for instance, the trial and error nature of implementing the ten 
guidelines allows for mutual learning from experiences.331 There are those that hold 
the view that voluntary approaches may enhance CSR above levels that could be 
negotiated upon in the case of a regulatory framework, among other things due to 
the stimulation of dialogue and learning.332 For others, however, they are products of 
corporate influence, designed to stave off further binding forms of regulation.333 
Others see them as top-down.334 Moreover, many note that because compliance is 
voluntary, it is unlikely to result in lasting change.335 Indeed, given the soft and often 
non-binding nature of alternative forms of regulation, the lack of enforceability and 
reliability proves to be a significant area of criticism.  
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When it comes to accountability, criticisms of existing approaches are equally 
abundant. In the case of enforcing existing legislation, for instance, many note the 
unwillingness and inability of states both to promulgate and enforce laws when they 
exist. In regards to the OECD NCPs, that ‘only a fraction of the final statements 
issued by the OECD includes a rigorous analysis of the implementation of the 
Guidelines’ and that ‘most NCPs do not make findings regarding compliance with 
the Guidelines’ at all, lead some to question their usefulness in providing remedies 
to victims.336 Others note the potential of extraterritorial litigation but equally lament 
the lack of notable progress and the numerous legal and political barriers that exist 
to prevent victim’s access to justice. 
In short, while there are numerous existing initiatives and thus an abundance of 
debate on the effectiveness of different forms of regulation, many regard existing 
approaches to regulation as insufficient. As previously noted, the incomplete nature 
of these different initiatives leads many to view these efforts as useful approaches to 
filling in gaps that emerge, but not quite regulation.  
3.5.2. Identifying different forms of influence from regulatory 
pluralism 
Putting to one-side debates regarding the effectiveness of these initiatives and 
conceptual questions revolving around what these initiatives are or are not, I 
suggest that the existence of these different initiatives illustrates a range of ways 
that businesses can be influenced.  
For example, traditional approaches to regulation focus on states adopting 
legislation, commanding and controlling businesses. The influence exerted is 
coercion through legal measures. Alternatively, responsive approaches to regulation 
maintain a binding approach but focus more on regulating self-regulation. An 
example of this is mandatory corporate reporting where, while businesses are 
commanded to report, a degree of discretion is often afforded to businesses as to 
how they are address a particular issue. 
We also see influence in the form of directing or guiding businesses. Guidelines 
typically attempt to inform businesses as to how to go about acting in particular 
settings. For example, context-sensitive guidelines such as the OECD or IPIECA 
                                                            




Guidelines, seek to guide businesses to ensure that they are not causing harm in 
conflict-affected settings by outlining processes for businesses to adopt. Adhering to 
guidelines is often voluntary in nature. However, when considered from the 
perspective of regulation, we might say that rather than constituting voluntary 
approaches, they are in fact discretionary, given the different ways that actors might 
seek to influence adherence to these guidelines through persuasion.  
At the core of persuasive influence is an attempt to convince businesses to act in 
socially responsible ways. Certification schemes, for example, try to build on the 
desires of businesses to be viewed as socially responsible or ethical. Such schemes 
include those developed by industries, states and multistakeholder initiatives. MSIs 
are also persuasive in other ways. For instance, compliance with human rights 
governance schemes or best practice sharing MSIs, rarely derives from law or the 
threat of legal sanctions. Rather, various initiatives attempt to draw on the desire of 
companies to project to consumers or businesses up the supply chain that they are 
socially responsible. Not only might consumers opt not to purchase from specific 
suppliers, but other businesses might decide not to engage in commercial 
relationships with businesses that are not perceived as ethical or socially 
responsible. As such, the market acts as a regulator, with different schemes 
attempting to build on the importance attached to corporate reputation. In other 
contexts, the persuasion derives from the desire to be part of a club- particularly in 
the context of MSIs. For example, while accountability before the FLA may not lead 
to binding legal sanctions, it might have economic repercussions if a business is 
forced to relinquish its membership to the scheme. MSIs also illustrate the potential 
of more collaborative forms of influence. In these instances, different actors pull 
together to address a specific issue, be it conflict minerals or child labour in apparel 
factories.  
The discussion on alternative regulatory paradigms sits at a peculiar position 
between command and control-based and persuasive approaches to regulation. In 
certain instances, extraterritorial liability is command and control in nature. It is thus 
a form of coercive influence. At the same time, the lack of sufficient remedies for 
victims, coupled with the numerous obstacles facing victims in bringing businesses 
to book, does not render these approaches useless. For example, even naming 
businesses as potential defendants might have an impact on a company’s bottom 
line, inspiring changes to how they approach CSR, irrespective of the outcome of 




specific instances; civil society campaigns and other soft forms of accountability, can 
influence businesses indirectly by drawing attention to socially irresponsible 
practices.   
Economic conditions are arguably a more reliable form of regulation. At the heart of 
these approaches are efforts to influence businesses through economic incentives. 
For instance, linking conditionalities to export credits, finance, or the use of public 
and private procurement demonstrate how different actors can use their financial 
influence in order to shape business behaviour.  
There are, therefore, various ways to influence businesses. When we identify 
different forms of influence, I argue that we can begin to question the ways that 
these same methods and actors might bring about more proactive interventions on 
the part of business. For example, while shareholders can use their influence to 
demand that actors comply with environmental standards or human rights norms, 
can and do they require firms to challenge corrupt regimes or promote the rights of 
minorities? As Angelika Rettberg postulates on these possibilities: 
The first factor [in engaging businesses in peacebuilding efforts] may come 
in the form of specific mandates from shareholders seeking to build a 
positive social record for corporate activity […].337 
Perhaps business contributions to peacebuilding can be induced through ‘access to 
special lines of domestic or international credit’.338 Alternatively, can government 
policy require businesses not only to avoid discrimination of women or ethnic 
minorities but also to empower women and ethnic minorities? Can multi-stakeholder 
processes, often focused on reducing governance gaps, also serve to promote and 
guide business contributions to peacebuilding? How and to what extent can we 
develop guidelines, which push beyond requiring that business do no harm, to 
instead informing businesses as to how and when to contribute to peacebuilding? 
Secondly, when we do alter our lens to enquire as to how different forms of 
regulation might be useful in requiring, incentivising or persuading businesses to act 
in more proactive ways, does this then alter how we interpret the use of these 
different approaches? For instance, command and control-based approaches might 
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be viewed as optimum, given the ability of such approaches to outline predictable 
standards of conduct and thus predictability. However, when approached through a 
lens, which asks how regulation might influence businesses contributions to 
peacebuilding in context-sensitive and reflective ways, are these same approaches 
still the most appropriate? Does the softness of certain initiatives, then become one 
of its strengths? Similarly, while MSIs suffer the same supposed limitations, does 
the ability to address issues through collaboration stand as an important aspect? 
The case studies take these enquiries forward. I suggest that notwithstanding 
conceptual debates regarding whether these initiatives amount to regulation, or 
whether or not they do and can prevent harms from arising or remedy damages 
when they occur, underpinning the different initiatives examined above is a range of 
ways that different actors can influence businesses. How and whether these 
different forms of regulation can be used to engage businesses to contribute to 
peacebuilding will form the focus of the remainder of this work.  
3.6. Conclusion  
This chapter has sought to examine how different actors can influence businesses in 
a range of ways. To understand these various forms of influence, I considered a 
range of what many interpret to be regulatory initiatives that exist in post-conflict 
settings. These included command and control-based regulation, along with other 
less binding forms of regulation in the form of persuasion, economic incentives and 
some alternative regulatory paradigms. Collectively, these different initiatives often 
emerge in response to the limitations of state-based formal regulation, a reality 
present in many, if not most, post-conflict settings.  
These initiatives, while many, are often assessed according to a number of criteria. 
At a conceptual level, many question whether these various initiatives are, in fact, 
regulation. On a more practical level but directly related, others examine whether 
and the degree to which they are successful in preventing businesses from causing 
harm or holding businesses to account when they do. The answers that emerge are 
as diverse as the initiatives themselves. Some note the importance and benefits of 
flexibility; others criticise the lack of enforceability and predictability that arise from 
softer forms of regulation. One might add, however, that assessing these initiatives 
in a broad and overarching manner overlooks the fact that in different instances, 




procurement may prove to be ineffective in one context, it may serve as a useful and 
successful means of influencing corporate conduct.  
Nevertheless, despite these various debates regarding the pros and cons, does and 
does nots, underlying these multiple initiatives are different forms of influence. When 
we step beyond conceptual and twin-tests of efficiency-based discussions, we can 
begin to question how these different forms of influence might be used to achieve 
different ends. In the context of this thesis, I am particularly interested in 
understanding how different actors, using different forms of influence, might require, 
incentivise or persuade businesses to contribute to peacebuilding. In asking this 
question, we can also begin to consider whether what are often understood as the 
weaknesses of different initiatives- i.e. flexibility and unpredictability, might in fact be 
regarded as strengths when examined through a different lens. The next two 
chapters examine how businesses have been influenced to contribute to 























This chapter examines how different actors sought to require, induce and persuade 
businesses to contribute to the peacebuilding effort in South Africa. This chapter 
also discusses how initiatives interact with others focusing on the ways that they 
might reinforce, support, and/or undermine efforts to include businesses in the 
peacebuilding effort.  
4.1.  Introduction  
The previous chapter examined different forms that regulation can take in post-
conflict contexts. Along with command and control-based approaches, regulation 
can be persuasive in nature, or achieved with economic-conditionalities. I also 
outlined the possibilities of alternative regulatory paradigms that can shape business 
activities in post-conflict settings.  
To this end, a number of initiatives that come under persuasive and conditionality-
based approaches to regulation, as well alternative regulatory paradigms that have 
expanded to include businesses, were discussed. These approaches to regulation 
typically try to prevent businesses from causing harm and at times to hold 
businesses accountable for harmful practices when they occur. I also suggested that 
notwithstanding conceptual debates over how we define these initiatives or whether 
they can achieve the twin tests of efficiency, underpinning these various approaches 
are different forms of influence. 
This chapter examines how different actors sought to use various forms of influence 
to engage companies in the peacebuilding effort in South Africa. I do so through two 
stories that draw on a number of important regulatory moments throughout the 
peacebuilding process in South Africa. The first is that of the Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Framework (B-BBEE). B-BBEE is a state-developed 
framework that seeks to include businesses in efforts to address the socioeconomic 




relies primarily on the use of economic conditionalities and persuasion to engage 
businesses in the peacebuilding process. Through B-BBEE, respective South 
African governments have sought to incentivise companies to, amongst other things, 
adopt affirmative practices in the area of employment, engage in the skills 
development of black South Africans, and to contribute to the socioeconomic 
development of black South African communities.  
The second story that this chapter will tell is one of different initiatives and influences 
interacting. Firstly, I examine how different initiatives contributed to the emergence 
of B-BBEE. Focusing on three key initiatives, namely economic sanctions, 
divestment campaigns and the Sullivan Principles,1 this discussion demonstrates 
that different forms of influence and approaches to regulationcan help to shape 
business conduct and the post-conflict regulatory environment. I also identify the 
importance of significant peace building moments, most notably the South African 
Constitution of 1996, which has provided the robust constitutional framework upon 
which B-BBEE is built.  
By including aspects of the B-BBEE agenda within the remits of different initiatives, I 
then explore how various efforts have helped to reinforce the extent to which 
businesses have engaged in the peacebuilding effort. Following this, I address how 
different initiatives can be understood as gap filling for the B-BBEE by requiring, 
incentivising and persuading businesses to do no harm. The final discussion 
addresses conflicts between initiatives.  
These two stories and sub-discussions merge to form a broader narrative of the 
possibilities and limitations of different actors influencing businesses in post-conflict 
settings. In particular, this chapter illustrates that different forms of regulation are 
important not only for engaging businesses in peacebuilding efforts but also in 
helping to contribute to the emergence of regulatory initiatives that attempt to 
achieve similar ends. The findings of this chapter help to inform the discussion in 
chapter 6 as to how a range of actors, employing different methods, might help to 
engage businesses in peacebuilding efforts and the possibilities that might exist for 
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thinking about a global policy instrument on business and peacebuilding, which 
could seek to promote these possibilities.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 briefly outlines the background to the 
conflict in South Africa. As many initiatives in post-conflict South Africa emerged in 
response to the role that businesses played before and during the South African 
conflict, this background is explored with a strong focus on the relationship between 
business and apartheid. Section 4.3 examines how different initiatives drew on 
business involvement during the apartheid era to target businesses in the push for 
change. I suggest that these initiatives have helped both to galvanise and sustain 
the participation of business in the peacebuilding efforts and to force regulatory 
developments at the institutional level. Section 4.4 examines B-BBEE, namely its 
origins, objectives, methods of regulation and impacts. Section 5.5 then discusses 
other regulatory initiatives that exist alongside B-BBEE. In different ways, these 
initiatives can be understood as reinforcing, gap-filling and/or undermining the B-
BBEE framework. This chapter concludes by summarising the findings of the case 
studies (section 4.6.), which will be developed in chapter 6.  
4.2.  Background to the Conflict  
The origins of the conflict in South Africa lie in the system of apartheid. Apartheid in 
South Africa was described as a political system predicated on a racially exclusive 
institutional framework that eroded political rights and freedoms, property rights and 
generated high levels of political uncertainty.2 Under apartheid, the white-led 
government viewed blacks as subordinate, expressing and reflecting this 
perspective through policies and laws adopted.3 The suborindation of black South 
African’s manifested itself in the classification of individuals into racial categories; 
the denial of voting rights to black South Africans; and the establishment of separate 
living areas for Whites through the forced resettlement of non-Whites.  
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Legislation was one of the primary tools used by apartheid governments to sub-
ordinate non-whites.4 For instance, the Population Registration Act of 1950 
established a rigid racial classification system,5 while the 1953 Reservation of 
Separate Amenities Act provided governmental authorisation for the enforcement of 
racially separate public accommodations and other facilities.6 Interracial property 
transactions were outlawed under the Group Areas Acts of 1950.7 The Native Laws 
Amendment Act of 1952 established a registration process and labour bureau to 
control the movement of black South African’s seeking work in ‘white areas.’8 Laws 
were also passed outlawing strikes by black workers and prohibiting legally 
registered trade unions from having black members. The reservation of particular 
types of work for persons of specific racial groups was enshrined in the Industrial 
Conciliation Amendment Act of 1956.9  
Businesses were both, directly and indirectly, involved in helping to sustain the 
apartheid regime. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) established in 
1995 was tasked with painting ‘as complete a picture as possible of the causes, 
nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights which were committed 
during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date.’10 As part of these 
investigations, the TRC dedicated a whole section and two days of hearings to 
assess the various roles that businesses played during the era of apartheid.11 The 
findings of the TRC provide insights into the ways that businesses were implicated 
in supporting and benefitting from the apartheid system. 
Amongst other things, the TRC assessed that the degree to which corporations 
became complicit in sustaining the apartheid regime varied from ‘engaging in 
activities directly associated with repressive functions to simply benefitting from 
operating in a structured society in which wages were low, and workers were denied 
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basic rights.’12 To capture the different degrees of culpability, distinctions were 
drawn between first, second, and third-order involvement of businesses with the 
apartheid regime.  
Companies that played a central role in helping design and implement apartheid 
policies were categorized as having first-order involvement. In regards to mining 
companies, for example, the TRC determined that the system of ‘grand apartheid’ 
was itself based on the mining system which preceded it.’13 According to Mueller-
Hirth, capitalist development accelerated when minerals were discovered (diamonds 
in Kimberly in Afrikaner-governed Trasnvaal in 1866; gold on the Witwatersand in 
today’s Johannesburg in 1886), and that the mining sector in particular initiated 
oppressive and discriminatory practices, which were consolidated and expanded 
with the formal establishment of apartheid in 1948.14 Thus, the TRC assessed that 
‘the blue print for ‘grand apartheid’ was in fact provided by the mines and was not an 
Afrikaner innovation.’15 Essentially, first order involvement suggests that businesses 
and businessmen were among the architects of apartheid. 
Businesses in the second-order involvement group were those that knew ‘that their 
products or services would be used for morally unacceptable purposes’16 but 
continued to do business with the apartheid regime regardless. These businesses 
sought to prosper from the system of apartheid. For example, companies that 
provided arms and ammunition, military technology, and transportation and all fell 
within this category.17  
Lastly, businesses implicated in third order involvement were those that benefitted 
indirectly from the repressive apartheid regime.18 These businesses, while not 
necessarily directly supporting apartheid, failed to challenge the administration, 
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adhering to repressive policies and often profiting from them. The final report of the 
TRC stated, for instance, that:  
[t]he manufacturing industry benefitted from cheap electricity generated 
through the exploration of cheap labour in the coal mines. The arms industry 
benefited from the military requirements of the apartheid regime, resulting in 
internal repression and external destabilisation. Those banks and financial 
institutions that bankrolled the mineral-industrial complex and the mineral-
energy complexes benefitted vicariously.19  
Owing to the different ways in which businesses were implicated in helping to 
support and sustain the apartheid regime, various regulatory efforts sought to 
directly include business as part of a broader effort to push for change at the political 
level. As will be developed below, these initiatives had a number of impacts, such as 
in helping to drive the inclusion of businesses in the peacebuilding effort in the post-
conflict era. 
4.3.  Challenging the Relationship between business and conflict 
Different initiatives that emerged during the era of apartheid were instrumental in 
pressuring companies to reconsider how they conducted their economic activities in 
South Africa. These initiatives have also been central to the development of 
regulatory initiatives at the institutional level post-confict, most notably the B-BBEE 
framework, that has sought to include businesses in promoting a more inclusive 
South Africa. For present purposes, I focus on three significant regulatory moments: 
economic sanctions; divestment campaigns, and the Sullivan Principles. I briefly 
outline the basic parameters of each approach before engaging in a fuller discussion 
of their impacts. 
4.3.1.  Economic Sanctions 
From the early 1960s, anti-apartheid activists urged Western countries with 
economic relations with South Africa to impose international economic sanctions on 
South Africa. The main argument advanced was that this route offered the most 
                                                            




feasible nonviolent strategy to undermine a repressive system of racial oppression.20 
Examples of economic sanctions that were subsequently levelled against South 
Africa included those by the United Nations (UN), European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1985 and the US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.21 Sweden 
also forbade not only new investments but also the transfer of certain patents and 
technology to South Africa, while Norway prohibited the use of export credits to 
finance trade with South Africa. As a final example, Prime Minister Laurent Fabius 
banned all new French investment in South Africa.22 
Spearhead by civil society campaigns, and while initially opposed by the West, 
sanctions helped to inform the importance and dangers of an unbalanced economy. 
Sanctions also adversely impacted businesses in different ways. As a result of the 
economic sanctions imposed on South Africa, businesses were prevented from 
participating in the global market economy, which had boomed with the onset of 
globalisation.23  
4.3.2.  Divestment Campaigns 
Demanding the divestment of companies from South Africa was another approach 
pursued by anti-apartheid campaigners.24 Like economic sanctions, the broad 
objective of divestment campaigns was to put pressure on both businesses and the 
apartheid regime to alter their policies and, in the case of companies, to challenge 
the apartheid regime. Shafir, for instance, assesses that over 350 foreign 
corporations disposed of their South African investments by the late 1980s.25  
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Support for divestment was significantly strengthened in the wake of the Soweto 
Uprising. On June 16, 1976, police fired on a student demonstration in Soweto, the 
black township outside Johannesburg. Following a strike wave in 1973, the Soweto 
students’ uprising was a catalyst for increased protests, as black communities 
challenged apartheid through school boycotts, strikes, occasional guerrilla attacks, 
and other tactics designed to disrupt and undermine government control.26  
The Soweto Uprising proved to be the catalyst for a number of campaigns, often led 
by civil society and institutional investors such as universities and Churches. These 
actors demanded that businesses cease their operations and relationships with the 
apartheid government.27 As Mangaliso notes, ‘proponents […] believed that the 
presence of overseas multinational corporations (MNCs) in South Africa gave moral 
legitimacy to the White minority’ and thus urged business to cease all economic 
activities there.28 Sanctions had the impact of increasing demands for the 
divestment of hundreds of companies and helped to galvanise businesses to 
challenge the apartheid regime. 
4.3.3.  The Sullivan Principles  
Some opposed calls for divestment on the basis that businesses were also a force 
for good in a system characterised by oppression. It was argued, for instance, that in 
what De Jon terms as ad hoc responsibility,29 businesses helped to challenge 
apartheid and to alleviate the suffering of black South Africans.30 As an illustration, 
in 1973, two giant mining powerhouses, Anglo American and DeBeers, jointly 
established a ‘Chairman’s Fund’ to tackle some of the social ills of apartheid rule in 
non-white communities.31 Similarly, the ‘Urban Foundation’, a coalition of 
                                                            
26 Seidman, supra note 20, at 11. 
27 C. Charney, ‘Civil Society, Political Violence, and Democratic Transitions: Business and the Peace 
Process in South Africa, 1990 to 1994’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 41, no. 1, 
1999, at 191;  
D.L. Spar and L.T. La Mure, ‘The Power of Activism: Assessing the Impact of NGOs and Global 
Business’, California Management Review, vol. 45, no. 3, 2003. 
28 Mangaliso., Supra note 23, at 219-238. 
29 D. De Jongh, ‘Corporate citizenship around the world: What happens in South Africa?’, Management 
Today, 2009, at 37, cited in N. Mueller-Hirth Supra note 14, at 55. 
30 O.A. Babarinde, ‘Bridging the Economic Divide in the Republic of South Africa: A Corporate Social 





businesses operating in South Africa, was formed in 1976, primarily to improve 
dreadful living conditions in townships across the country.32   
The potential political influence of businesses, coupled with these fleeting or ‘ad hoc’ 
instances of proactive social interventions, catalysed and strengthened the 
argument that rather than divesting, companies should use their economic leverage 
to push for further change in South Africa.33 From this basis emerged the Sullivan 
Principles, a corporate code of conduct formally announced in 1977 by Reverend 
Sullivan. The Sullivan Principles became a focal point of debate about United States 
(US) foreign policy and the behaviour of multinational corporations (MNCs) during 
the heyday of the struggle against apartheid laws. At their core, the Sullivan 
Principles encouraged businesses to challenge discriminatory employment practices 
through their core business operations. For instance, among the requirements 
asked of business was that they:  
Promote equal opportunity for […] employees at all levels of the company 
with respect to issues such as color, race, gender, age, ethnicity or religious 
beliefs, and operate without unacceptable worker treatment such as the 
exploitation of children, physical punishment, female abuse, involuntary 
servitude, or other forms of abuse.34 
Adherence to the Sullivan Principles was strengthened through a number of different 
initiatives. For one, investors in businesses that operated in South Africa began to 
demand changes in how businesses operated, often using the Sullivan Principles as 
the basis upon which to do so. As Christopher McCrudden notes:  
Added weight was given to the Principles by the activities of church groups, 
human rights groups, institutional investors, college and university students, 
and several state and local governments in the USA, which used the Sullivan 
Principles as bench-marks against which to assess corporations with which 
they contracted, or in which they invested.’35  
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At one extreme, McCrudden notes that the restrictions were absolute, requiring 
divestment from any firm doing business in or with South Africa.36 Another approach 
was to limit investment only to firms subscribing to the Sullivan Principles.37 
Alternatively, where states and localities continued to hold stock in companies with 
South African connections, shareholder resolutions were a favourite method of 
increasing the pressure to make changes, often by pressing for compliance with the 
Sullivan Principles.38 Added to this, state and local activity in South Africa also 
involved much recourse to the use of ‘selective purchasing’ as a tool to bring 
pressure for change. Indeed the first recorded economic initiative at a state or local 
level involved the adoption of a binding resolution by the city council of Madison, 
Wisconsin, to seek purchasing contracts with companies that did not have economic 
interests in South Africa.39 
Through a mixture of persuasion and economic-conditionalities, these initiatives all 
attempted to leverage businesses through both opportunities and the threat of 
sanctions to challenge the policies of the apartheid regime. 
4.3.4.  Impacts of In-Conflict Initiatives 
The section briefly touches upon a number of the impacts that these in-conflict 
initiatives made. I address the direct effects of influencing businesses and the 
indirect impacts of shaping institutional reform, which I develop further in the next 
section. 
4.3.4.1.  Shaping the Contributions of Business to Peace 
The initiatives described above, were, in different ways, able to influence businesses 
to challenge the system of government that was a root cause of conflict in the 
region. Pressure to divest brought the involvement of businesses in helping to 
sustain the apartheid regime centre stage, galvanising business action. For 
instance, even those ad-hoc contributions cited above, the impetus to address 
socioeconomic conditions in South Africa emerged against criticism against 
companies for exploiting black South Africans. Moreover, divesting from South 









the unstainability of maintaining presence in South Africa under the then political 
system was a decisive factor in pushing businesses to challenge the apartheid 
regime. The Sullivan Principles, which essentially asked businesses to oppose laws 
that deliberately marginalised black South African’s, can be understood as a 
contribution, on the part of business, to challenge the political order, against which 
black South African’s were fighting. On one level, the example of the Sullivan 
Principles demonstrates that codes of conduct and guidelines can be used for 
purposes that extend beyond limiting the harms that businesses might cause. On 
another, the example further shows that actors such as shareholders and 
institutional investors can leverage businesses, through both economic sanctions 
and incentives, to adopt them. 
Subsequently, along with adopting the Sullivan Principles and in doing so, opposing 
the repressive legislation in place, businesses played various roles in contributing to 
the peace process. As an illustration, in 1988, the Consultative Business Movement 
(CBM), a coalition of businesses operating in South Africa, was set up ‘to mobilize 
business as a major change agent and communication mechanism’40 and to foster 
contact between business and the black leadership.’41 CBM galvanised the business 
community by convening workshops with the representatives of virtually all the 
major corporations. The coalition also facilitated dialogue between the ANC and the 
Government of South Africa by arranging and attending a number of clandestine 
meetings, the result of which was the signing of a peace agreement in 1991. In 
implementing the peace agreement of 1991, businesses also played a role in the 
regional and local peace committees, not only providing financial assistance but also 
making available human resources and leadership.42 Moreover, at the end of 1991, 
the Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was launched which saw 
working groups appointed to deal with specific issues. The CBM acted as secretariat 
to the process.43 These efforts subsequently led to two further peace agreements in 
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the form of the interim constitution of 1993 and the adoption of the final constitution 
of 1996. Businesses also established such initiatives as Business against Crime, the 
Business Election Fund, and the National Business Initiative, which all attempted, in 
various ways, to contribute to the realisation of democracy and peacebuilding.44 
The various in-conflict regulatory initiatives were able to engage businesses in 
challenging apartheid in a range of ways. On one level, the particular methods 
adopted sought to affect the bottom line of businesses. For instance, shareholders 
and investors were able to threaten divestment if companies did not adhere to the 
principles. Similarly, attaching conditions to procurement opportunities meant that it 
was in the economic self-interest of businesses to adhere to the Sullivan 
requirements. On another level, these initiatives were also able to persuade 
businesses to act by drawing on the relationship between business and the 
apartheid regime. Ostensibly, the reputation of firms suffered because of their close 
connections to morally defunct government. In-conflict regulatory moments, drawing 
attention to the roles played by businesses during the era of apartheid, helped to 
highlight the socially irresponsible practices of businesses.  
Added to this were developments in thinking regarding the relationship between 
business and society more generally. One such development was the emergence of 
the concept of corporate citizenship, itself catalysed, in part, by the practices of 
businesses in South Africa. As Hamann et al. note: ‘The international debates 
surrounding the role of business in apartheid South Africa, with a focus on labour 
and human rights issues, were an important driver of the growing corporate 
citizenship movement in the last 20 years.’45 
Conversely, against the backdrop of this movement, scrutiny was directed towards 
the activities of businesses in South Africa, further increasing the pressure mounted 
against firms to help oppose the system of apartheid. The broader public, in other 
words, became increasingly aware of the involvement of businesses, with the 
reputation of companies suffering as a result. 
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The onset of globalisation also meant the emergence of new business opportunities, 
which, through the imposition of sanctions, were then denied to business.46 Shafir 
notes, for example, that as institutions of the colonial era were losing their value and 
their political defenders began abandoning them and the world economy and its 
institutions - the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
World Economic Forum (WEE)- demanded greater openness to the world, new 
opportunities opened up for the business communities in both societies.47 The 
sanctions levelled against South Africa meant that for those businesses that 
remained in South Africa, global markets were largely off limits. Lost economic 
opportunities caused by sanctions helped to galvanise businesses to oppose the 
apartheid regime.  
Along with the impacts of these regulatory initiatives, it should also be noted that 
other factors contributed to business adopting a more engaged role in the early 
peacebuilding efforts. As just one example, apartheid laws and policies were 
increasingly viewed by businesses as detrimental to their interests. Whereas 
businesses wanted a stable workforce so they could hold on to scarce skilled 
workers, the apartheid system had led to increasing violence and protesting 
workers. In this sense, it is arguably the case that the susceptibility of businesses to 
change and to regulatory pressure had shifted over time. 
4.3.4.2.  Indirect Impacts of In-conflict Initiatives 
Sanctions, divestment campaigns, and the Sullivan Principles were also 
instrumental in directing change in other ways. In focusing on the ways in which 
businesses helped to sustain and benefit from the regime, the public consciousness 
regarding the inequalities of apartheid was heightened. This aided broader 
campaigns focused on ending the system of apartheid.  
Similarly, while not the sole driving force, in raising awareness in this way, these 
initiatives arguably helped to contribute to the importance attached to inequality in 
the post-conflict era. One such example is the constitutionalisation of socioeconomic 
rights in the 1996 South African constitution, which attempted to respond, in part, to 
the failures of the South African Government to respect, protect and realise rights of 
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black South Africans during the apartheid era.48 Another is the importance attached 
to the realisation of equality in the post-conflict era. As will be discussed below, 
partly driven by these in-conflict initiatives, the South African Constitution focuses 
heavily on safeguarding equality. From this constitutional basis, one of the most 
important regulatory moments emerged in the form of B-BBEE. 
4.3.5.  Discussion  
By drawing on the role of businesses during conflict, a number of initiatives 
attempted to persuade and incentivise businesses to challenge the apartheid 
regime. These initiatives used methods that included offering economic 
opportunities through procurement and threatening economic sanctions when 
businesses failed to comply with the conflict transformative code that was the 
Sullivan Principles. In other cases, in holding businesses accountable for 
wrongdoing, companies were driven to play more proactive roles in challenging the 
apartheid regime. As will be developed in due course, these approaches are 
somewhat different to the example of B-BBEE, which directly attempts to engage 
businesses in contributing to a positive peace. Nevertheless, these examples do 
show the potential for using accountability-based forms of regulation, and economic 
incentives, as means to galvanise more positive interventions on the part of 
business. 
Thus, driven by a combination of the pressures exerted via different regulatory 
initiatives, coupled with economic costs of doing business in apartheid South Africa 
more generally, businesses subsequently became key players in ending the 
apartheid regime. Moreover, by drawing attention to the broader levels of inequality 
in South Africa, these initiatives at least contributed to the importance attached to 
equality in South Africa’s Constitution. The combination of this constitutional 
framework, coupled with the in-conflict regulatory initiatives that drew attention to the 
relationship between business and the white minority government, were significant 
catalysts for emergence of the B-BBEE framework. 
                                                            
48 See C. Heyns and D. Brand, ‘Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution’, 




The discussion below now turns attention to B-BBEE, which is a prime example of 
state-developed initiative that directly attempts to engage businesses in 
peacebuilding efforts.  
4.4.  Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
The B-BBEE framework is the primary driver of business involvement in 
peacebuilding efforts in South Africa. The discussion below examines the origins of 
the framework before exploring the methods used to engage businesses in the 
peacebuilding effort. I conclude by outlining some different perspectives on the 
impacts of B-BBEE. 
4.4.1.  Origins 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) preceded the B-BBEE framework. BEE 
emerged as part of the African National Congress (ANC)-led government’s 
commitment to addressing the past. The preamble to the Constitution acknowledges 
that the South African Constitution must, among other things, ‘lay the foundations for 
a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the 
people and every citizen is equally protected by law.’49 Section 9 explicitly allows the 
government to take affirmative legislative and other measures to promote the 
achievement of equality by advancing the interests of individuals or groups 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.50 This constitutional mandate was the 
primary driver of the early BBE policy, which was primarily focused on rebalancing 
the control of capital in South Africa. That is, the primary objective of BEE was to 
encourage and facilitate the transferring of company ownership to black South 
Africans.  
This initial approach was, however, criticised on numerous levels. For one, some 
assessed that BEE was underpinned by, and fuelled, corruption. 51 BEE policies 
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were perceived as growing out of the practice of large businesses hiring well-placed 
members of the ANC to secure good standing with the new government and to 
reposition themselves in the post-apartheid society.52 To critics, both black and 
white, many of the early purchasers appeared to have an inside-track, such as 
former secretary of the ANC’s Youth League, Nthata Motlana, who was given 
exclusive opportunity by Sanlam, one of South Africa’s biggest companies, to buy 
10% of its Metropolitan Life subsidiary.53As Southhall notes: ‘Given the centrality of 
political leverage to the promotion of BEE and the structure of the South African 
economy, black capitalism and black capitalists are as likely to tend towards 
‘cronyism’ and ‘compradorism’ as ‘Weberianism’ and ‘patriotism’.’54 
One of the implications of this approach was that only a few benefitted from BEE, 
undermining the objective of helping to advance the constitutional mandate of 
achieving equality in the economic sphere.55 Thus, on 29 May 1998, Thabo Mbeki 
opened the National Assembly debate on ‘Reconciliation and Nation Building’ with 
what became known in South Africa as his ‘Two Nations’ speech.56 In his address, 
Mbeki argued that national unity and reconciliation between black and white South 
Africans were impossible dreams if socio-economic disparities, which prevented 
black South Africans from exercising their citizenship rights to the same extent as 
white South Africans, were not rapidly overcome.57 A B-BBEE Commission was 
subsequently established to identify barriers to black participation and to propose a 
viable B-BBEE strategy. It recommended national legislation to facilitate economic 
empowerment, which resulted in the B-BBEE Act, 2003.58 
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4.4.2.  Objectives of B-BBEE 
The inclusion of ‘broad-based’ in the B-BBEE Act was a direct response to the 
limitations of BEE. As per the Act, ‘broad-based black economic empowerment 
means the economic empowerment of all black people including women, workers, 
youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas through diverse but 
integrated socio-economic strategies […]’.59 Codes of Good Practice were also 
developed and published by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in 2007, 
setting out seven elements of a B-BBEE framework.60 These elements were namely, 
ownership, management and control, employment equity, skills development, 
preferential procurement, enterprise development, and socio-economic 
development.61 The intention behind these Codes was to ‘encourage all entities, 
both public and private, through the issuing of licenses, concessions, sale of assets 
and preferential procurement to implement proper B-BBEE initiatives.’62 
4.4.2.1.  Employment Equity  
Employment equity includes the promotion of non-racial, gender-sensitive 
workplaces as well as a respectable workplace that provides reasonable work 
conditions, respect to the sustainable development of the environment and cultural 
diversity.63 The inclusion of employment equity as an objective is a direct response 
to the exclusion of blacks during the apartheid era. In particular, under apartheid, 
few if any blacks enjoyed positions in management. To address this marginalisation, 
the employment equity objective attempts to address this deficit by encouraging 
businesses to promote black South Africans. 
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4.4.2.2.  Skills Development 
While employment equity is salient, the broader backdrop of marginalisation creates 
an additional set of barriers. In particular and as suggested in chapter 2, a further 
impact of exclusion is that those marginalised in the past often lack the requisite 
skills to avail of employment opportunities that can arise post-conflict. The skills 
development component of B-BBEE, therefore, focuses on helping to increase the 
skill set of those previously marginalised to help reduce barriers to employment. 
4.4.2.3.  Enterprise Development  
While ownership of a company is one thing, it is another to empower previously 
disadvantaged people to found their own companies. Part of the importance of doing 
so stems from the fact that transferring company ownership is limited in its reach. To 
this end, enterprise development focuses on promoting entrepreneurship. Regarding 
how and in what ways enterprise development can be achieved, some possibilities 
can be identified.  
Firstly, investments can be made in black-owned and black-empowered companies 
or, joint ventures can be made with these black-owned and -empowered companies. 
Joint ventures may constitute the outsourcing of projects by the established 
company to the black company or both companies can contract for the same 
projects resulting in a spillover of skills.64 
Within these categories, there are different types of contribution that other 
businesses might make. For instance, support such as preferential credit terms, 
preferential pricing structures, mentorship and business skills training can be given 
by large companies to emerging black-owned businesses are some such 
examples.65 According to the South African Enterprises Agency Forum, other 
examples of enterprise development initiatives can be grants and loans, investment 
in beneficiary entities, guarantees/security, and providing seed capital.66 They can 
also include access to capital through the provision of collateral/relaxed security 
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requirements, early and/or timely payments for goods supplied, and extended credit 
terms for procurement amounts owed by the beneficiary entity.67 
Driving the inclusion of the enterprise development component of B-BBEE is 
encouraging entrepreneurship and economic empowerment amongst the black 
community.  
4.4.2.4.  Favourable Procurement 
A follow-on or variation of enterprise development is that of favourable procurement. 
While procurement is often thought of in terms of government participation in the 
market, and through this participation, influencing the social responsibility of 
business actors, it was also noted that businesses themselves can incentivise 
businesses throughout a supply chain. Favourable procurement seeks to increase 
the extent to which businesses procure materials and services from black-owned 
businesses.   
4.4.2.5.  Social and Community Development and Investment 
Finally, in the context of South Africa, the importance attached to socioeconomic 
development is a direct response to the systematic marginalisation of black South 
Africans.68 The Social and Community Development objective of B-BBEE attempts 
to engage businesses in helping to deliver social goods to those previously denied 
access. While the primary responsibilities of guaranteeing rights of a socioeconomic 
nature lie with the state, the B-BBEE framework identifies the possible roles that 
businesses might also play in this regard. 
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4.4.3.  B-BBEE and the allure of incentives 
How then does the B-BBEE attempt to engage businesses to contribute to the 
realisation of these objectives? Although promulgated, B-BBEE is not a command 
and control-based regulatory approach.69 As Chahoud et al. assess: 
Despite the wide-ranging legal foundations of B-BBEE, [businesses] not 
engaged with the South African government in procurement relationships 
and not acting as suppliers to companies tendering for government contracts 
are not required by law to contribute to B-BBEE. They fall into the realm of 
‘soft law’, which has no mandatory power.70 
The B-BBEE framework relies on a combination of economic conditionalities and 
persuasion. Under the B-BBEE Act, businesses are assessed against how they are 
performing in relation to the aforementioned criteria. Dependent upon how many 
points an entity scores for each element, an overall score is allocated. B-BBEE 
Certificates are then issued by Verification Agencies so long as they are approved to 
do so by South Africa National Accreditation System, or Independent Regulatory 
Board for Auditors. The Certificate can only be issued once a full verification has 
been performed and the documentation presented by a company has been verified 
and the score translated into a B-BBEE status.  
For the most part, economic conditionalities emerge in the form of government-
business interactions, while persuasive approaches are linked to business-business 
relationships. In regards to the former, the B-BBEE Act binds the public sector (i.e. 
Governmental departments, public entities or State-owned enterprises and organs 
of State),71 with the effect that gaining government contracts are linked to how 
businesses are adhering to the B-BBEE requirements. Businesses that are not B-
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BBEE compliant risk missing out on economic opportunities offered by the state. As 
Esser and Dekker stress:  
If a company falls under the scope of application of the Act and does not 
properly comply with the prescribed black economic empowerment 
scorecard the company will receive a poor B-BBEE rating which will 
negatively affect its ability to do business in South Africa. This will directly 
impact on the interests of the shareholders.72 
Thus, through procurement, businesses are incentivised to comply by the allure of 
economic opportunities in the form of government contracts. This is, however, only 
one aspect of the B-BBEE framework. B-BBEE also uses economic persuasion in 
order to help induce businesses to act. The codes as adopted in 2007 apply to the 
following entities in South Africa: 
[…] Any public entity (defined under schedule 3 of the Public Finance 
Management Act) that undertakes any business with any organ of state, 
public entity or any other enterprise 
Any enterprise that undertakes any business with any organ of state or 
public entity 
Any other enterprise that undertakes any business (directly or indirectly) 
which is subject to measurement as specified above and which is seeking to 
establish its own level of B-BBEE compliance.73 
Therefore, according to Kruger:  
For all practical purposes, the codes in South Africa thus apply to all 
government departments, NGOs (nongovernmental organisations), all public 
and private companies (both those listed on the JSE and those that are AltX 
listed), close corporations, Article 21 (non-profit) companies, incorporated 
companies, external companies, sole proprietors and partnerships.74  
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The B-BBEE framework creates a market for B-BBEE compliance. In essence, 
because larger companies gain points by doing business with other B-BBEE 
compliant firms, smaller companies are incentivised to comply with the codes as 
well. That is, because larger businesses increase their score when they 
commercially interact with or help empower smaller companies, it is in the interests 
of smaller companies to engage in peacebuilding. As Esser and Dekker note: 
The Act is structured in such a manner as to ensure that B-BBEE will have a 
“knock-on” effect throughout the business supply chain. Ultimately 
businesses will in itself become drivers of B-BBEE in the businesses of their 
suppliers and other stakeholders.75  
Juggernuth et al. continue that: 
[w]ithout it, businesses can expect to experience a steady drop in turnover 
that will, ultimately have a detrimental effect on the national economy. B-
BBEE is not simply a moral initiative to redress the wrongs of the past. It is a 
pragmatic growth strategy that aims to realise the country's full economic 
potential while helping to bring the black majority into the economy. 76 
In other words, businesses can influence the contributions that other companies 
make to peacebuilding. By requiring that the businesses in a supply chain be 
empowered as a prerequisite for entering into commercial relations, private 
procurement arguably operates as a form of regulation, incentivising other 
businesses to contribute to peacebuilding.   
4.4.4.  Impacts of B-BBEE 
Much has been written about the B-BBEE framework and its impacts. Scholars such 
as Hamann, Khagram and Rohan, for instance, have noted with concern the 
apparent lack of progress B-BBEE has made in rectifying the legacies of 
apartheid.77 Writing in 2008, they assessed that ‘ten years later many of the 
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challenges remain or have become even more acute in terms of poverty, 
unemployment, housing and basic services, inequality, HIV/AIDS.’78  Kovacevic also 
observes that ‘the program has achieved little success in eradicating poverty, 
increasing employment or fostering economic growth.’79 Many analysts and 
journalists continue to claim that B-BBEE benefits only the elite.80 Moreover, more 
recent discussions have focused on the issue of fronting, which refers to a wrongful 
and an intentional act in terms of which a company puts a black person in a position 
of authority, within the company, in order for the company to eventually obtain a 
better overall BEE rating.81 
For others, B-BBEE has been instrumental in bringing businesses into the 
peacebuilding fold.82 Because of the social and community objective, for instance, 
businesses have helped to build schools and hospitals and funded programmes 
focused on battling HIV. Through development trust funds, businesses have 
engaged in women’s economic empowerment in ways that extend beyond 
developing employee skills, especially programmes aimed at developing women’s 
access to microfinance or basic skill sets and education. These contributions are 
often attributed to B-BBEE.83 
Some also acknowledge the limitations of B-BBEE but draw attention to its 
adaptability and improvement over time. For instance, in reference to the initial 
limitations of B-BBEE, some have assessed that ‘government capacity for 
enforcement was seriously limited, which reduced the effectiveness of legislation as 
a driver for CSR.’84 However, the same authors proceed to note that ‘[o]ver the past 
decade, the South African government has made significant progress in 
strengthening the enforcement of the human rights and CSR aspects of its 
legislation.’85 Kleynhans and Kruger also assess that over the year’s short-comings 
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and some unintended consequences have been highlighted, and implementation 
challenges identified.86  
Moreover, some of these improvements have been made relatively recently. For 
instance, until May 2015, government policy was based on the ‘voluntarist’ principle, 
providing a methodology for measuring the B-BBEE rating. Under the new 
approach, by contrast, a full array of policies, procedures, legal requirements, codes 
of good practice and scorecards including punitive measures, such as hefty fines 
and even the possibility of imprisonment for non-compliance or partial compliance, 
accompany the legislation.87 Similarly, to deal with fronting, the DTI amended the 
codes to deal with fraudulent empowerment credentials such as fronting88 and 
introduced B-BBEE monitoring and compliance through the B-BBEE Commission, 
as well more onerous requirements to drive a more concerted transformation 
effort.89 
In other ways, scholars have argued that B-BBEE has been successful in achieving 
a delicate balance between enticing businesses into a post-conflict environment, 
while at the same time using businesses as agents through which to address the 
past. When it came to power, the ANC-led government inherited a failing economy, 
driven in part by sanctions levelled against the apartheid state and the divestment 
campaigns discussed above. Faced with the realities and scale of the transformation 
process, the ANC’s ideology shifted notably throughout the transition process. The 
most illustrative example of this was the transition from the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme of (RDP) 1994 to the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) of 1996.  
RDP was part of the election platform of the ANC in the 1994 elections and was 
chosen as the primary socio-economic programme. The aim of this socio-economic 
policy was to establish an equal society through reconstruction and development as 
well as strengthening democracy for all South Africans. Visser notes, however, that 
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from the beginning the government could not implement the RDP.90 Most notably, it 
became clear that the country’s economic and fiscal difficulties would impede the 
realisation of the RDP’s goals.91 In response, the government embraced a 
conservative macro-economic strategy in the form of GEAR.92 In line with neoliberal 
logic prevalent at the time and reflective of perceived necessity of growing the 
economy, ‘growth through redistribution’ was to be replaced by ‘redistribution 
through growth.93  
By incentivising rather than requiring businesses to contribute to the peacebuilding 
effort, the B-BBEE framework is viewed as an effort that has achieved, to an extent, 
the difficult balance between enticing businesses to invest, on the one hand, while at 
the same time incentivising companies to play more proactive peacebuilding roles, 
on the other. Indeed, as Isaacs and Raakjaer note, ‘South Africa’s B-BBEE policy 
combines neoliberal market-oriented economic policies with redistributive social 
policies and notions of social inclusion and social and economic justice.’94 For some 
then, the success of B-BBEE derives not only from the extent to which it has 
engaged businesses in helping to contribute to peacebuilding but that it has done so 
while also promoting and garnering investment. 
4.4.5.  Discussion 
B-BBEE is an important framework when considering how states might encourage 
businesses to contribute to peacebuilding efforts. Firstly, it is important to reiterate 
that the existence of the framework has been driven, in part, by the efforts of 
different in-conflict initiatives and forms of influence, which, in different ways, 
underlined the importance of bringing businesses into the peacebuilding effort. 
Through B-BBEE, governments in South Africa have attempted to engage 
businesses in the peacebuilding efforts through both persuasive and economic-
conditionality-based approaches. Moreover, by creating a market for B-BBEE 
compliance, the example also illustrates ingenuity and creativity, allowing for the 
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emergence of businesses to act as regulators for peacebuilding through private 
procurement.  
The B-BBEE framework, therefore, operates on a system of economic incentives. It 
should be noted that whether or not to define this particular framework as 
‘regulation’ could be contested. For instance, some might suggest that the B-BBEE 
approach is different from those initiatives that define standards of conduct for 
businesses to achieve. While the latter approach focuses on shaping business 
conduct, often to prevent businesses from causing harm, the latter is more 
concerned with engaging businesses in development-oriented objectives.  
At the same time, we might contest these views by arguing that such responses only 
emerge when one conceives regulation as focused on specific objectives- limiting 
harms caused or holding businesses accountable. If, on the other hand, we accept 
that regulation has pluralised, both in respect of the actors involved and the methods 
used, we might also offer the view that objectives of regulation can also expand. In 
other words, in much the same way that some argue that public procurement is a 
means to regulate businesses to do no harm, we might also argue that the same 
forms of regulation are at play under the B-BBEE, albeit for the purposes of 
achieving different ends. 
Moreover, the dichotomy between B-BBEE and the example of standard setting 
approaches is less ‘clear-cut’ than it first appears. For instance, while B-BBEE is 
more concerned with engaging businesses in proactive ways, companies are, in 
fact, assessed against a defined criteria, as demonstrasted by the codes of good 
practice. That is to say, in order to gain access to government opportunities, 
businesses are assessed against a set of standards, that are clearly defined and 
which businesses meet or they do not.  
While the intention of examining B-BBEE is to understand how different actors are 
able to influence businesses, the example raises important conceptual questions 
regarding to how define regulation. In line with the approach of regulatory pluralism, 
we might observe that regulation is used for more expansive purposes than limiting 
harms and offer the narrative that this occurs because of the particular 
circumstances of the context in question. These circumstances, reflecting the history 




inequalities in the context a peace process through more creative forms of 
regulation. I develop this discussion in due course.  
Putting conceptual issues to one side, none of this is to say, of course, that B-BBEE 
is or should be viewed as a panacea, quite the opposite. Criticisms of B-BBEE have 
ranged from those that highlight the corruption associated with the framework to 
those who question its impact. Nevertheless, the achievements of B-BBEE highlight 
the importance of experimentation and evolution of the framework over time. 
Moreover, in adopting this particular approach, the government has also sought to 
achieve a delicate balance of both encouraging rather than deterring investment on 
one hand, while addressing the past inequalities of the past on the other. 
4.5.  Co-existing Regulatory Moments  
B-BBEE is the central and driving framework for encouraging business contributions 
to peacebuilding in South Africa. It is not, however, the only initiative that attempts to 
engage businesses in these ways. A range of different initiatives also exist in South 
Africa that focus on shaping business conduct. An important part of the story of how 
different actors have sought to influence businesses to engage in peacebuilding in 
South Africa is the interaction of these different initiatives with B-BBEE. Drawing on 
some other significant moments, the discussion below explores how these 
interactions have occurred. I focus on those initiatives that reinforce B-BBEE, those 
that ‘gap-fill’ for B-BBEE, and those that at times conflict with B-BBEE. As will be 
taken up in chapter 6, these initiatives and interactions help support the need for 
and possibilities of coordinating regulatory efforts.  
4.5.1.  The Interactions of different initiatives 
4.5.1.1.  Reinforcement through persuasion and incentives 
Reinforcement refers to those initiatives that contribute to the advancement of the 
objectives of B-BBEE promoting B-BBEE objectives. In some cases, reinforcement 
has occurred through legislative efforts. For instance, the Skills Development Act of 
1998 encourages companies to help contribute to developing the skills of black 
South Africans.95 The stated purpose of the act is to improve the employment 
                                                            




prospects of persons previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination and to 
redress those disadvantages through training and education; and, to ensure the 
quality of education and training in and for the workplace.96 
The Preferential Procurement Act of 200097 allows government entities conducting a 
tender process to evaluate tender submissions according to specific criteria. In 
evaluating a tender submission out of 100 points, 90 of those points have to be 
allocated to the price submitted by the tenderer. The 10 remaining points are 
allocated to the categories of preference referred to in the Constitution. The 
Preferential Procurement Act of 2000 stipulates that state tenders be granted to 
companies that are as B-BBEE compliant as possible.98 This takes into account the 
B-BBEE status of suppliers, as well as whether or not materials are sourced locally. 
When tender bids are submitted, companies tendering need to submit a certificate 
calculated in accordance with a scorecard set under the Codes of Good Practice.99 
The certificate presents the bidding organisation’s B-BBEE score, as well as their 
score out of 10 or 20 (depending on the contract value) based on the transformation 
criteria.100  
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA), which was 
enacted in June 2002, represents a legislative commitment to achieving equitable 
access to, and the sustainable development of, South Africa’s mineral and 
petroleum resources.101  Amongst other things, the MPRDA obliges mining 
companies to convert their old rights under the Minerals Act 50 of 1991 to new rights 
under the MPRDA condition that they enact suitable B-BBEE deals.  
As a final example, Section 72(4) of the Companies Act 2008 expresses that: 
“The Minister, by regulation, may prescribe – 
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a category of companies that must each have a social and ethics 
committee […] 
The Regulations referred to above were implemented in 2011 under regulation 
43.102 The purpose of Social and Ethics Committees is to monitor a company’s 
activities having regard to relevant legislation or codes of conduct and to ensure that 
the company behaves like a responsible corporate citizen.103 The committee 
monitors the company's activities with regard to the following five areas of social 
responsibility: ‘social and economic development, good corporate citizenship, the 
environment, health and public safety, consumer relationships and labour and 
employment.’104 Included within the Committees roles is monitoring a company’s 
adherence to B-BBEE. Thus, by requiring that businesses monitor and report on B-
BBEE compliance, businesses are encouraged to adhere to the objectives of B-
BBEE.105 
In different ways, these initiatives reinforce B-BBEE through different regulatory 
approaches. The Skills Development Act (1998), for example, seeks to support the 
skills development act by linking procurement opportunities to compliance with the 
legislation. The Preferential Procurement Act (2000) operates on a similar basis. 
The MPRDA 2002 incentivises businesses to be B-BBEE compliant, by linking 
compliance with the granting of mining licences. Finally, while it is currently unclear 
whether a failure to adhere to the requirements of establishing social and ethics 
committees under the Companies Act leads to sanctions being imposed,106 an 
argument can be made that failing to adopt committees and, subsequently, 
complying with B-BBEE can lead to market losses for businesses.  
Along with demonstrating that different forms of influence can be used to engage 
businesses in peacebuilding efforts, these interactions also suggest that various 
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initiatives can help to support each other in pursuance of the objective of engaging 
businesses in peacebuilding efforts. As I will suggest, thinking about how to 
integrate and align different efforts in ways similar to this could prove useful when 
considering how to engage businesses in peacebuilding efforts in other contexts.  
4.5.1.2.  Gap Filling Initiatives 
Different efforts can also be seen to gap-fill for B-BBEE. The history of businesses in 
South Africa underlines the fact that firms can act in detrimental ways. These 
adverse impacts can occur even when businesses are attempting to contribute to 
peacebuilding. B-BBEE, as focused on addressing the marginalisation of black 
South Africans, seeks, for the most part, to engage businesses to go beyond doing 
no harm. In doing so, however, it mostly overlooks the importance of ensuring that 
businesses do no harm. To this end, some initiatives gap fill for B-BBEE, by 
concentrating on curtailing harms that might arise at the behest of businesses.  
For instance, labour laws have been at the forefront of the post-apartheid 
government’s determination to remove unfair discrimination. The Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (2000) prohibits discrimination 
in both civil society and in employment practices.107 Additionally, Schedule 7 of the 
Labour Relations Act considers unfair discrimination either directly or indirectly as an 
unfair labour practice.108 Grounds include race, gender, ethnic origin, sexual 
orientation, religion, disability, conscience, belief, language and culture. Chapter 2 of 
the Employment Equity Act prohibits unfair discrimination against designated 
employees.109 These include black people, women and employees with disabilities. 
Regarding gap-filling B-BBEE, Horowitz sums up the argument:  
Whereas employment equity legislation focuses mainly on employment 
opportunity redress in workplace practices, the latter B-BBEE Act was 
enacted to provide to Black people economic opportunities to “manage, own 
                                                            
107 The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000 [No. 4 of 2000]. 
108 Labour Relations Act, 1996 [No. 60 of 1995]. 




and increase financial and managerial control in the South African economy, 
as well as attain significant decreases in income inequalities.”110  
These initiatives complement B-BBEE by seeking to ensure that even businesses 
that attempt to advance the objectives of the framework nevertheless continue to 
ensure they are not discriminating against individuals when in employment. 
A number of corporate governance initiatives also focus on preventing businesses 
from causing harm. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 elections, 
The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa established the King Committee.111 In 
the same year, the King Committee issued an influential and widely circulated report 
on corporate governance. Published by the DTI, King I set out the potential direction 
of corporate governance post-apartheid. The report urged a participative corporate 
governance system, articulating a need for companies to recognise that they no 
longer acted independently from the society and environment in which they 
operated.112 According to Visser, the report was the first global corporate 
governance code to talk about ‘stakeholders’ and to stress the importance of 
business accountability beyond the interests of shareholders.113    
This report was updated in 2002 by the King Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa (‘King II Report’). King II took the ‘inclusive approach’ developed by 
King I further, recommending the introduction of ‘triple bottom line’ reporting. It 
reiterated the stance taken in King I, stressing that companies must recognise that 
they did not act independently from the societies in which they operated.114 King II 
also recommends that every company should report annually on their policies and 
practices on how the interests of stakeholders are met.115 Implementing the 
‘inclusive approach’ meant that companies should define their purpose, identify the 
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values by which they carry out their activities and communicate these to 
stakeholders.  
This theme was endorsed in King III (February 2009) which stated that it ‘seeks to 
emphasise the inclusive approach of governance.’116 King III provides that 
shareholders do not have a predetermined place of precedence over other 
stakeholders.117 Importantly, the best interests of the company should be interpreted 
within the parameters of the company as a sustainable enterprise and as a 
responsible corporate citizen. King III advocates a holistic approach to CSR that 
requires a company to view itself as a corporate citizen motivated by principles of 
development and sustainability; taking into account all of its stakeholders.118 Both 
King II and III required that the fulfilment of companies’ obligations to stakeholders 
must be measured, calculated, audited and reported in the same way as their 
financial performance.  
Despite King III being a voluntary governance code, the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange now requires, under regulation 8.63(a), that all-listed companies apply the 
King III principles.119 It has accordingly become a de facto mandatory requirement 
for all JSE-listed companies, albeit on an ‘apply or explain’ basis.120 The 
incorporation of King III into the Listing Requirements made the JSE the first 
exchange globally for mandating companies to move towards integrated reporting or 
explain why they are not doing so.121 Because listed companies are expected to be 
in full compliance with the King Report on Corporate Governance, companies 
wishing to go public must adhere to the King Codes and are incentivised to do so.  
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4.5.1.3.  Regulatory Conflicts  
As a final example of regulatory initiatives interacting, it is necessary to consider 
briefly how and when tensions might arise between them. As mentioned in the 
introductory remarks, the South African TRC focused on the role of businesses 
during the apartheid era. The TRC was also progressive, however, in issuing 
recommendations. The TRC recommended, for instance, the imposition of a once-
off wealth tax on South African business and industry; and the establishment of a 
business reconciliation fund to which businesses could contribute to funding small 
black entrepreneurs.122 It also recommended reconsideration of the repayment by 
the new government of the apartheid regimes odious debt.123 The TRC described its 
recommendations as based on ‘at the very least, a moral obligation [of businesses] 
to assist in the reconstruction and development of post-apartheid South Africa,’124 
and found that banks in particular, ‘played an instrumental role in prolonging 
apartheid from the time of the debt crisis in 1985 and onwards.’125 
In 2002, the Khulamani Support Group, a South African victims’ organisation, 
together with 93 of its members, filed a civil complaint under the Alien Tort Stature 
(ATS) in the Eastern District of New York against 23 multinational corporations and 
banks for having aided and abetted the apartheid regime. The argument advanced 
by the plaintiffs included the charge that, amongst others, Swiss and German banks 
had aided and abetted the former apartheid regime, particularly its security forces, in 
the commission of gross human rights violations, resulting in many people’s injury 
and death.126 Along with international banks, other industries, such as arms and 
ammunition, fuel and transportation, security and military forces, and military 
technology industries, had equally been complicit in apartheid. Relying on the legal 
theory of secondary liability for aiding and abetting the apartheid regime, the 
plaintiffs argued that:  
[T]he participation of the defendants, companies in the key industries of oil, 
armaments, banking, transportation, technology, and mining, was 
instrumental in encouraging and furthering the abuses, Defendants’ conduct 
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was so integrally connected to the abuses that apartheid would not have 
occurred in the same way without their participation.127 
Following a ruling in favour of the defendants, the plaintiffs subsequently narrowed 
the range of defendants to four specific sectors- armaments, technology, 
transportation, and banking- that were identified as having been of particular 
importance for assisting the apartheid regime in its crimes, including apartheid itself; 
extrajudicial killing; torture; prolonged unlawful detention; and cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment.128 The case was subsequently settled out of court.  
In both these examples, regulatory initiatives in the post-conflict era have sought to 
draw on business involvement with the regime.129 An argument can be made that in 
doing so these initiatives have helped to persuade businesses to contribute to 
certain aspects of the B-BBEE framework. For instance, some have drawn attention 
to the high levels of corporate social investment (CSI) in South Africa. Arguing that 
CSI is a distinctively South African phenomenon, scholars have suggested that this 
is a result of the history of business and conflict in South Africa that has driven the 
level of CSI initiatives.130 Figg contends, as an illustration, that CSI is used to divert 
attention from calls on business to redress the results of its historical contribution to 
the apartheid system.131 
At the same time, we can also identify tensions between the B-BBEE framework and 
these accountability mechanisms. Abrahams notes, for example, that the South 
African government did not implement any of the TC’s recommendations. This was 
because foreign and local private-sector investment was regarded as crucial to the 
peacebuilding effort, with the imposition of these recommendations regarded as 
potentially deterring business.132 He continues that:  
Instead of obligating corporations to provide reparations to apartheid victims, 
the South African government complimented businesses for their voluntary 
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contributions to the Business Trust Fund that was established in 1999 as a 
voluntary initiative by businesses with the purpose of creating jobs, building 
capacity, and reducing poverty.133  
Driven in part by the recognition of the South African government that businesses 
were necessary for economic development, the ANC-led administration argued that 
these measures could be viewed as discouraging companies from investing. Thus, 
the South African government also opposed litigation in US courts.134 In what 
became known as the Maduna Declaration, the government’s opposition was set out 
in great detail; the main argument was that the litigation interfered with South 
Africa’s sovereignty. Again, the Government was also keen to stress the importance 
attached to enticing businesses. For instance, paragraph 8.1 states that ‘[T]he 
government's policy is to promote reconciliation with and business investment by all 
firms, South African and foreign, and we regard these lawsuits as inconsistent with 
that goal.135 
The Maduna Declaration further noted the following: 
The Government's policies of reconstruction and development have largely 
depended on forging constructive business partnerships. Its 1996 Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution ("Gear") strategy further acknowledged the 
importance of the private sector that faster economic growth offers the only 
way out of poverty, inequality, and unemployment, that such growth is driven 
by both foreign and local private sector investment, and that government's 
principal role is to create an enabling environment for such investment. This 
market-friendly strategy regards business as the engine of economic 
growth.136 
Thus, in this case, far from reinforcing each other, the tensions between the 
government-developed B-BBEE framework and the efforts of the TRC and ATS 
were in direct contrast. What this suggests is that when different initiatives are not 
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aligned, tensions can emerge that arguably undermine efforts to engage businesses 
in peacebuilding efforts. 
4.5.1.4.  Discussion  
Given the plurality of actors seeking to influence corporate conduct in South Africa, 
the study above has sought to briefly draw attention to some of the ways that 
regulatory initiatives interact. In some cases, these interactions appear positive. By 
including aspects of the B-BBEE objectives as part of the regulatory objectives of 
others, efforts can help to reinforce efforts to engage businesses in peacebuilding 
efforts. In other cases, regulatory initiatives can be understood as gap filling. The 
importance of this interaction derives in part from the history of business and conflict 
in South Africa. While companies can make salient contributions to peacebuilding, it 
is important not to overlook that even well-meaning businesses can do harm. Here, 
different initiatives can, therefore, gap-fill for more initiatives focused on engaging 
businesses in more peacebuilding focused ways. Finally, given the plurality of 
regulatory initiatives that can exist, we must also recognise that tensions can arise.  
The purpose and importance of this discussion will become clear in chapter 6. It will 
be sufficient to note for present purposes that while an essential objective of this 
thesis is to examine how different forms of influence might be used to engage 
businesses in contributing to peacebuilding efforts, it is also necessary to consider 
the ways that a unified framework might also help to support different approaches in 
post-conflict settings. These discussions tentatively outline both the benefits of doing 
so and limitations with not. 
4.6.  Findings 
This section focuses briefly on a number of important findings that emerge from the 
case study of South Africa. For present purposes, I outline these findings briefly 
before developing them further in chapter 6.  
4.6.1.  Business Contributions to Peacebuilding 
In South Africa, businesses have contributed to peacebuilding in a range of ways. In 
line with the requirements of B-BBEE, these contributions have spanned from efforts 




from black-owned companies. Businesses have also sought to contribute to skills 
development and to contribute to community and socioeconomic development. In 
other cases and while not technically post-conflict, businesses have been 
instrumental in contributing to the peacebuilding process and were critical in 
challenging the apartheid regime and framing some of the central issues of 
transition. That many of these contributions stem from what might be regarded as a 
regulatory framework helps to support the relationship between business 
contributions and regulation and to introduce the case study findings. 
4.6.2.  Contested views on ‘Regulation’ 
The case study raises a number of conceptual questions regarding what amounts to 
regulation and how and in what ways regulation can lead to business-based 
peacebuilding. In some cases, only a tenuous and consequential link exists. For 
instance, in the khulumani litigation before the US Courts, the approach to regulation 
is one in line with orthodox regulation. In this case, companies, stood accused of 
contributing to human rights violations, were brought before authorities to face 
potential sanctions. While formally, no sanctions were levelled against businesses, 
some suggest that businesses were inspired to contribute to peacebuilding and 
developmental efforts in order to ‘manufacture amnesia.’137 Here, it appears that 
regulation, as normally understood, had the indirect effect of pushing businesses to 
contribute to peacebuilding.  
In other ways, there seems to be a direct link between regulation and business-
based peacebuilding. For instance, legislation such as MPRDA (2002) or the Skills 
Development Act (1998), falls within the contours of orthodox regulation. In contrast 
to widely held views that regulation is about curtailing harms from being caused, in 
these examples, legislative efforts are more geared towards promoting more 
proactive interventions. The MPRDA, while legislation, also sought to inspire 
proactive contributions on the part of businesses by specifying that obtaining a 
licence would be subject to whether a business was empowered under the B-BBEE 
initiative.  
In the case of the Sullivan Principles, on the face of it, this appears to be a 
straightforward case of settings standards and assessing compliance. As suggest in 
                                                            




chapter 3, standards, whether developed by civil society actors or multilateral 
institutions, are a common way of defining corporate conduct and developing 
metrics to help identify whether businesses are complying with these standards. 
However, differing from the vast majority of corporate codes, the Sullivan principles 
asked businesses to go beyond avoiding causing harm. In this case, the corporate 
conduct that the principles sought to promote was for businesses to proactively 
challenge and go against the apartheid regime. In this way, the same methods often 
regarded as forms of regulation when concerned with limiting the harms that 
businesses might cause are also used in the case of South Africa to promote more 
proactive interventions. 
The case study also highlights that there are, at least prima facie, very different 
approaches to shaping business conduct, complicating the discussion on what 
regulation is and is not. For instance, B-BBEE is an approach which has clear 
developmental objectives. It is not so much about setting specific standards and 
holding businesses accountable according to these standards, but rather 
encouraging businesses to participate in development and peacebuilding objectives. 
Such an approach is different from those initiatives that define standards and 
metrics, and which hold businesses accountable according to whether they comply 
with them.  
However, as argued in chapter 3, others would suggest that procurement is itself a 
form of regulation, particularly when linked to, for instance, demands that 
businesses act in socially responsible ways. In the case of B-BBEE, a form of 
economic regulation, often used to promote such things as environmental 
responsibility or fair labour practices, is used to develop more proactive business 
contributions. Is this then regulation or something else? Moreover, in the case of B-
BBEE, while a policy focused on promoting the social and economic development of 
the black community, businesses were nevertheless assessed according to how 
they performed in relation to criteria defined in the Codes of Good Practice. That is, 
corporate conduct was specified in the same manner that would normally be the 
case in corporate standards. Thus, while appearing to be something other than what 
we would usually understand regulation, the incentive-based initiative that is B-




While the purpose of this chapter was to examine how different actors might 
influence businesses, indirectly, the case study raises a number of conceptual 
questions regarding what regulation is and what it is not.  
4.6.3.  Different Forms of Influence 
Putting to one side conceptual discussions over whether different initiatives amount 
to regulation, the case studies demonstrate a range of different ways in which to 
influence businesses to contribute to peacebuilding. In some cases, business 
contributions to peacebuilding emerged as consequences of accountability-based 
initiatives. As suggested, in the case of litigation before US Courts and to some 
extent the TC findings, businesses were not directly asked to contribute to 
peacebuilding, but opted to do so to, in the words of David Figg, to ‘manufacture 
amnesia.’138 In this way, holding businesses to account for harms committed in the 
past inspired more proactive contributions in the future. 
In other cases, businesses were persuaded to contribute to peacebuilding. For 
instance, adherence to the King Codes, which include some B-BBEE elements, is 
reliant on companies complying or explaining why they have not adhered to the 
criteria defined in the Codes of Practice. Such an approach focuses primarily on 
businesses reporting on the developments that they have made or reporting why 
that have not. The logic is that businesses will be persuaded to comply in order to 
improve their reputation. To this end, accountability-based mechanisms during the 
era of apartheid added to this persuasion.  
Moreover, while businesses were both persuaded and incentivised to act, there was 
also a growing awareness that the apartheid regime was no longer in the economic 
self-interests of business. In this way, the use of sanctions not only helped to create 
a set of circumstances where businesses were being punished economically but, 
coupled with wider developments in the area of corporate citizenship, other 
initiatives such as the Sullivan Principles and divestment campaigns were able to 
draw on business perceptions that change needed to occur. 
Businesses were also incentivised to contribute to peacebuilding objectives. In the 






ensure that business involvement. Firstly, such actors as institutional investors, 
shareholders, and US States made it in the economic self-interests of companies to 
challenge the apartheid regime. In some cases, the threat of divestment and 
shareholder resolutions were used to coerce businesses to challenge the apartheid 
regime or risk losing economic support, if they did not. In other cases, through the 
allure of government contracts, US States were able to create the reality that 
challenging the regime offered economic opportunities to companies. This 
demonstrates the potential of home states to require more proactive contributions. 
Similarly, in the case of the Sullivan Principles, pressure from shareholders to adopt 
a more proactive stance in challenging the apartheid regime illustrates the 
possibilities that shareholders can use their position as owners of a company to 
direct business activities in ways more proactive than avoiding harm.  
The B-BBEE approach offered economic opportunities in the form of government 
contracts for businesses that were empowered. In adopting this approach, a delicate 
balance has been attempted: one that seeks to entice businesses to invest and do 
business in South Africa but also to engage businesses in peacebuilding. This also 
suggests that states have ‘options’ that extend beyond conventional command and 
control-based approaches.  
Through the same process, South African Governments have also persuaded 
businesses to contribute to peacebuilding by creating a marketplace for businesses 
that are B-BBEE compliant. That is, this policy of incentivising proactive 
contributions through public procurement also led to the emergence of private 
procurement as a means of incentivising contributions to peacebuilding. Businesses, 
by asking and requiring that those within their supply chains were also empowered, 
incentivised smaller businesses to promote the objectives of the B-BBEE 
framework. Because businesses are rewarded according to how they are complying 
with B-BBEE, there is a business case for other, often smaller businesses, to help 
promote aspects of the B-BBEE agenda. In this sense, businesses arguably perform 
quasi-regulatory functions, requiring that those businesses with which they contract 
are also contributing to peacebuilding.  
4.6.4.  Initiatives Leading to Institutional Change 
A further finding from the case study is that while regulation might be targeted 




post-conflict era. In South Africa, different in-conflict regulatory initiatives have been 
instrumental in contributing to developments at the institutional level. The most 
obvious example of this is B-BBEE, which was driven, in part, by the awareness 
created by the imposition of economic sanctions and the demands of investors for 
businesses to challenge the inequities of legislation. It might also be argued that 
such initiatives as the king codes, the social and ethics committee requirements 
under the Companies Act 2008, and the wealth of legislative efforts dealing with, 
amongst other things, fair employment, have all been driven by these in-conflict 
regulatory efforts.  
4.6.5.  Peace Moments leading to change in business regulation 
Closely related to the above discussion, the case study also highlights that 
significant peacebuilding moments can lay the foundation for progressive regulatory 
initiatives that target businesses to contribute in peacebuilding. In South Africa, the 
progressive constitution of 1996, by prioritising equality, has been an important 
driver of change in how the regulation of business is approached.  
4.6.6   Regulatory Interactions  
The case study of South Africa also shows the interactions of regulatory initiatives, 
the opportunities that can arise from such interactions, and the limitations that exist 
when initiatives conflict.  
Firstly, the case study highlights the potential for regulatory initiatives to reinforce 
other regulatory initiatives. While the central driving force of business contributions 
to peacebuilding has been the B-BBEE framework, other initiatives have also helped 
to reinforce the objectives of engaging businesses in peacebuilding efforts. This 
highlights that coherency amongst regulators can help to advance the objectives of 
regulating business.  
The case study also suggests that regulatory initiatives can interact in ways that 
help to gap-fill for regulatory initiatives focused on engaging businesses in more 
proactive ways. This is important because even well-meaning businesses can cause 
harms. If not complying with, for instance, human rights norms, any proactive 
contributions made will be undermined by detrimental activities. Finally, regulatory 
initiatives can conflict with other initiatives. As I will argue, these interactions help to 




4.7.  Conclusion  
The discussion on regulatory pluralism in chapter 3 intended to identify different 
ways through which to influence businesses to understand whether these same 
approaches might be used to engage businesses in peacebuilding processes. This 
chapter has demonstrated a number of different ways that various actors have 
sought to do so. In some instances, proactive contributions arise as consequences 
of regulation, as in the case of the ATS described above. In this example, proactive 
contributions flowed consequentially from efforts to hold businesses to account for 
breaching standards of expected conduct.  
At the same time, while we normally consider codes and standards of conduct to be 
associated with curtailing the harms businesses might cause, the example of the 
Sullivan Principles demonstrates that standards can require more proactive 
interventions. Similarly, shareholders and investors can use their influence to require 
businesses to adhere to more proactive standards, in this case challenging the 
apartheid regime and pushing forward an agenda based on affirmative action. The 
case study also demonstrates that legislation can be used to promote proactive 
contributions. For instance, the MPRDA (2000), the Skills Development Act (1998), 
the Preferential Procurement Act (2000) are all legislative approaches adopted by 
the state to engage businesses in more proactive ways.  
The B-BBEE framework is, in some ways, different. On the one hand, this initative 
seems more focused on promoting development than existing as a form of 
regulation. It is, in this way, quite distinct from what we might regard as regulation. 
At the same time, many consider public procurement to be a form of regulation. 
Approached through this lens, does the fact that objectives shift from preventing 
harm to engaging businesses to do more, nullify B-BBEE as a form of regulation? 
The question is complicated by the fact that under B-BBEE, companies are 
assessed against defined criteria, as demonstrasted by the codes of good practice. 
That is, to benefit from government or private contracts, businesses must meet a set 
of expected standards in the same way that other regulatory initiatives require. 
Thus, because many accept that procurement is a form of regulation, we might also 
suggest the B-BBEE is also a variation of regulation, albeit one, that admittedly 
pushes conceptual boundaries. Nevertheless, the primary intention of this chapter 
was to demonstrate that business conduct can be shaped in ways that seek to 




regardless of its conceptual nomenclature, demonstrates a creative and useful 
example of engaging businesses to make positive contributions to peacebuilding 
efforts. 
The case study also raises a number of other, somewhat unexpected issues. For 
one, the direct regulation of business can lead to institutional change. For another, 
significant peacebuilding moments can be relevant to the emergence of other 
regulatory efforts. Moreover, regulatory initiatives interact in different ways, 
sometimes positively, other times in ways that conflict. These findings suggest a 
number of things. Firstly, when considering the roles and responsibilities of the state 
to promote business involvement in peacebuilding efforts, other initiatives can 
influence how and whether the state adopts does so. This is particularly important in 
those settings where states are unable or unwilling to do so. Secondly, while the 
case study demonstrates that different actors can be involved in influencing 
businesses, it is important to consider how these different actors might be 
orchestrated. As outlined above, when interactions are positive, this can help to 
promote particular objectives. However, when they conflict, different initiatives and 
forms of influence can undermine other objectives. How and in what ways to 
facilitate positive and uniform approaches, therefore, is an important issue. Finally 
and building on from this idea of interactions, while it is a positive development that 
different actors seek to influence businesses in contributing to peacebuilding, it is 
also important that businesses do not cause harm and, to that end, that efforts 
continue to be directed towards ensuring businesses do not act in socially 
irresponsible ways.  
As will be discussed in chapter 6, these findings are particularly useful when 
considering what a global policy instrument on business and peacebuilding might 
look like. In particular, this case study helps to support the view that different actors 











This chapter examines how different actors sought to require, induce and persuade 
businesses to contribute to the peacebuilding effort in Northern Ireland. This chapter 
also demonstrates how regulatory initiatives interact with others focusing on the 
ways that they reinforce, support, and/or undermine efforts to include businesses in 
the peacebuilding effort.  
5.1.  Introduction  
The previous chapter explored a variety of initiatives in South Africa, which have 
sought and managed, in different ways, to engage businesses in the peacebuilding 
effort. It was also suggested that the direct regulation of business has indirectly 
contributed to institutional developments or been driven by significant peacebuilding 
and that initiatives interact in different ways, sometimes positively, while other times 
potentially detrimentally. The current chapter explores how different actors have 
influenced businesses to engage businesses in the peacebuilding process in 
Northern Ireland. As in the case study on South Africa, I tell this story through 
significant regulatory moments, which, in the case of Northern Ireland, all revolve 
around the issue of equality.  
The first discussion focuses on the MacBride Principles, a campaign similar to the 
Sullivan Principles in South Africa. The MacBride Principles were organised and 
implemented by Irish Americans in an attempt to address the discrimination of 
Catholics in private sector employment. Through the MacBride campaign, 
subsidiaries of American companies operating in NI were persuaded and 
incentivised to adopt fair employment practices. I also examine, as part of this story, 
how these different in-conflict initiatives led to institutional change in the regulatory 




(Northern Ireland) Act 19891 and the subsequent Fair Employment and Treatment 
Order (FETO) of 1998,2 which were supported by a number of significant 
peacebuilding moments. The most notable of these was the Good Friday Peace 
Agreement (GFA) of 1998 and the legal formalisation of this agreement in the 
Northern Ireland Act (NIA) 1998.3 The discussion also examines the regulatory 
approach adopted under FETO, which has been primarily one of co-operation 
between the Equality Commission of Northern Ireland and businesses to help them 
progress affirmative action policies. 
The second story explores the way in which the European Union (EU), through the 
EU PEACE programmes, has sought to incentivise businesses to participate in 
Local District Partnerships (LDPs). These Partnerships were designed as 
mechanisms to better integrate different sections of the community into the 
governance of Northern Ireland and were strengthened with the inclusion of 
businesses. This story highlights the potential for non-state actors, in this case, the 
EU, to influence businesses in contributing to peacebuilding with creative economic 
incentives.  
The final story offers an example of the limitations of regulation. By focusing on the 
issue of ex-political prisoner reintegration, a vital component of the transition in 
Northern Ireland, this discussion highlights the impediments that states can create to 
the participation of businesses in the peacebuilding effort by adopting legislative 
measures that act as obstacle to integratings businesses into peacebuilding efforts.  
The stories of these regulatory moments converge to offer examples of the different 
ways that regulation can be used to engage or deter businesses from contributing to 
peacebuilding efforts. This chapter also illustrates further the potential for indirect 
contributions that can arise from the direct regulation of companies, in particular, in 
forcing institutional change, along with the linkages between significant 
peacebuilding moments and the regulation of business.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.1.1. touches on the background to the 
conflict focusing in particular on the relationship of businesses to the conflict. 5.2. 
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examines the MacBride Principles before discussing the impacts of the principles at 
the institutional level. Section 5.3. focuses on FETO and some significant 
peacebuilding moments. Section 5.4. explores the EU’s role in incentivising 
businesses to contribute to LDPs while section 5.5. outlines how important 
opportunities to engage businesses in the peacebuilding effort have been missed. 
Section 5.6. maps out the findings before offering a number of conclusion under 
section 5.7. 
5.1.1. Background to the Conflict  
The conflict or ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland refer to a period between 1969 and 
1998 fought between Republicans, the British State and Loyalists. During this period 
almost 3700 people were killed and over 40,000 people injured.4 McEvoy puts these 
statistics in perspective: 
With a relatively small population of just over 1.7 million people, the scale of 
the Northern Ireland conflict is appropriately compared to those in Sri-Lanka 
or Lebanon. If we compare the casualties to what would have happened in 
England with its population of 50 million people, the equivalent proportion of 
people killed would have seen 500,000 deaths.5 
The origins of the Troubles can be traced back to the colonial military conquest of 
Ireland by England in 1169 and later Elizabethan rule during which time penal codes 
were part of a calculated scheme to disenfranchise the Catholic minority.6 Along 
with the 1607 Ulster Plantation, the industrial revolution, and the modernization of 
Ulster during the nineteenth century, profound social and economic differences were 
created between Catholics and Protestants.  
A divisive social order between Protestants and Catholics became endemic in 
Northern Ireland by the 1920s, providing the backdrop for the partition of Ireland by 
politically severing six counties from the nine-county province of Ulster in 1921.7 
Partition resulted in the ‘external territorial caging’ of competing nationalist and 
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territorial demands as ‘the geography of the partition settlement reflected hugely 
asymmetrical power relationships, the British imperial state and its Ulster Unionist 
supporters on the one hand, and Irish Nationalists on the other.’8 
The result of these competing allegiances saw nationalists, the vast majority of 
which are Catholics, treated as second-class citizens throughout the remainder of 
the 20th century. For instance, under Sections 5 and 8 of the Government of Ireland 
Act 1920,9 the Northern Ireland Parliament was prohibited from making any law 
which would give a preference, privilege or advantage or impose any disability or 
disadvantage on account of religious belief or ecclesiastical status. However, there 
existed little legal protection against religious discrimination for the citizens of 
Northern Ireland. As such and as a wealth of scholarship attests, nationalists were 
systematically discriminated against in the areas of housing, education, political 
representation and participation, amongst others.10 
The movement by Irish Catholics to gain equal footing with their Protestant 
counterparts began in the 1960s.11 Protestors engaged in mass marches, influenced 
by the civil rights struggle in the United States (US) were often met with strong 
resistance from British forces.12 Detention, arrest and interrogation, were conducted 
pursuant to regulations passed under the Special Powers Act of 1922.13 This statute 
acted as enabling legislation, allowing the suspension of the procedural and 
substantive rights of due process and equal protection.14 The United Kingdom (UK) 
also derogated from their treaty obligations to protect human rights guaranteed 
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under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).15 Added to this was the 
resurgence of terrorism from both Protestant and Catholic paramilitary groups, the 
collapse of the Northern Ireland Government, the suspension of the experiment in 
devolution, and the imposition of 'direct rule' by the government of the UK in 1972.16 
After thirty years of violence, and numerous ceasefire agreements, a peace accord, 
known as the Belfast or GFA, was reached between the Unionist, Loyalist, 
Nationalist and Republican Parties on 1998. Both the UK and Irish governments 
acted as guarantors of this agreement.17  
5.1.2.  Discrimination in the Private Sector 
One of the central areas where marginalisation and discrimination of Catholics 
occurred in Northern Ireland was in employment. As Professor Christopher 
McCrudden wrote in 1999:  
On almost all socio-economic indicators, Catholics are significantly worse off 
than Protestants. One of the most dramatic differences, and the one which 
has attracted significant local and international attention, is the 
unemployment differential between Catholics and Protestants. On average, a 
Catholic is around twice as likely as a Protestant to be unemployed, and this 
differential has remained fairly stable from when such statistics have become 
publicly available.18 
This mirrors the findings of others such as Barritt and Carter who, writing in 1962, 
identified four different types of discriminatory employment practices:  
1. Firms that employed members of only one community.  
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2. Protestant-owned firms that employed Catholics only in lower paid jobs, and 
not in any administrative or supervisory capacity.  
3. Firms employing both Protestants and Catholics, but segregating them by 
departments.  
4. Firms that mixed the two communities within departments.19 
 
These disparities were continually documented throughout and before the troubles. 
For instance, as a consequence of the unrest during the early years of the Civil 
Rights campaign, the then Governor of Northern Ireland appointed a Commission 
headed by Lord Cameron to inquire into the causes of the disturbances. The 
Cameron Commission's Report was published in 1969.20 The evidence from the 
investigation which it carried out showed that injustices in the fields of housing and 
public employment, in particular, were significant contributory factors to the upsurge 
of violence and that the Roman Catholic population felt resentful and frustrated at 
not having been afforded greater protection against such practices. The Cameron 
commission further concluded that ‘complaints are now well documented in fact, of 
discrimination in making local government appointments at all levels, but especially 
in senior posts to the prejudice of non-Unionists and especially Catholic members of 
the community, in some Unionist controlled authorities.’21 
In 1980, a Fair Employment Agency study also concluded that during the period of 
direct rule by Britain, the gap between Catholics and Protestants "was widening" 
and would worsen in the "foreseeable future."22 In 1987, a report by the Standing 
Advisory Commission on Human Rights (hereafter 'the Commission') found that 
‘[h]igh unemployment is experienced by both sections of the community but there is 
a greater degree of disadvantage within the Catholic section of the community.’23 It 
continued that: ‘The unemployment rate for male Catholics is two and a half times 
that for male Protestants. This has shown no improvement in the last decade […].’24 
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Belfast, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1969. 
21 Ibid., at 39. 
22 D.R. Lowry, ‘Keeping Catholics in their place’, COMMONWEAL, July 16, 1982, at 400, cited in 
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Research carried out by the Policy Institute (PSI) in 1991 further highlighted the 
extent of inequality between the two communities in NI.25 According to the PSI 
study, for instance, Catholic male unemployment, then at 35 percent, was two and a 
half times that of Protestant male unemployment, and continued at this level despite 
there being over 100,000 job changes a year.26 A study by Murphy and Armstrong in 
199427 reached similar findings, as did Smith and Chambers.28  
Because of the high levels of discrimination in the area of employment, entrenching 
the inequalities that subsequently contributed to the emergence of conflict in the 
region, various attempts were made to address disparities between Catholics and 
Protestants in the workplace. For instance, the Northern Ireland Constitution Act of 
1973 prohibited discrimination on religious and/or political grounds.29 It provided that 
any discriminatory legislation passed by the Northern Assembly was void. After 
three years with virtually no improvement in the pattern of discriminatory hiring, the 
Parliament passed the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976.30 This 
outlawed job discrimination on the grounds of religion and political opinion in both 
public and private employment; and it provided for the establishment of a Fair 
Employment Agency (FEA) with advisory, research, investigative and enforcement 
functions, which was established one year later.  
From the outset, however, the legislation was criticised as ineffective. McCrudden 
considers that the legislation was unclear and ambiguous, along with being 
insufficiently enforced.31 Similarly, MacNamara outlines that:  
From the outset, the FEA was under-resourced and was hampered by the 
hostility of Unionist politicians, officials in the DED [Northern Ireland 
Department of Economic Development] and direct interference by ministers 
[…]32  
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The FEA was circumscribed by the legislation creating it. It never received 
the resources it was promised, and was hamstrung by the political hostility 
and indifference to it displayed by the Northern Ireland establishment. […]33 
Other weaknesses observed included inadequacies in its procedures, the 
fact that few of the complaints came from the private sector, and its inability 
to deal with indirect discrimination.34 
The limitations of a command and control-based approach are important when 
considering how different methods of regulation have been used to promote 
affirmative action in the post-conflict era. We return to this discussion in due course.  
For now, it is enough to note that the background of discrimination in the private 
sector, the weaknesses of the fair employment legislation, and the reluctance of 
employers to change their recruiting patterns, all led Irish-Americans to embark 
upon the MacBride campaign, a discussion to which we now turn. 
5.2.  The MacBride Principles  
The MacBride Principles were drawn up in 1984 by Irish civil rights activists in the 
US. The purpose was to address job discrimination in Northern Ireland. They were a 
direct response to the aforementioned marginalisation and discrimination of 
Catholics in the workforce.  
The nine fair hiring practice principles were named after and sponsored by Sean 
MacBride. MacBride was a controversial Irish political leader who had been chief of 
staff of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) during the 1930s, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
in the Irish Republic, founder of Amnesty International, and recipient of the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1974. The MacBride Principles were fashioned to encourage 
corporations doing business in Northern Ireland to take positive actions to 
implement equal hiring practices and ensure the security and safety of employees in 
the workplace. Through the MacBride Principles, American companies with 







non-discrimination and affirmative action principles in their operations in Northern 
Ireland. They included, among other things: 
Increasing the representation of individuals from underrepresented religious 
groups in the workforce, including managerial, supervisory, administrative, 
clerical and technical jobs; 
[ensuring that] job openings should be publicly advertised and special 
recruitment efforts should be made to attract applicants from under-
represented religious groups; and 
[abolishing] job reservations, apprenticeship restrictions and differential 
employment criteria, which discriminate on the basis of religion or ethnic 
origin […].35 
From the perspective of understanding how different actors were able to influence 
businesses to adopt the principles, some methods can be identified. 
Firstly, efforts were made to incentivise businesses to adhere to the principles by 
threatening divestment. For example, several large pension funds in the US 
controlled by state and local government embraced the Principles and put pressure 
on American parent company through shareholder resolutions.36 Shareholder 
resolutions were submitted to companies' annual meetings from 1985, with growing 
numbers and support emerging each year during the 1980s. The first shareholder 
resolution on Northern Ireland was organized by the Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility to General Motors in 1985.  
Similarly, since 1989, successive city Comptrollers of New York have pushed 
companies to adopt the principles by leveraging their position as critical institutional 
investors. Indeed, some have argued that the immediate genesis of the MacBride 
Principles was the decision of the Comptroller at that time, Harrison Goldin, to ask 
his staff to 'generate a Sullivan-type proposal.’37 As in the case of Shareholder 
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resolutions above, the Comptroller has utilized the position as an important 
institutional investor to persuade businesses to comply with the Principles. For 
instance, the New York City Pension Funds, the umbrella group that includes the 
pension funds for city police officers, teachers, members of the fire department and 
other employees, is a significant investor in equities. The Comptroller leveraged its 
position as a shareholder in many companies that have operations in Northern 
Ireland to encourage those firms to accept the MacBride Principles.  
Another technique adopted by the MacBride campaign was to incentivise 
businesses to comply with the principles through the allure of government 
contracts.38 A forerunner of the MacBride campaign lay in the activities of church-
related groups and the Irish National Caucus (INC), 'a lobbying group in 
Washington, DC with a strongly nationalist perspective on the Northern Ireland 
question.’39 Using this lobby, along with the New York City Comptroller's Office, 
Irish-American-related trade union groups, and several religious groups, attempts 
were made to promote the Principles at the state and local levels.  
For instance, the MacBride campaign appealed to state legislatures to require 
compliance with the principles as a precondition to government business. As 
McCrudden notes, from around 1989, selective purchasing, 'emerged as the major 
new plank of the MacBride campaign. As illustrations, Cleveland, Chicago, and New 
York City, among others, had passed legislation linking contract eligibility to 
companies’.40 According to MacNamara, by the end of the twentieth century, 17 
states had passed MacBride legislation, covering the majority of the US population 
and involving more than 50 percent of public pension monies.41 Thirty-one 
municipalities had passed laws or legally binding resolutions, and fifteen had passed 
resolutions, proclamations or memorials expressing support. There were also 88 
corporate agreements accepting the MacBride Principles.42 
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The MacBride Principles and campaign were also able to build on the discontent of 
businesses and to persuade businesses to act through highlighting their 
discriminatory actions. In regards to the former, companies began to assess that, 
according to Wennmann, economic development in Northern Ireland was contingent 
upon the end of the conflict and called for greater economic integration with the 
Ireland and the European Common Market.43 Because discrimination lay at the 
heart of the conflict, businesses were cognisant of the need for legislative change. 
Moreover, businesspeople became aware of new global and regional economic 
opportunities for the region that would materialise only if violence was significantly 
reduced.44 Thus, like in South Africa, broader developments meant that businesses 
viewed conflict and repression as economically detrimental. 
5.2.1. Impacts of the MacBride Campaign on Individual Businesses 
The Principles arguably helped to raise the consciousness of business owners in 
Northern Ireland.45 For instance, in 1996 the Northern Ireland office of the 
Confederation of British Industries (CBI) joined with six other trade and business 
organisations to create the Group of 7. It included the CBI, the Hospitality 
Association for Northern Ireland, the Institute of Directors, the Northern Ireland 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Northern Ireland Growth Challenge, the 
Northern Ireland Economic Council, and the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions. This organisation promoted the objective of peace in 
Northern Ireland by lobbying other businesses to campaign for an end to the 
Troubles. Businesses also made material contributions to the peace process by 
spelling out the economic consequences of conflict to rival leaders and introducing 
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the possibility of a ‘piece dividend’ into the local political vocabulary46 and 
participated in media campaigns focused on ending the conflict and bringing the two 
communities together. 47 
5.2.2.  Impacts of the MacBride Campaign on Institutional Change 
The more significant consequences of the MacBride campaign, however, was in 
how it forced institutional change. The MacBride Principles were initially opposed by 
the British Government, which defined its opposition to the MacBride Campaign as 
one involving its ability to defeat what it saw as an Irish Republican based campaign 
against itself in the US.48 The British government also suggested that the MacBride 
Principles: discouraged companies from investing in Northern Ireland; impeded the 
progress of equal opportunity employment because of their ambiguity; and called for 
reverse discrimination, which was also illegal.49 
However, pressure to maintain good relations with the US was an important catalyst 
for legislative developments in the area of affirmative action. Against the background 
of the MacBride campaign, by 1985 the Secretary of State had already directed the 
Department of Economic Development (DED) to review the whole question of 
equality of opportunity in employment. The outcome was a comprehensive 
Consultative Paper, issued in 1986.50 This not only confirmed previous research on 
Roman Catholic disadvantage but proposed for discussion a range of possible 
measures which might be taken to remedy the situation. Final confirmation of the 
Government's determination to adopt a firmer stance on equality of employment 
opportunity came in the White Paper, Fair Employment in Northern Ireland.51  
Thus, while targeting businesses, the MacBride campaign indirectly led to important 
changes at the institutional level. As McCrudden contends:  
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Partly as a result of the MacBride campaign […], the British Government 
initiated a process of reconsideration of the adequacy of the government's 
policies dealing with discrimination and equality between the two 
communities, particularly due to the UK's sensitivity to bad publicity in the 
USA about its role in Northern Ireland.52 
This is reiterated by MacNamara in the conclusion of his book on the MacBride 
Principles:  
Irish-Americans used their electoral power to wield the ultimate peaceful 
capitalist weapon – the power of the dollar – to achieve social and economic 
reform in Northern Ireland. They used it to remedy a situation about which 
UK governments were either in denial or to which they turned a blind eye.53 
In the section that follows, I focus on some of these institutional developments, 
which, in different ways, have made important contributions to engaging businesses 
in the peacebuilding effort in Northern Ireland in the post-conflict era.  
5.2.3.  Discussion  
The above discussion offers some insights into the possibilities of using different 
forms of regulation to push businesses to engage in peacebuilding efforts. Firstly, 
the genesis of the MacBride Principles lay in civil society campaigns. Using leverage 
and moral arguments, civil society actors, such as the INC, were able to influence 
institutional actors, shareholders and state departments to leverage their respective 
positions to put pressure on businesses to alter how they conducted their operations 
in Northern Ireland. This highlights the importance of different actors in pushing 
would-be regulators to challenge business activities in the first place.  
The example of the MacBride Principles also highlights how codes of conduct can 
be used to promote positive interventions. Similar to the case of the Sullivan 
Principles, this suggests that while we normally think of corporate codes of conduct 
in terms of preventing businesses from causing harm, they can also be used to 
encourage interventions of a more proactive nature. Similarly, the case also 
demonstrates how different actors can incentivise businesses through economic 
                                                            
52 McCrudden, supra note 11, at 193. 




opportunities, such as through procurement, to contribute to peacebuilding. In other 
cases, actors can threaten economic sanctions, such as threats of divestment or the 
use of shareholders resolutions to influence corporate conduct. While like the in-
conflict regulatory initiatives in South Africa, these initiatives are not post-conflict per 
se, they are nevertheless relevant, not least in highlighting different approaches to 
regulation and leading to developments in the post-conflict regulatory landscape.  
The discussion also shows the limitations of command and control. In the case of 
Northern Ireland, one of the reasons for adopting the more progressive and creative 
regulatory framework discussed below stems from the limitations of the Fair 
Employment Act of 1976. By contrast, the approaches adopted under the Fair 
Employment Act of 198954 and the Fair Employment and Trade Order 1998 are 
particularly progressive, involving more collaborative efforts between the state and 
business. Similar to the example of South Africa, these discussions demonstrate 
that different forms of regulation can be used to influence businesses in different 
ways and that these efforts can inspire broader change at the institutional level. It is 
with this latter issue that I expand upon below.   
5.3.  FE (NI) Act (1989) and FETO  (1998) 
The MacBride campaign helped to forge change at the institutional level. The 
eventual outcome of the UK’s appraisal of existing regulation, catalysed by the 
MacBride campaign, was the promulgation of the FE Act 1989, which took effect in 
January 1990. This Act placed affirmative action on a statutory footing for the first 
time with new statutory duties being on employers. For instance, and by way of 
comparison, the regulatory approach to securing equality of opportunity adopted in 
NI differs significantly from that in the rest of the UK.55 In the UK, the central 
approach to combating discrimination is to prohibit certain forms of conduct, in 
particular by placing employers and others under a non-discrimination 
requirement.56 In Northern Ireland, by contrast, the approach has been more 
proactive or affirmative in nature. Northern Ireland has since 1989 had a ‘remarkable 
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and innovative programme of affirmative action’ that aims to use legal enforcement 
measures to ensure that both communities in Northern Ireland - Catholics and 
Protestants - enjoy "fair participation" in employment.57 
The FETO, 1998, which amended the FE Act 1989, demonstrates the proactive 
approach adopted in Northern Ireland. Under the FETO approach, employers have 
several duties that go beyond those set out in most of the other anti-discrimination 
law applicable in Northern Ireland and Great Britain. The affirmative action 
provisions allowed by the FETO include:  
 the encouragement of applications for employment or training for people 
from under-represented groups;  
 recruitment from those not in employment;  
 targeting training in a particular area or at a particular class of person;  
 the amendment of redundancy procedures to help achieve fair participation; 
and  
 the provision of training for non-employees of a particular religious belief, 
following approval by the Equality Commission.58 
 
There are two broad approaches used to facilitate compliance. Firstly, businesses 
can be punished through a loss of economic opportunities. That is, employers, who 
are in default of the legislation through failure to register with the Equality 
Commission (ECNI), or for not submitting monitoring returns, face penalties as well 
as economic sanctions such as the loss of government grants and exclusion from 
public procurement contracts.59 
 
Alternatively, there is also a more collaborative approach between businesses and 
the ECNI. As touched upon above, the command and control-based approach to 
non-discrimination under the FE Act of 1976 was perceived as inadequate. Most 
notably, it failed to address the discrimination of Catholics in employment or to help 
rebalance the levels of Catholics in employment. The major tool available under the 
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legislation to the principal legal enforcement agency- from 2000 the ECNI- is to 
select regulated employers for investigation and, where deemed necessary, to 
establish agreements to improve the representation of the under-represented 
group.60 That is, although technically a command and control-based form of 
regulation, the primary methods adopted have been collaborative forms of regulation 
between the ECNI and business. The latter approach involves the ECNI working 
alongside companies to develop how best to improve employment practices. In 
doing so, the ingenuity of affirmative legislation has been supported through the 
creative use of partnerships between the ECNI and businesses. While the ECNI can 
move towards legally binding agreements in practice, the great majority of the 
agreements (around two-thirds) have been voluntary ones. In other words, while 
ultimately these legally binding agreements are supported by the possibility of 
sanctions although in practice the Commission has primarily employed persuasion 
rather than enforcement.61 
 
Amongst other findings, McCrudden and colleagues conclude that agreements were 
positively associated with improvements in fair employment, both those designed to 
improve Catholic representation and those designed to improve Protestant 
representation […].62 For instance, by the year 2000, the Catholic share of the 
monitored full-time workforce rose from [34.9%] to [39.6%], an increase of 4.7 
percentage points. There was a corresponding fall in the Protestant share. 
Numerically, the number of Catholic full-time employees rose by 32,339 (28.2%), 
compared with an increase of 10,777 (5.0%) in the Protestant count.63Similarly, 
compared with 1992, by 2010 the number of monitored Catholic full-time employees 
had increased by almost 49,000, a rise of 37 percent. In contrast, the Protestant 
count fell by over 16,000 (7.0%) over the same period.64 
 
FETO is, therefore, a legislative initiative that directly tries to address the history of 
discrimination in the business sector. Recognising the limitations of previous 
approaches, both FE Act and FETO included an affirmative action approach, which 
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include creative co-operation between businesses and the ECNI to advance these 
objectives.  
5.3.1.  Significant Peace Building Moments 
In contributing to the reform of employment legislation, the MacBride Principles also 
indirectly influenced certain aspects of the broader peacebuilding effort. For 
instance, when the GFA was signed and subsequently approved in a referendum, 
addressing the inequalities in Northern Ireland formed a major component of the 
peace settlement struck. Along with the creation of a power-sharing political 
settlement between Nationalist, Unionist and other political parties, the GFA focuses 
heavily on the importance of protecting human rights and the principle of equality. 
These issues were subsequently put on a statutory basis through the NIA, 1998. 
The drive to do so was aided, at least in part, by the attention on inequality garnered 
by the MacBride campaign. This has also contributed to further protections in the 
area of persons with different religious beliefs, political opinion and racial group.65 
In turn, significant peacebuilding moments have also been important for the 
furtherance of equality in the private sector. For instance, the formalisation of 
equality at the governmental level was an influential driver of the amended FETO.66 
It provided the broader statutory basis upon which to advance equality in the 
economic as well as legal, political and social spheres. Secondly, the GFA led to the 
creation of the ECNI, which is constituted formally under the NIA, 1998. As 
suggested above, the ECNI plays a critical role in promoting affirmative actions 
among businesses. Finally, section 75, coupled with the incorporation of ECHR, has 
also contributed to the emergence of other equality legislation that complements 
more proactive measures. These include non-discrimination and equality legislation 
in the areas of disability,67 sexual orientation,68 special needs,69 and age,70 as 
examples. 
                                                            
65 Equality Commission Northern Ireland. Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 A Guide for 
Public Authorities’, Belfast, ECNI, April 2010. 
66 See, for instance, Northern Ireland Act 1998, s. 75. 
67 See, Equality (Disability, etc.) (Northern Ireland) Order 2000 (No. 1110); Disability Discrimination 
(Northern Ireland) Order 2006 (No. 312). 
68 See Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2003 (No. 497); The 
Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland), 2006 (No. 439). 
69 Special Educational Needs and Disability (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 (No. 1117). 




5.3.2.  Discussion  
The discussion above helps to demonstrate different forms that regulation can take, 
various actors that can be involved in regulating, and the different impacts that can 
arise from the direct regulation of business. Early initiatives such as the MacBride 
Principles and the roles played by such actors as shareholders, investors and US 
States using public procurement, demonstrate the possibilities for different actors to 
shape business conduct in conflict-affected settings.  
These significant regulatory moments also illustrate the somewhat complex ‘chicken 
and egg’ trajectory of regulation in Northern Ireland. In one way, business-focused 
in-conflict regulatory initiatives helped contribute to change institutionally, in the form 
of FE Act of 1989. This, in turn, had at least a contributory role in pushing forward 
the equality agenda, which is enshrined politically in the GFA and formalised legally 
in the NIA of 1998. In doing so, the equality agenda provided the basis for FETO 
and the creation of the ECNI.71 To this end, the approach adopted under the FETO 
demonstrates a degree of ingenuity. Recognising the failures of previous legislative 
efforts, coupled with the practical difficulties of enforcing affirmative action 
legislation, a different regulatory method was adopted. Here, the ECNI works 
collaboratively with businesses in helping to push the equality agenda forward with a 
co-operative approach to regulating business.  
Thus, like the example of South Africa, the discussions above help to show that 
possibilities exist for engaging businesses in contributing to peacebuilding efforts. 
From states to investors, civil society to shareholders, different actors using 
methods of persuasion, collaboration, command and control and incentives, can 
help to engage businesses in peacebuilding efforts. The discussion also 
demonstrates that these efforts can have impacts that extend beyond shaping 
business behaviour. In particular, they show that different actors can indirectly force 
change at the institutional level and in particular, at the level of the post-conflict 
regulatory landscape. 
                                                            




5.4.  The EU PEACE Programme 
International actors have been involved in the peace process in Northern Ireland in 
various ways.72 For instance, along with the involvement of Irish Americans through 
the MacBride Principles, American businesses as participants and contributors to 
such foundations as the Ireland Funds,73 and American Philanthropies, have 
donated millions of dollars in support of peace.74 Throughout different stages of the 
peace process, international actors, from Bill Clinton to Richard Haas, have played 
instrumental roles in helping to broker peace.  
Similarly, following the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1986, the International Fund for 
Ireland (IFI) was founded ‘to tackle the underlying causes of sectarianism and 
violence and to build reconciliation between people and within and between 
communities throughout the island of Ireland.’75 The IFI was made possible by the 
contributions of the US which initially donated $50 million USD in 1986 and by 1996 
had donated a total of $500 million USD,76 with contributions also including those 
from the EU, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The EU, in its own individual 
right, has also been highly influential in the Peace Process, not least with the 
introduction of the EU PEACE funds which continue to operate until this day.77  
5.4.1.  The EU PEACE Funds 
The EU PEACE programme was established with the purpose to, amongst other 
things, ‘make a positive response to the opportunities presented by developments in 
the Northern Ireland peace process during 1994, especially the announcements of 
cessation of violence by the main republican and loyalist paramilitary 
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organisations.’78 The EU Peace Programme to date has consisted of four separate 
programmes. Under PEACE I, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a 
Community Initiative under the Structural Funds from 1995 to 199,9 with €500 
million in total provided, 80 per cent of which went to Northern Ireland and 20 per 
cent to the Border Counties. Additional government funding of €167 million brought 
the total to €667 million.79 The strategic aim of the programme was ‘to reinforce 
progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation by 
increasing economic development and employment, promoting urban and rural 
regeneration, developing cross-border cooperation and extending social inclusion. 
These aims and objectives were to be achieved through a number of priorities 
(containing 24 sub-measures), namely: (1) Employment, (2) Urban and Rural 
Regeneration, (3) Cross-Border Development, (4) Social Inclusion, (5) Productive 
Investment and Industrial Development, and (6) District Partnerships (Northern 
Ireland only), all supported by (7) Technical Assistance. 
Peace II was essentially a continuation of Peace I. The EU provided a further €531 
million for five years (2000–2004) with the national governments adding €304 million 
to bring the total to €835 million.80 In February 2005, a two-year extension was 
announced to the end of 2006, providing a further €160 million (€78 million from the 
EU and €82 million national funding). Peace I was a new Community Initiative 
devised as a stand-alone programme within a new structural funds programming 
period (1994–1999). Peace II, by contrast, was integrated as an Objective 1 
Operational Programme within the Community Support Frameworks of both 
Northern Ireland and the Republic (one of two Operational Programmes in Northern 
Ireland and one of seven in the Republic of Ireland). 
The PEACE III programme 2007-13 was introduced as a distinctive programme 
part-funded by the European Union (€225million from the EU with further national 
contributions of €108million), through its Structural Funds programme. The main 
aims of the PEACE III Programme are to reinforce progress towards a peaceful and 
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stable society and to promote reconciliation by assisting operations and projects, 
which help to reconcile communities and contribute towards a shared society for 
everyone. The programme was divided into two main priorities: reconciling 
communities and contributing to a shared society. These priorities are delivered 
according to various objectives such as building positive relations at the local level, 
acknowledging the past, creating shared public spaces, and developing institutional 
capacity for a shared society.81 
Finally, PEACE IV (2014-2020) was officially launched on 14 January 2016, with a 
strong emphasis on investment targeted at children and young people.82 It builds 
upon two main priorities (reconciling communities and contributing to peace) and 
four main objectives for the 2014-2020 programming period: shared education; 
helping children and young people; creating shared spaces and services; and, 
building positive relations at a local level.83 
A detailed overview of the PEACE programmes is beyond the confines of this 
chapter. Instead, the specific intention of the discussion below is more confined. 
Firstly, I seek to show how businesses helped contribute to peacebuilding through 
their participation in LDPs. Secondly, I suggest that an international organisation, 
such as the EU, can incentivise businesses to engage in peacebuilding efforts.   
5.4.1.1.  Partnerships, Business and EU PEACE Funds 
As suggested, the GFA constituted the formal end of the approximately thirty-year 
conflict in Northern Ireland. As was also noted, this peace agreement served as the 
basis for the NIA, 1998 which represented a new constitutional settlement for 
Northern Ireland.84 The NIA provided for the creation of a devolved Northern Ireland 
Assembly, Northern Ireland Ministers, an Executive Committee and Northern Ireland 
Departments. Under a power-sharing framework, the Executive is led by a First 
Minister and Deputy First Minister. Members of the Executive are elected based on 
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a complex voting system intended to reflect cross-community interests and party 
strength as demonstrated in the elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly.85 
Political arrangements such as these are often employed in the aftermath of political 
violence to ensure a form of group accommodation in which elites share power. In 
the case of Northern Ireland, the power-sharing framework was a partial response 
and attempted solution to the intractable constitutional question of its position within 
the UK and the island of Ireland.86 
However, one of the central criticisms that has been levelled against power sharing 
arrangements is that they are divisive, cementing societal divisions and perpetuating 
‘us and them’ tendencies. Byrne, for instance, has suggested that the powersharing 
approach to ending conflict has not worked in producing a more deferential mass in 
Northern Ireland.87 Scholars such as Dixon advocated from early on that as an 
accompaniment to the political peace process in Northern Ireland, a civil society 
peacebuilding model that promoted intergroup contact was needed to offer a way 
out of the political zero-sum elite negotiation process.88 
Against this backdrop, central to the objectives of PEACE I was facilitating inclusion 
from the bottom-up, to help support the more top-down political settlement. Peace I 
focused, therefore, on the concepts of local ownership, participative democracy and 
partnership. On one level, achieving these objectives was about bringing sections of 
the community together to co-operate functionally to identify and resolve local 
problems. In this way, the space and necessity for cross-community and cross-
sector contact and co-operation were created – aided by the availability of significant 
funding for local area initiatives.89 Regarding the actors included, Racioppi and 
O’Sullivan note that the Programme sought to draw in those who might be at the 
margins of political life (women, youth, the aged, ethnic minorities, rank-and-file 
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paramilitary members, the poor, and the disabled).90As Racioppi and O’Sullivan 
state further: 
Its logic has been to engage them in the peace process by generating 
opportunities for them to design and implement projects for their 
communities, by encouraging their involvement in cross-community 
interaction and cooperation, and by providing training and skills for 
employment and political participation.91 
On another level, the approach adopted sought to integrate the private and the 
public spheres to strengthen accountability, participation and effectiveness. As 
noted by Hughes, for instance, the injection of EU funding on such a massive scale 
contributed to a redefinition of the political landscape in Northern Ireland by 
empowering civil society and weakening state control over the ‘community relations’ 
agenda.92 LDPs were regarded as the most visible expression of a marriage 
between representative and participatory democracy.93  
LDPs functioned under the oversight of the Northern Ireland Partnership Board 
(NIPB). This is an executive body comprising representatives, one-third each, from 
local authorities; voluntary/community sectors; business, trade unions, rural and 
farming which has full responsibility to agree on plans within the resources available 
for each District Partnership. These coalitions also involved representatives of 
various sectors within that area: one-third of the representatives were elected 
councillors, one-third were community and voluntary sector representatives and 
one-third represented the private sector, trade unions and other interests. The 
function of these coalitions was to identify and fund local development initiatives 
seeking to contribute to peace and reconciliation. The intention was to pursue the 
EU’s objectives by ‘providing local economic and social actors with resources to 
translate developments into a lasting peace, and to facilitate ongoing progress 
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towards reconciliation.’94 This strategy reflected the view of the Commission that at 
the local level, actors such as local authorities, business, trade unions and voluntary 
associations, should be involved in shaping and implementing the programme.95 
That a partnership approach was adopted emerged for a number of reasons. 
Alongside the view that the political peace process should be supported by bottom-
up initiatives, approach coincided with the post-Maastricht Treaty (1992) policy 
framework of the EU.  This framework emphasized social inclusion as an objective 
and the role of civic organizations as a means towards addressing that objective and 
it had been embodied in the Third Poverty Programme that ran from 1989 to 1994.96 
Thus, when it came to designing the particular framework that the PEACE projects 
were to adopt, Williamson et al. suggest that both a shift in thinking at the European 
Commission level coupled with the impressive record of voluntary community-based 
initiatives within Northern Ireland were influential in the design of the PEACE.97 
The story of the LDPs highlights the role of businesses as effective participants in 
governance. Under a framework of collaboration, the private sector, along with other 
business interests, was a key player in a tripartite approach to governance that 
sought to not only respond to the limitations of local governance but also to utilise 
the very process of collaborations as a conflict resolution tool. For Birrel and Gray, 
the valuable contributions that businesses brought were management expertise, 
entrepreneurial skills and access to resources.98 In much the same way that 
scholars have noted the important roles that businesses can play in helping to 
broker peace, the inclusion of the private sector in the LDPs shows the potential and 
importance of including business, particularly local businesses, in helping to govern 
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in the post-conflict phases. Through their involvement in the LDPs, businesses were 
directly involved in helping to realise important peacebuilding objectives. These 
objectives included bringing previously at-war communities together, developing the 
socioeconomic conditions of those previously marginalised and complementing the 
broader, more elite-driven peace process.  
Regarding impact, the overall usefulness of the LDP model is suggested by the fact 
that its structure was retained and developed further throughout subsequent PEACE 
programmes. Furthermore, the proportion of PEACE funding disbursed through the 
District Partnership model increased from 14% to 24% within the PEACE I 
Programme. Indeed, in PEACE III, partnerships evolved into Local Peace Action 
Clusters. 99 Moreover, and while not without controversy,100 a number of analyses 
into the PEACE programmes have highlighted not only the important impacts of the 
PEACE programmes but also the centrality of participation to it. This retention 
highlights the overall usefulness of the LDP model.101  
5.4.1.2.  Incentivising Participation? 
Why did businesses participate in these partnerships? In answering this question, it 
is important to keep in mind the broader economic context of the time. As scholars 
like Andersson et al. note: 
Northern Ireland’s economic infrastructure [was] poor and underfunded. The 
conflict hampered private investment and government funds were largely 
focused on direct measures to provide security and combat the IRA and 
associated paramilitary groups.102 
The constant threat of bombings, the high cost of security, and lack of a stable 
internal market made plant openings unattractive and drove away large 
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manufacturers in great numbers.103In short, the economy in post-conflict Northern 
Ireland was weak. Businesses, as economic actors, depend on a strong economy.  
Against these realities, it is necessary to understand the influence of LDPs over 
economic policy. In terms of operation, each LDP was invited to bid against the 
allocation for its area through a plan of action. This plan detailed the actions/projects 
which, in the opinion of the partnership, were best calculated to advance the aims 
and objectives of the initiative in its area. To this end, the economy was identified as 
a key priority. Under PEACE I, for instance, EU PEACE funds had to go to projects 
for social inclusion, employment, urban/rural regeneration, and productive 
investment and industrial development. Within these general parameters, LDPs 
could set their own strategies for grant-making. The partnerships awarded over £61 
million to more than 3,000 projects; the average grant was £18,687.   
Similarly, under Peace II, five priority areas receive designated percentages of total 
funding: economic renewal; social integration; locally based regeneration and 
development; outward- and forward-looking region; and cross-border cooperation. 
Peace II’s objectives were to promote reconciliation to forge a peaceful society by 
addressing the legacy of conflict in areas most impacted by conflict and to take 
advantage of opportunities arising from peace focusing on cross-border cooperation, 
economic renewal, inclusion, locally based regeneration and development, outward 
and forward-looking region, and social integration.104 
Through LDPs, businesses were able to shape economic policy. That is, as direct 
participants, businesses were able to identify important areas for reform, including 
developing and supporting local businesses, and improving infrastructure necessary 
for business logistics. The EU Funds provided an incentive for businesses to 
engage in those processes by offering businesses the opportunity to become 
involved in shaping the economic agenda in NI. Against this backdrop and as will be 
developed, we can begin to think about other ways that, for instance, those 
financing businesses can shape business interventions in post-conflict contexts. 
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5.4.1.3.  Discussion  
The discussion above is relevant for a number of purposes. Firstly, from the 
perspective of businesses contributing to peacebuilding efforts, the example outlines 
some context-relevant interventions. While politically, through a power-sharing 
framework, Northern Ireland was moving towards a more co-operative society, on 
the ground these realities were less visible. The LDPs were viewed as a compliment 
to top-down measures by seeking to integrate both communities through a 
collaborative, bottom-up process. The inclusion of businesses as participants in the 
LDCs, illustrates that companies can be involved in governance, community 
reconciliation efforts and socioeconomic development, in ways that extend beyond 
‘doing no harm’ or a ‘business as usual’ approach. Secondly, the EU was able to 
incentivise businesses to participate in the LDPs by creatively offering the 
opportunity to engage in governance and economic reform processes. This shows 
the possibilities not only external actors to influence companies to contribute to 
peacebuilding but also the importance and usefulness of doing so creatively. 
At the same time, the example of the EU PEACE program is distinct from other 
approaches, such as FETO. An argument can be made that pursuant to the latter, 
businesses were regulated to contribute to peacebuilding, through both the threat of 
legal sanctions for non-compliance and, in most cases, promoting collaboration 
between the ECNI and businesses. It is harder to advance the same argument for 
the EU PEACE programme. Incentivising businesses to contribute to the 
peacebuilding effort through participation in the LDPs demonstrates creativity and a 
degree of lateral thinking. It helps to highlight that those capable of influencing 
businesses can adopt approaches that succeed in aligning peacebuilding objectives 
with business interests. However, these approaches are not and should not be 
regarded as regulation. Differing from B-BBEE, which arguably has some regulatory 
components, the approach of the EU Peace program is something different; a smart 
approach to leveraging influence, but not quite regulation. 
5.5.  Legislative Barriers: The Issue of Political Prisoner Reintegration  
The final story identifies an area in which businesses could make a significant 
contribution to the ongoing peacebuilding effort but which, partly because of 




Ireland, the reintegration of former political prisoners back into society has been a 
fundamental component of the peace process.105 The passing of Emergency 
Provisions Act of 1973, which applied exclusively inside Northern Ireland and to the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1974, which applied to the whole of the United 
Kingdom increased the amount of political prisoners in Northern Ireland.106 The 
result was that at the time of brokering a peace deal, a significant number of former 
combatants were or had been incarcerated within the British penal system. Shirlow 
and McEvoy, for instance, estimate that 15,000 Republicans and between 5,000 and 
10,000 loyalists were imprisoned during the conflict.107Others argue that the number 
was around 25,000.108  
When it came to negotiating the political settlement, prisoner release was viewed as 
a critical component of the deal. Under the GFA, for example, the British and Irish 
governments pledged ‘to recognise the importance of measures to facilitate the 
reintegration of prisoners into the community by providing support both before and 
after release, including assistance directed towards availing of employment 
opportunities, retraining and/or re-skilling, and further education’.109 Eight years 
later, the St Andrew’s Agreement stressed that the British ‘government will work with 
business, trade unions and ex-prisoner groups to produce guidance for employers 
which will reduce barriers to employment and enhance re-integration of former 
prisoners’.110 
Notwithstanding the importance attached to prisoner reintegration, however, 
McKeever notes that less attention has been paid to implementing prisoner-related 
aspects of these agreements.111 For example, the vast majority of the 300 ex-
prisoners surveyed by Shirlow et al. – 93% of republicans and 84% of loyalists – had 
experienced financial difficulties when first released and 48% of loyalists and 64% of 
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republicans continued to have such difficulties.112 Jamieson and Grounds found that 
for the republican 18 ex-prisoners they contacted employment was the single 
greatest obstacle to successful resettlement.113 
One particular aspect that is increasingly identified is the barriers that face political 
prisoners in gaining employment. For instance, under the terms of the GFA, ex-
prisoners were released on licence- the GFA did not grant an amnesty. Under the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders (NI) Order 1978, convictions of more than two and a half 
years can never be spent.114 Additionally, under the aforementioned Fair 
Employment and Treatment (NI) Order 1998 it is legal to refuse employment to 
someone who’s political opinions ‘approve or accept the use of violence for political 
ends.’ Article 2(4) of the 1998 Order states the following: 
In this Order any reference to a person’s political opinion does not include an 
opinion which consists of or includes approval or acceptance of the use of 
violence for political ends connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland, 
including the use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any 
section of the public in fear.115 
According to groups focused on the rights of prisoners, this aspect of employment 
legislation has had the effect of impeding ex-political prisoners of gaining access to 
employment.  
A leading case on the issue is McConkey and Jervis v the Simon Community.116 
McConkey was jailed in 1986 for murder, possessing a firearm and belonging to a 
proscribed organisation. He was released on licence in 1997. Marks, another 
applicant, in this case, served a prison sentence for possessing explosives and 
conspiracy to murder. He was released in 1998. Both were turned down for jobs at 
Simon Community hostels in Belfast and Newry on the basis of Article 2(4). 
According to the Irish News: 
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The Simon Community were bolstered in their employment ban by the Fair 
Employment Tribunal, the refusal of a judicial review and a ruling by five 
judges in Britain’s Supreme Court. The court’s ruling relied on the ironically 
named ‘Fair Employment Treatment Order’ 1998 (FETO) which legally 
approves discrimination against former prisoners. It states that a convicted 
person with a political opinion who supported armed struggle can be lawfully 
discriminated against even though in the McConkey/Marks case both stated 
they supported the peace process. In effect FETO is a VETO. It means that 
former prisoners can be legally discriminated against.117 
In a similar case, the Belfast High Court ruled that a Stormont department unlawfully 
stopped an ex-prisoner working as a groundskeeper with a conservation charity 
even though he had held the job for 18 years. The judge also held that Peter 
Robinson, as the Finance Minister when Martin Neeson lost his job, broke the 
ministerial code by not consulting his Executive colleagues and in fact ‘made a 
decision he had no power to make” when he “disapplied” the guidance for employing 
political former prisoners accepted by the North’s Civil Service.118 
These leading cases do not involve businesses per se. However, numerous 
publications and organisations have noted that legislative provisions under FETO 
have prevented ex-political prisoners from obtaining employment in the private 
sphere.119 In contrast to the notion that the state and its agencies can promote 
business engagement in peacebuilding processes, a thus far overlooked reality 
emerges; the state can erect barriers that subsequently prevent businesses from 
doing so.  
According to John Loughran: 
It is evident that despite explicit commitments in the Good Friday Agreement 
(1998) and latterly the St Andrews Agreement (2006) little progress has been 
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made to remove the barriers […] for political ex-prisoners. […] The Neeson 
case evidences that the discrimination of ex-political prisoners and their 
denial to full and equal citizenship is acceptable – and communicates more 
generally that in certain instances discrimination will be tolerated.120 
Bringing this discussion back to the issue of regulation, a counter to the argument 
that peacebuilding moments can help to create the broader conditions for engaging 
businesses in the peacebuilding effort arises. While the argument suggested above 
that peace moments can contribute to important regulatory moments, in this case, 
the two appear in tension: the former highlights the importance of prisoner 
reintegration, including economic integration, while the latter works against this 
objective. In the coming chapter, I will suggest that one response to these tensions 
is to better orchestrate efforts focused on engaging businesses in peacebuilding 
efforts, in such a way that these tensions do not arise. This might be achieved by 
thinking more holistically about aligning the efforts of those that seek to influence 
businesses to contribute to peacebuilding 
5.5.1.  Discussion 
The last story is used as an illustration to highlight that in certain circumstances, the 
important roles that businesses might play in contributing to peacebuilding are either 
ignored or overlooked. Given the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland and 
the high levels of prisoners that must be reintegrated back into society, businesses, 
as key economic players, could be important actors in helping to facilitate this 
particular aspect of the peacebuilding process. However, because of existing 
limitations, namely legislation in place, businesses have been less willing to employ 
those previously involved in the conflict. As I will suggest, it is arguably the case that 
through a coordinated approach where the potential contributions that businesses 
might make are identified and promoted, missed opportunities can be prevented. I 
return to this discussion in chapter 6.  
                                                            




5.6.  Findings 
This section briefly summarises a number of important findings from the case study, 
which will be developed further in chapter 6.  
5.6.1.  Business Contributions to Peacebuilding 
The Northern Ireland case study deomstrates different ways that businesses can 
contribute to peacebuilding. In some cases, businesses have been instrumental in 
putting pressure on government to enact change. They have done this through 
opposing repressive policies and campaigning for peace. By adopting affirmative 
action policies, businesses have also played a key role in helping to address the 
past, particularly by integrating previously marginalised sections of society into the 
economy. This can be seen as supporting the political process, which resulted in a 
power-sharing executive as well as helping to give life to the realisation of equality 
on the ground. Businesses have also been important players in committees 
designed especially to help address the marginalisation of Catholics and to 
compensate for the perceived inadequacies of local government. I also argued that 
businesses have at least the potential to integrate former combatants back into 
society, the importance of which stems from the high level of political ex-prisoners in 
the context. In different ways, the contributions and potential contributions that 
businesses can make are directly linked to the context-specific realities of the 
peacebuilding process in the region.  
5.6.2.  Contested views on ‘Regulation’ 
As suggested in the case study on South Africa, the purpose of exploring different 
approaches to regulation in chapter 3 was to examine a number of different ways in 
which various actors influence business conduct. I then sought to examine, through 
this case study, how different actors might use these forms of influence and perhaps 
variations of regulation, to require, induce or encourage businesses to contribute to 
peacebuilding in Northern Ireland.  
However, the case study raises some conceptual questions regarding whether we 
might look beyond the different forms of influence being used to ask whether these 
businesses were regulated to contribute to peacebuilding. In some cases, the 




PEACE approach demonstrates a creative way of involving businesses in the 
peacebuilding process by incentivising them. The incentive emerged in the form of 
access to important decision-making processes and to use this position to steer 
projects in ways that might benefited them. This is a creative approach, which 
demonstrates a useful way of incentivising businesses to play a more ‘hands on’ 
role. It should not be regarded, however, as a form of regulation. 
In other cases, whether initiatives amount to regulating businesses for peacebuilding 
depends on how one defines regulation more generally. For instance, if we accept 
the premise that such actors as institutional investors and shareholders, through 
different forms of economic pressure, are types of regulators, then we might suggest 
that regulation can be used to encourage peacebuilding. In the case of investors, 
such entities as the NY can be seen as leveraging businesses to challenge anti-
discrimination practices, one of the underlying causes of conflict in the region. In this 
sense, in much the same that we might accept such an approach to be regulation 
when it attempts to limit the harms that businesses cause, we might also argue that 
adopting the same approach, albeit for different ends, can still be regarded as 
regulating.  
In other areas still and again similar to the South African study, the link seems even 
stronger. Through legislative efforts such as the FETO 1998, which fall squarely 
within the definition of orthodox regulation, we might suggest that businesses are 
being regulated to contribute to peace. Under this approach, companies were 
commanded to adopt affirmative action policies and faced sanctions if they did not 
adhere to them. While in most cases, collaborations between businesses and the 
ECNI has helped to advance the objectives of this legislation, the example 
nevertheless raises interesting questions about what regulation is and is not and 
whether different forms of regulation can be used to push businesses beyond ‘doing 
no harm.’ While the purpose of this chapter was to examine how different actors 
might influence businesses, indirectly, the case study raises a number of conceptual 
questions regarding what regulation is and what it is not. 
5.6.3. Different Forms of Influence  
Putting to one side conceptual discussions, the more important point to be made is 
that the case of Northern Ireland highlights that a range of different actors can 




both during and in the aftermath of the conflict in adopting affirmative action policies. 
It has been progressive not only in adopting affirmative action legislation but also in 
thinking creatively about how to ensure that affirmative action requirements are 
adhered to. While as outlined above, a command and control-based approach 
underpins the FETO legislation, the primary method of influence has been the use of 
voluntary agreements between businesses and the ECNI, a statutory organisation 
under the NIA, 1998. This highlights the potential for collaborations to advance 
business-based peacebuilding. Moreover, in some cases, procurement has been 
used to further support these efforts, with contracts being won or lost based on the 
basis of a business’s employment practices. This approach seeks to incentivise 
businesses to adopt affirmative action policies. Read together, the example of FETO 
suggests that businesses can be required, persuaded or incentivised to contribute to 
certain aspects of a peace process.  
The US has also been instrumental in engaging businesses to contribute to 
peacebuilding in various ways. The NY Comptroller, for instance, as an institutional 
investor, was able to leverage its position to demand change. The example 
suggests that investors can use their influence to shape corporate conduct, in this 
case, pushing against repressive state-legislation, which marginalised a particular 
section of society. Shareholders in companies that had operations in Northern 
Ireland did the same. In the case of the MacBride Principles, for instance, the 
position of institutional investors and shareholders, as part owners of companies, 
enabled economic pressure to be levelled against businesses to enact and demand 
change. 
Civil society actors, such as the IAC, have also been instrumental in exerting moral 
pressure on these different actors to demand change in the first place. To this end, 
the links between business and conflict have also been critical. By identifying 
businesses as essential constituents in contributing to the continuation of 
discriminatory policies and subsequently to conflict, different actors were able to 
draw on these connections and avail of the opportunities to challenge discriminatory 
legislative provisions. This helps to show the importance of ‘getting to regulation’, 
with civil society constituents playing salient roles in identifying opportunities to lean 




Through the EU Peace Funds, businesses were offered incentives to help 
participate in community-level partnerships by the prospect of involvement in helping 
to shape the domestic economy. Amongst other factors, capital flight during the 
zenith of the violence had left the economy mostly dependent on the public sector, 
which adversely impacted business performance. Through a creative process, the 
EU was able to draw on these concerns to engage companies in peacebuilding 
activities. This again suggests that actors can influence businesses through various 
forms of economic leverage and opportunities.  
5.6.4. Initiatives Leading to Institutional Change  
The Northern Ireland case study also highlights a number of interesting patterns that 
flow from the direct exertion of influence over business. A case in point is MacBride 
Principles. While ultimately directed towards American businesses, the MacBride 
Principles had the impact of forcing the British government to alter its employment 
policies. In this sense, both institutional developments in the form of the FE Act and 
FETO are directly linked to the in-conflict regulatory moment that was the Sullivan 
Campaign.  
Similarly, while inequality was a much more extensive part of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland, we might also conclude that in some senses, discrimination in the private 
sector, helped contribute to the strong equality provisions of the GFA and the NIA, 
1998. Indeed, for McCrudden, these comparatively older regulatory systems relating 
to equality in employment between the two communities in Northern Ireland 
pioneered the more progressive approach to equality constituted through the NI Act. 
The case study illustrates that the direct regulation of businesses can drive other 
regulatory developments, further demonstrating the indirect contributions that can 
flow from directly targeting business’s involvement in discriminatory regimes. 
5.6.5.  Peace Moments leading to change in business regulation 
At the same time, it is necessary to recognise the importance that moments in the 
peacebuilding process have had on the discussion on regulation of business. Firstly, 
the GFA and NIA provided the basis upon which the FETO was enacted. These 
peacebuilding moments were regarded as essential in furthering the broader 




NIA is similar to the case of South Africa where the B-BBEE framework sought to 
give effect to the equality provisions in the 1996 constitution.  
Secondly, the Equality Commission, which plays a central role in the collaborative 
and experimental approach under FETO, owes its origins to these significant 
peacebuilding moments. Finally, the approach adopted through the EU Peace funds 
directly builds on the equality agenda. On the one hand, the LDPs are a form of 
community integration where different sections of the community participate in a 
consultative bottom-up way of governance. On the other hand, the decision that 
these committees made had a direct impact on the process of giving life to the 
equality provisions in both the GFA and NIA. Thus, peacebuilding moments can be 
important aspects of engaging businesses through regulation by providing the 
foundations for other actors upon which to do so.  
5.6.6.  Regulatory Interactions 
While far less limited that the South African case study, there are also some 
different interactions between regulatory initiatives. In some senses, these have 
already been discussed and relate to the various ways that different regulatory 
initiatives have built on from others. To this, we might also add how different 
regulatory efforts have supported others. For instance, while affirmative action 
attempts to break with the past by integrating previously marginalised sections of 
society, other legislative initiatives have emerged to ensure that other groups are not 
subsequently discriminated against.  
Less progressively, while reintegrating former ex-political prisoners is recognised as 
a significant component of the peacebuilding effort, aspects of FETO appear to 
conflict with these peace agreement goals. This discussion highlights the fact that 
not only can barriers be created, which limit the willingness of businesses to become 
involved in the peacebuilding effort but, more importantly, opportunities for using 
firms in peacebuilding efforts can be missed.  
5.7.  Conclusion  
The discussion on regulatory pluralism in chapter 3 intended to identify different 
ways through which to influence businesses. By identifying these various forms of 




used to engage businesses in peacebuilding processes. This chapter has shown 
that not only can businesses be involved in the peacebuilding effort in different ways 
but also that different actors can influence how and when businesses do.  
While we normally consider codes and standards of conduct to be associated with 
curtailing the harms businesses might cause, the example of the MacBride 
Principles demonstrates that standards can require more proactive interventions. 
Similarly, shareholders and investors can use their influence to incentivise 
businesses to challenge discriminatory employment practices, pushing forward an 
agenda based on affirmative action. In this way, the case study helps to highlight 
that different actors can strengthen business adherence to standards through 
various forms of economic pressure. A similar reality exists in the context of 
institutional investors which, as demonstrated through the example of NY’s 
comptroller, can leverage businesses to pursue peacebuilding objectives.  
The case study also demonstrates that legislation can be used to promote proactive 
contributions. The FETO, for example, directly requires that businesses adopt 
affirmative action policies, in doing so responding to the historical marginalisation of 
Catholics in the workforce. To this end, the NI example also shows the possibility of 
experimentation and the opportunities for actors to think outside the box. This is 
particularly evident in the case of the more collaborative approaches around FETO, 
between businesses and the ECNI. In these examples, exploring how, what many 
consider to be different forms of regulation, can shape business conduct, helps to 
locate different types of influence that can be exerted on businesses and the various 
actors that can be involved in these processes.  
The example of the EU PEACE program, by contrast, suggests that while not 
amounting to regulation, different players on the peacebuilding scene can 
nevertheless use economic incentives in ways that include businesses in 
peacebuilding efforts. In this instance, businesses were incentivised to contribute to 
efforts focused on community reconciliation, social peacebuilding, and collective 
governance.  
The study has also suggested that efforts targeting businesses directly can indirectly 
lead to institutional developments of the regulatory environment. FETO, for example, 




To this end, the MacBride campaign owed its origins to the work of civil society 
actors, highlighting the importance of putting pressure on those capable of 
influencing the conduct of businesses. It was also noted that peacebuilding 
moments are often crucial in setting the broad agenda for change, providing the 
basis for the development and reinforcement of other initiatives post-conflict.   
These discussions all suggest that there exists a number of opportunities not only 
for influencing businesses to engage businesses in peacebuilding efforts but also in 
pressurising other actors to alter their policies. At the same time, the case study also 
suggests that there are coordination problems and opportunities. The example of 
political reintegration reminds us that tensions can arise between peacebuilding 
goals and regulatory possibilities.   
As will be discussed in chapter 6, these findings are particularly useful when 
considering what a framework on business and peacebuilding. In particular, this 
case study helps to support the view that different actors can engage companies to 
do more; that other sources can drive those assuming regulatory responsibilities; 
and that opportunities exist for different initiatives interacting. I develop these 




6.     
 
A Global Policy Instrument on Business and 
Peacebuilding? 
The previous chapters have demonstrated that different actors, employing a range 
of methods, can influence businesses to contribute to peacebuilding. While in the 
vast majority of instances, we look to these different forms of influence, whether 
legal or softer in nature, to prevent businesses from causing harm or holding 
businesses accountable, the case studies suggest that businesses can also be 
influenced to contribute to peacebuilding efforts. From post-conflict states to civil 
society organisations, home states to institutional investors, various actors can 
require, persuade and induce businesses to contribute to peacebuilding. I also 
suggested that initiatives can interact in different ways, sometimes supporting the 
objective of engaging businesses in processes of peacebuilding, while at other times 
stifling the realisation of this aim. In some instances and depending on how one 
understands the concept of regulation, we might even go so far as to suggest that 
businesses are being regulated to contribute to peacebuilding.  
Despite these possibilities, there is currently little discussion on the different ways 
that other actors might influence business contributions to peacebuilding. How then 
might we build on the case study findings? This chapter will argue that a global 
policy instrument on business and peacebuilding, which attempts to include different 
actors in promoting businesses to make more proactive contributions in 
peacebuilding processes, might be one potential solution.  
6.1.  Introduction  
The case studies on South Africa and Northern Ireland have demonstrated that 
different actors can shape business conduct in various ways and that in some 
instances; these different forms of influence can be used to engage businesses in 
contributing to peacebuilding. From post-conflict states to civil society organisations, 




induce businesses to play more proactive roles in transitions from conflict to peace. 
How though might these findings be relevant elsewhere and what possibilities exist 
for advancing the discussion beyond the confines of both the case studies and this 
thesis?  I suggest that considering what a global policy instrument on business and 
peacebuilding might look like can act as a catalyst for further discussions and 
research on the connections between various forms of influence and business-
based peacebuilding. In advancing this argument, I will draw on the United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP)- the principle framework 
on business and human rights- for two primary reasons.1  
6.1.1.  The UNGP are a Conversation Starter 
Firstly, although, as will be developed below, the UNGP have had some success in 
promoting the business and human rights agenda, and in improving respect for 
human rights, they have faced a number of criticisms. Amongst these are that they 
do not reflect differences across industries, that they fail to adequately protect the 
rights of such groups as women and children, and that they are not representative of 
the true position of international human rights law, for instance, in the context of 
extraterritorial obligations of states.  
However, approached from the perspective of progressing a discussion on the roles 
that other actors can play to engage businesses in peacebuilding efforts, I suggest 
that these limitations demonstrate how a policy instrument can be a conversation 
starter. When Professor John Ruggie, the author of the UNGP, presented this policy 
instrument to the Human Rights Council (HRC) in 2011, he stated that he was 
‘under no illusion that the conclusion [of his] mandate will bring all business and 
human rights challenges to an end. But Council endorsement of the Guiding 
Principles will mark the end of the beginning.’2 He has since elaborated that by this 
he meant that the UNGP would provide a solid foundation on which to build. They 
                                                            
1 UN Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human 
Rights, 2008 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie. A/HRC/8/5. 7 April 
[hereinafter the UNGP, the Guiding Principles or the ‘Principles’]. While specifc terms and names are 
abbreviated throughout this thesis, I include the full names again for ease of reference when each 
previously abbreviated word is mentioned. 
2 ‘Presentation of Report to United Nations Human Rights Council, Professor John G. Ruggie, Special 





were intended to ‘trigger an evolution, not [to be] the final work on the subject.’3 
Because of the perceived limitations of the UNGP, a boom in scholarship and 
thinking on the issue of business and human rights has since emerged. The 
pushback against the UNGP has led to important discussions regarding how to 
further the business and human rights agenda and how to address the various 
shortcomings of the policy instrument that was presented.  
I suggest that the trajectory of the business and human rights debate following the 
UNGP shows how a policy instrument can inspire debate and interdisciplinary 
discussions, with the aim of progressing the ultimate objective of improving 
corporate conduct in a particular regard. In this light, the UNGP has been a 
conversation starter; one which has led to more significant efforts to progress how 
and in what ways to forward the business and human rights agenda, and, 
importantly, the role of different actors in this effort. Thus, as an area of research, 
which has yet to attract significant discussions, I suggest that a policy instrument, 
however provocative or limited, might serve a similar function in progressing 
discussion nd debate regarding the linkages between the influence of different 
actors and business-based peacebuilding. 
6.1.2.  The UNGP are a Useful Template 
Secondly, I will argue that the UNGP offer a useful template for considering the form 
that a global policy instrument on business and peacebuilding might take. On the 
face of it, contemplating what such an instrument could look like might appear a 
confusing and uncertain task. Where would we begin to think about such an 
instrument and what would its parameters look like?  
I will argue that the UNGP offer some basis for considering the structure and 
primary components of a policy instrument on business and peacebuilding.4 Before 
proceeding, however, it is necessary to qualify and to differentiate an instrument on 
business and peacebuilding from that of the UNGP. Elements of the UNGP reflect 
                                                            
3 J. G. Ruggie, ‘Incorporating human rights: lessons learned, and next steps’, in D. Baumann-Pauly 
and J. Nolan (ed.) Business and Human Rights: From Principles to Practice, Routledge, New York, 
2016, at 64. 
4 UN Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human 
Rights, 2008 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie. A/HRC/8/5. 7 April 




the position of international human rights law. The UNGP reiterate, for example, that 
states have legal obligations to protect against human rights, with much of the 
substance of the UNGP outlining and identifying how states might go about 
executing these duties. A business and peacebuilding policy instrument would have 
no such legal basis. States do not have obligations to engage businesses in 
peacebuilding processes, nor have such arguments been advanced. I suggest 
simply that the particular structure of the UNGP is instructive in helping to inform the 
broad parameters of a policy instrument on business and peacebuilding. As a 
template and only as a template, are the UNGP useful in providing a reference point 
for thinking about a policy instrument on business and peacebuilding.  
Their relevance stems from their ability both to draw on the roles that different actors 
can play in shaping corporate conduct and in galvanising other actors to assume 
these responsibilities. The UNGP consist of three pillars: the state duty to protect 
human rights; the corporate responsibility to respect rights; and the remedy pillar. 
The state duty to protect human rights requires states to employ a range of 
measures to ensure that businesses are not undermining the enjoyment of human 
rights. Reflecting the plurality of regulatory options available to the state, this 
includes adopting command and control-based approaches, alongside measures 
that incentivise and persuade businesses to respect rights. Secondly, under pillar 2 
and elements of pillar three, the UNGP serve as a set of guidelines directed towards 
businesses to help inform companies as to how to go about respecting rights in the 
contexts in which they operate. This includes, amongst other things, asking 
businesses to undertake human rights due diligence, which stresses the importance 
of context-sensitive approaches to human rights. Finally, both implicitly and 
explicitly, the UNGP draw on a range of actors that can help to promote business 
responsibilities to respect rights. Explicitly, this includes reflecting the plurality of 
actors and methods in the formal text of the UNGP. Implicitly, the UNGP have 
helped to garner extensive support, with a diverse range of actors seeking to 
incorporate due diligence requirements into their functions.  
As I will develop further below, the UNGP are useful in showing that a policy 
instrument can help to align different actors around a common objective; in this 
case, reducing the extent to which businesses undermine the enjoyment of rights 
and in some cases providing remedies to victims when harms occur. They do this by 




focusing on the direct measures that states can take on one hand, and by 
developing and engaging other actors to promote the process of due diligence, on 
the other.  
Similar to the UNGP, a global policy instrument on business and peacebuilding 
should involve different actors putting pressure or incentivising businesses to 
contribute to peacebuilding processes. Most importantly, it should respond to the 
limitations of relying solely on the individual decisions of companies as to when and 
how to intervene. The first port of call, in this regard, should be post-conflict states. 
Such an instrument, recognising the various difficulties that often face states 
transitioning from conflict to peace, should outline the broad range of possibilities 
and methods that the state could employ. In other words, the state-limb of a global 
policy instrument should reflect the plurality of options that state’s can use. At the 
same time, the realities are often such that, despite these various options, states will 
be unwilling and/or unable to assume these roles. For this reason, a global policy 
instrument should also speak to businesses. That is, an instrument should seek to 
inform businesses as to how they might identify ways to make proactive, positive 
contributions to peacebuilding efforts. At this point, there is perhaps an obvious 
limitation: how might a global instrument be contextually applicable? As this thesis 
has argued throughout, there are numerous difficulties associated with making 
broad statements about how businesses can contribute to peace. Most notably, 
because post-conflict contexts are complex, businesses contributions to peace in 
one setting might have little impact in another. Moreover, in some cases, these 
contributions might exacerbate the situation. For these reasons, the business limb of 
a business and peacebuilding policy instrument should focus on outlining processes 
that businesses should adopt to identify how to engage in post-conflict settings.  
The final limb of a policy instrument on business and peacebuilding arises in 
response to the potential failures of both orthodox and self-regulation. In the 
absence of states, relying solely on businesses to follow a set of guidelines is, in 
some senses, to bring us back to the start of this thesis. That is, we would be left to 
assume that businesses would decide when to adhere to these guidelines, thus 
leaving us stagnated in the aforenamed state of optimistic uncertainty. For this 
reason, pillar 3 of a policy instrument on business and peacebuilding should attempt 
to include different actors that might be able to influence business contributions to 




peacebuilding objectives? Moreover, is it even wise for them to do so? I suggest that 
pillar 3 of any instrument on business and peacebuilding should focus more on 
promoting adherence to pillar 2 guidelines. That is, adopting a responsive-regulatory 
type approach, such actors as investors, financiers and civil society, as examples, 
should seek to promote adherence to the guidelines set.  
In short, the UNGP are useful, therefore, in two, perhaps contradictory ways. Firstly, 
the broader context of the trajectory of the business and human rights debate post- 
UNGP offers hope that such an approach can galvanise debates, thinking and 
argumentation over how best it might proceed. Secondly, the UNGP provide a 
template for considering the form that such an instrument might take.  
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows. Section 6.2. examines two 
existing global initiatives on business and peacebuilding: the UN Business for Peace 
Platform (B4P) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). While both are 
welcomed developments in the area of business and peacebuilding, the discussion 
helps to illustrate the lack of thinking on the role that other actors might play in 
promoting business-based peacebuilding. Section 6.3. analyses the UNGP. I begin 
by dissecting the UNGP, examining the different ways in which the UNGP 
endeavour to address the business and human rights problem. This involves 
unpacking the state duty to protect human rights (6.3.1.1.) and the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights (6.3.1.2.). Also included in this discussion is 
an examination of the ways that the UNGP, based on and reflecting the pluralisation 
of regulation, attempt to integrate different actors and methods to promote the 
corporate responsibility to respect rights (6.3.1.3 and 6.3.2.). I then examine a 
number of criticisms levelled against the UNGP (6.3.3.) and explain how these 
criticisms have helped to inspire a wealth of discussions and ideas about how to 
progress the business and human rights agenda (6.3.4.) I conclude by reiterating 
the relevance of these discussions to a global policy instrument on business and 
peacebuilding. 
Section 6.4 considers what a policy instrument on business and peacebuilding might 
look like. Drawing on the findings of the case studies and based on the state pillar of 
the UNGP, I begin by considering the different ways that states might attempt to 
require, induce or encourage businesses to contribute to peacebuilding in context-




support the emergence of other initiatives  (6.4.1.1.1.) before focusing on how states 
might be pressured to adopt such measures (6.4.1.1.2) and how other actors might 
help to inform how they go about doing so (6.4.1.1.3.).  I conclude by considering 
the merits of a state limb (6.4.1.1.4.). 
Drawing on the due diligence guidelines in the UNGP, the next section considers 
what a set of guidelines on business and peacebuilding might look like (6.4.1.2.). To 
do so, I draw on a document produced by the UNGC in collaboration with CDA 
Collaborative Learning Projects. I then consider how different actors might seek to 
influence businesses to adopt these guidelines (pillar 3- s. 6.4.1.3.). For different 
reasons, I suggest that for actors other than states, a process-oriented approach, 
which focuses on promoting compliance with the guidelines is the best model for 
seeking to engage businesses in contributing to peacebuilding in ways that are not 
only context relevant, but which do not conflict with state-based peacebuilding 
objectives. I conclude this section by reflecting upon the limitations of this policy 
instrument, while at the same time considering its potential for inspiring wider debate 
(6.4.2.). I offer a number of conclusions in the final section (6.5.2.).  
6.2.  Existing Attempts at a Global Approach to Business and 
Peacebuilding  
One of the reasons for considering the emergence of a global policy instrument on 
business and peacebuilding is that such an instrument might help to inspire a range 
of actors to consider using their influence over businesses to engage them in 
peacebuilding processes. As suggested, the drive for doing so derives from the 
limited levels of thinking regarding the roles that different actors might play, 
limitations that are reflected in and by existing policy efforts on business and 
peacebuilding.  
For instance, the B4P platform emerged as a sub-initiative of the United Nations 
Global Compact (UNGC).5 Like the UNGC, the approach under B4P has been one 
of information sharing, encouraging businesses to share best practices in the area 
of business and peacebuilding. The B4P initiative does not define how businesses 
might go about engaging in peacebuilding per se, but rather seeks to harness 
                                                            
5 See UN Global Compact, ‘Business for Peace’, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/take-




lessons regarding the ways that businesses might contribute to peace or have 
contributed to peace in the past. As an offshoot of the broader UNGC initiative, 
commitment to B4P relies on the voluntary participation of businesses in the 
Platform.  
A second initiative is that of the SDGs.6  The SDGs are the follow-on project of the 
UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).7 Similar to their predecessor, the SDGs 
are a global and concerted plan of action for people, planet and prosperity. Among 
the various goals set in the SDGs, goal 16 focuses on peace, justice and strong 
institutions. The SDG’s explicitly recognise the importance of businesses in helping 
to achieve the objectives, including the realisation of peace. SDG 16 defines 
peacebuilding as a broad objective that businesses should seek to help realise.8 
Like the approach of the UNGC, businesses are encouraged to contribute to peace 
through arguments that there are potential economic benefits associated with acting 
as peacebuilding agents. 
These initiatives are important movers in the area of business and peacebuilding. In 
particular, one of the outputs of a collaboration between the B4P, the SDG project 
and the CDA Collaborative Learning Project, has been the development of a 
document that outlines a process for businesses wishing to contribute to 
peacebuilding.9 This will form an important part of the discussion on pillar 2 
regarding the possibility for developing guidelines that target businesses.  
At the same time, these initiatives are indicative of the current stalemate in thinking 
on the relationship between business and peacebuilding. In both examples, little 
attention is directed towards the possibility that different actors can help to drive 
business contributions to peacebuilding. Instead, they depend on businesses 
arriving at the conclusion that they should do so. Thus, these efforts perpetuate in 
policy the existing limitations of much of the literature: there is little certainty or 
predictability as to why and when businesses might contribute to peacebuilding. The 
                                                            
6 See United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Sustainable Development 
Knowledge Platform, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/, [last accessed 29 August 2017]. 
7 See United Nations Development Programme, Sustainable Development Goals, 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/mdg_goals.html [last accessed 15 September 
2017] 
8 See United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, SDG Business Forum, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf/SDGBusinessForum [last accessed 24 July 2017]. See also  
9 Ernstorfer, et al., ‘Advancing the Sustainable Development Goals by Supporting Peace: How 





intention of the case studies was to understand and illustrate how different actors 
might require, induce, and/or encourage businesses to contribute to peacebuilding 
processes to push beyond the current stalemate. A global policy instrument on 
business and peacebuilding, or at least initiating a discussion on such an 
instrument, could help to encourage actors in the future and in other contexts to use 
their capabilities to engage businesses in peacebuilding processes elsewhere.  As I 
elaborate directly below, the UNGP offer a number of useful insights when 
considering what such an instrument might look like and why it could be a useful 
conversation starter.  
6.3.  The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights  
The UNGP are widely recognised, for better or worse, as the main global standard 
on business and human rights.10 They were developed following a multi-stakeholder 
consultative process undertaken and led by Professor John Ruggie,11 the then 
Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) on the Issue of 
Business and Human Rights.12 The Guidelines operationalise a tripartite framework 
on business and human rights and consist of three pillars.13 The first pillar is the 
state duty to protect human rights. The second is the business responsibility to 
respect human rights, while the third pillar outlines the duties and responsibilities of 
states and businesses respectively to ensure that victims are remedied when 
breaches occur. Within these pillars, the Guiding Principles (GP) comprise thirty-one 
principles, each with commentary elaborating on its meaning and implications for 
law, policy, and practice. Although touching upon the remedy component of the 
UNGP, for the purposes of viewing this framework as a template for a global policy 
                                                            
10 For an overview of the UNGP, see J.H. Knox, ‘The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to 
Corporations’, in R. Mares (ed.)  The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2011; L.C. Backer, ‘On the Evolution of the United Nations’ Protect-Respect-
Remedy' Project: The State, the Corporation and Human Rights in a Global Governance Context’, 
Santa Clara Journal of International Law, vol. 9, no. 1, 2011. 
11 Human Rights Council Res. 2005/69, U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 (Apr. 20, 2005).   
12 See for discussion on the process of establishing the UNGP, K. Buhmann, ‘Navigating from ‘Train 
Wreck’ to Being ‘Welcomed’: Negotiation Strategies and Argumentative Patterns in the Development of 
the UN Framework’ in D. Bilchtiz and S. Deva (ed.) Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the 
Corporate Responsibility to Respect, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013; K. Buhmann, 
‘Business and Human Rights: Analysing Discursive Articulation of Stakeholder Interests to Explain the 
Consensus-based Construction of the “Protect, Respect, Remedy UN Framework”’, International Law 
Research, vol. 1, no. 1, 2012; Backer, supra note 10. 




instrument on business and peacebuilding, I focus primarily on those GP’s that 
attempt to curtail businesses from causing harm.  
6.3.1. Three Components of the UNGP 
6.3.1.1.  Regulatory Pluralism at the State Level 
Pillar 1 of the UNGP addresses the state duty to protect human rights. The 
Principles reflect the fact that, under international law, obligations for regulating 
businesses fall on states and that in an ideal world, the state duty to protect and 
remedy is the best way to regulate the activities of businesses.  
In some provisions, the UNGP promote orthodox approaches to regulation and in 
particular the use of command and control-based forms of influence. For example, 
GP 1 stresses that:  
States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or 
jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This requires 
taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such 
abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication.14  
The importance of orthodox approaches to regulation is also stated in the 
Commentary to GP 3:  
The failure to enforce existing laws that directly or indirectly regulate 
business respect for human rights is often a significant legal gap in State 
practice. Such laws might range from non-discrimination and labor laws to 
environmental, property, privacy and anti-bribery laws. Therefore, it is 
important for States to consider whether such laws are currently being 
enforced effectively, and if not, why this is the case and what measures may 
reasonably correct the situation.15 
Moreover, by underlining the importance of avenues to formal legal recourse for 
victims, the UNGP reiterate the control-based element of command and control-
based approaches to regulation. As is noted in GP 23’s Commentary: ‘Unless States 
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take appropriate steps to investigate, punish and redress business-related human 
rights abuses when they do occur, the State duty to protect can be rendered weak 
or even meaningless.’16  
At the same time, the plurality of options available to the state is also explicitly 
recognised throughout the UNGP. The Commentary to GP 3 outlines that ‘States 
[…] should consider a smart mix of measures […] to foster business respect for 
human rights.’17  These include, as examples, persuasive approaches such as 
corporate reporting,18 and the use of guidelines,19 along with conditionality-based 
regulatory influences, such as public procurement.20 
For example, GP 6 stipulates that ‘States should promote respect for human rights 
by business enterprises with which they conduct commercial transactions.’21 
Similarly, the Commentary to GP 4 alludes to the fact that: 
[a] range of agencies linked formally or informally to the State may provide 
support and services to business activities. These include export credit 
agencies, official investment insurance or guarantee agencies, development 
agencies and development finance institutions.22 
The plurality of regulatory approaches that the state might employ is also referenced 
in GP 7; a principle directly addressed to conflict-affected settings. This GP asserts 
that states should help to ensure that business enterprises operating in conflict-
affected contexts are not involved in human rights violations. Amongst other things, 
the Principles encourage ‘[e]ngaging at the earliest stage possible with business 
enterprises to help them identify, prevent and mitigate the human rights-related risks 
of their activities and business relationships.’23 They also stress the salience of 
‘[e]nsuring that their current policies, legislation, regulations and enforcement 
measures are effective in addressing the risk of business involvement in gross 
human rights abuses.’24 
                                                            
16 Ibid., Commentary to Principle 23. 
17 Ibid., Commentary to Principle 3 [italics added]. 
18 Ibid., Principle 3 (d). 
19 Ibid., Principle 2. 
20 Ibid., Commentary to principle 6. 
21 Ibid., Principle 6. 
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The UNGP are important in demonstrating how such an instrument is able to 
underline the fact States have the primary roles and responsibilities for shaping 
business conduct. As Anita Ramasastray notes:  
[T]he UNGPs are an important articulation of BHR [business and human 
rights] because they underscore the role of the state as a regulator and 
enforcer of laws. BHR […] contemplates an explicit and essential role for the 
state. BHR focuses first and foremost on the role of governments in 
supervising their corporate citizens.25 
One question that arises, however, is how a state should identify where to make 
improvements to existing regulatory frameworks. Different states are likely to face 
different human rights challenges. For instance, the risks associated with countries 
that are heavily reliant on extractive companies will raise different issues than a 
country dependent on the apparel industry. In the context of states adopting 
approaches focused on engaging businesses in peacebuilding efforts, ensuring that 
the policies are context-relevant is of critical importance. 
To address this issue of context, various governments have adopted National Action 
Plans (NAPs).26 These documents outline a plan of action for the future protection of 
human rights in different contexts. The Business and Human Rights Resource 
Centre (BHRRC) currently identifies eight countries that have produced and 
published NAPS: Colombia, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Finland, Lithuania, 
Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.27 Various African states such Kenya, Ghana, 
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Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa are 
in the process of developing NAPs. So too are other countries like Argentina, 
Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Spain and France.28 
There is growing awareness about the need for and importance of NAPs. In Europe, 
for instance, a catalyst for the development of NAPs came when the Council of 
Europe’s (CoE) Committee of Ministers (CoM) called on Member States inter alia, to 
take appropriate steps to protect against human rights abuses by business 
enterprises.29 It further outlined that Member States should formulate and implement 
policies and measures to promote measures that ensure all business enterprises 
respect human rights, as defined in the UNGP.30 The Working Group on Business 
and Human Rights now asks that states implement the Principles through 
developing NAPs.31 Different organisations have also developed guidelines outlining 
how to do so.32 For example, the International Service for human rights and the 
International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR), two Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), have developed detailed guidelines, which seek to help 
states improve their abilities to protect human rights, by devising and implementing 
NAPs.33 
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A particularly important part of the NAP process, when considered from the 
perspective of developing context-specific policies, is baseline assessments.34 A 
baseline assessment is a study conducted at the start of an intervention to analyse 
current conditions in a given context.35 The purpose of doing so is to ‘strengthen the 
effectiveness of NAPs by providing information on commitment- compliance gaps 
and raising awareness of business and human rights issues across government 
agencies.’36 Baseline assessments assist a country to ensure that they reflect those 
business and human rights-related issues that are pertinent in that setting.37 In 
concentrating efforts towards constructing NAPs and baseline assessments, various 
actors have, therefore, galvanised around the UNGP by attempting to strengthen the 
state duty to protect rights, focusing, in particular, on the salience of adopting 
context-specific policies and laws.  
Thus, the state pillar provides a useful example of how a policy instrument can 
outline how states can and should attempt to shape corporate conduct. This 
includes legal measures along the lines of orthodox regulation, but also more 
incentive and persuasion-based approaches. Moreover, the developments around 
NAPs and baseline assessments also demonstrate different approaches that states 
can adopt to ensure that any policies promoted are context-relevant.  As I will argue, 
states could also adopt a range of measures to help promote businesses to make 
context-sensitive contributions to peacebuilding, as illustrated in the case of South 
Africa’s Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE).  
6.3.1.2.  The Due Diligence Requirements  
The above discussion has examined how the UNGP outline different ways that 
states can directly attempt to regulate businesses as their operations relate to 
human rights. Nevertheless and in spite of this, in some contexts, it is also the case 
that states lack both the political will and capacity to assume these responsibilities. 
For this reason, the UNGP also develop guidelines for businesses, to help inform 
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companies as to how to go about respecting rights, again stressing the importance 
of context.  
Differing from state duty to protect, under pillar 2 of the UNGP, businesses are said 
to have responsibilities to respect rights rather than obligations. GP 11 outlines, for 
example, that businesses ‘should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and 
should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.’38 The 
rights to be respected are internationally recognized human rights – understood, at a 
minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights and the 
principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International Labour 
Organization’s (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.39 
The commentary to GP 12 goes on to stipulate that ‘[d]epending on circumstances, 
business enterprises may need to consider additional standards including United 
Nations instruments which have elaborated further on the rights of indigenous 
peoples; women; national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities to name a 
few.’40  
A defining feature of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is the 
inclusion of the concept of Due Diligence (DD). At the core of this concept is a 
process that businesses should undertake to improve their approach to human 
rights. As GP 17 states:  
In order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their 
adverse human rights impacts, business enterprises should carry out human 
rights due diligence. The process should include assessing actual and 
potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, 
tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed. Human 
rights due diligence:  
(a) Should cover adverse human rights impacts that the business 
enterprise may cause or contribute to through its own activities, or 
which may be directly linked to its operations, products or services by 
its business relationships; 
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(b) Will vary in complexity with the size of the business enterprise, the 
risk of severe human rights impacts, and the nature and context of its 
operations;  
(c) Should be ongoing, recognizing that the human rights risks may 
change over time as the business enterprise’s operations and 
operating context evolve.41 
The inclusion of the DD process is an attempt to inform businesses as to how to 
better identify potential adverse impacts that they might have in those contexts in 
which they operate. Given that businesses can all affect the enjoyment of rights in 
different ways, the DD requirements reflect the fact that adhering to all rights in all 
ways is neither possible nor practical. The DD approach, therefore, is more 
concerned with helping businesses to identify those areas and issues that are most 
pertinent to the business in question. In this way, it resembles the context-sensitive 
approach promoted through NAPs and baseline assessments, which focus on 
developing context-specific policies and procedures at the state level.  
As guidance, provide by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, states: 
It is through human rights due diligence that an enterprise identifies the 
information it needs in order to understand its specific human rights risks at 
any specific point in time and in any specific operating context, as well as the 
actions it needs to take to prevent and mitigate them.42 
The Commentary to GP 23 also identifies that some operating environments, such 
as conflict-affected areas, may increase the risks of enterprises being complicit in 
gross human rights abuses committed by other actors (security forces, for 
example).43 It affirms that ‘in complex contexts such as these, business enterprises 
should ensure that they do not exacerbate the situation.’44 Thus, ‘[i]n assessing how 
best to respond, [businesses] will often be well advised to draw on not only expertise 
and cross-functional consultation within the enterprise, but also to consult externally 
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with credible, independent experts, including from Governments, civil society, 
national human rights institutions and relevant multi-stakeholder initiatives.’45 For 
Davis, ‘Principle 23 directs companies’ attention to ensuring that they have the 
appropriate processes in place to address particular operating contexts.’46 To 
develop this awareness of context, the UNGP also identify that businesses should 
engage with local populations through stakeholder consultations. The Commentary 
to Principle 18, for instance, instructs that: 
[…] To enable business enterprises to assess their human rights impacts 
accurately, they should seek to understand the concerns of potentially 
affected stakeholders by consulting them directly in a manner that takes into 
account language and other potential barriers to effective engagement. In 
situations where such consultation is not possible, business enterprises 
should consider reasonable alternatives such as consulting credible, 
independent expert resources, including human rights defenders and others 
from civil society.47 
For Graf and Iff, due diligence, like context-sensitivity, includes the basic steps of 
identifying impacts, taking measures to address the impacts identified, and 
subsequently evaluating the measures taken.48 Thus, while the corporate 
responsibility to respect rights stands as the general objective under pillar 2 of the 
UNGP, through DD requirements, particular attention is directed towards the 
importance of context and in understanding how businesses impact on and in 
different settings. In doing so, the UNGP offer a useful example of how a global 
policy instrument, applicable irrespective of context, can nevertheless be locally 
relevant. It achieves this by promoting processes to help identify context-specific 
risks and in developing specific aspects of this process, such as engaging with 
locals and experts.  
As I will develop, including a process-based component in a global instrument on 
business and peacebuilding is important, not only to help inspire business 
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contributions to peacebuilding in the absence of state-based efforts, but also 
because it can help promote context-sensitive interventions. 
6.3.1.3.  The Roles of Other Actors 
If understood in isolation, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights under 
the UNGP might be regarded as another voluntary initiative. Indeed, in spite of pillar 
1, because many states are often unwilling and unable to assume their human rights 
obligations to protect, pillar 2 of the UNGP might well be regarded as yet another 
code of conduct. Similar to many of the guidelines discussed in chapter 3, in cases 
where states are unable or unwilling to regulate businesses, the UNGP could be 
interpreted, therefore, as a useful set of guidelines capable of directing business 
activities, but which are nevertheless voluntary, and, therefore, largely discretionary. 
The UNGP offer a response to this by reflecting the plurality of other actors and 
different methods that might be used to encourage business compliance with the 
UNGP.  The UNGP refer, for instance, to the roles of multilateral institutions;49 home 
states;50 multi-stakeholder initiatives,51 and civil society organisations;52 in pushing 
forward the business and human rights agenda. As an example, the importance of 
multilateral institutions is reflected in GP 10, where it is stipulated that: 
States, when acting as members of multilateral institutions that deal with 
business-related issues, should: 
Encourage those institutions, within their respective mandates and 
capacities, to promote business respect for human rights and, where 
requested, to help States meet their duty to protect against human 
rights abuse by business enterprises, including through technical 
assistance, capacity-building and awareness-raising.53 
GP 2 also refers to home states, outlining that they ‘should set out clearly the 
expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction 
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respect human rights throughout their operations.’54 Similarly, as part of the 
responsibility to provide remedies, GP 30 also notes that ‘industry, multi-stakeholder 
and other collaborative initiatives that are based on respect for human rights-related 
standards should ensure that effective grievance mechanisms are available.55 
Moreover, the Principles recognise that businesses have, in some circumstances, 
roles to play in limiting the adverse impacts that might be caused throughout their 
supply chains. For example, GP 13 specifies that along with ensuring that 
businesses do not negatively impact on the enjoyment of rights through their own 
activities,56 they must also endeavour to ‘prevent or mitigate adverse human rights 
impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their 
business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.’57 They 
thus recognise the potential for businesses to act as regulators of other companies 
within and throughout their supply chains. 
By including different actors and methods, some describe the UNGP as a 
polycentric policy instrument that seeks to integrate and orchestrate different 
methods, incentives, and actors associated with influencing business conduct 
around a defined issue and defined set of responsibilities.58 Perhaps part of the 
reason that the UNGP draw on such a constellation to help advance the business 
and human rights agenda reflects the fact ‘any attempt to deal with human rights 
infractions by corporations needs to offer a strategy that addresses this 
complexity.’59 The significance for current purposes is that alongside the roles and 
responsibilities assigned to states in promoting the corporate responsibility to 
respect and remedy, the UNGP also draw on a number of actors, that can employ a 
range of different methods, to help promote adherence to the Principles.  
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6.3.2.  Coherency through the UNGP? 
As touched upon in the case studies, coherency is essential when there are different 
actors and methods involved in regulating or influencing businesses, both to prevent 
clashes from occurring and to ensure that various initiatives support each other. In 
the case studies on Northern Ireland and South Africa, it was suggested that 
coherence among different actors can significantly help to promote a defined 
objective. For instance, while the B-BBEE framework is the primary driver for 
business contributions to peacebuilding in South Africa, subsequent pieces of 
legislation have helped further this objective. Similarly, in Northern Ireland, while the 
government has developed legislation around positive discrimination, such actors as 
the Equality Commission Northern Ireland has helped to translate this legislation into 
practical effect through productive partnerships with businesses. 
The UNGP also reflect the importance of coherency. At the state-level, for instance, 
GP 8 notes that:  
States should ensure that governmental departments, agencies and other 
State-based institutions that shape business practices are aware of and 
observe the State’s human rights obligations when fulfilling their respective 
mandates, including by providing them with relevant information, training and 
support.60 
In other words, while states might adopt different approaches to regulation to 
promote the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, the UNGP instruct the 
need for coherency between state-based approaches. As Rachel Davis notes: ‘[The 
Principles] spell out the policy implications of states’ existing duties under 
international human rights law when it comes to protecting against business-related 
human rights harms. They place particular stress on the need for greater policy 
coherence between states’ human rights obligations and their regulatory and other 
actions with respect to business.’61 
Coherency is even more relevant when the multitude of different actors that might 
influence businesses is considered, something at the forefront of Ruggie’s mind 
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throughout his mandate. When Ruggie began his work as SRSG, there existed a 
range of approaches all attempting to regulate the human rights impacts of 
businesses. Many of these, such as the UNGC, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines, and different multistakeholder 
initiatives, were discussed in Chapter 3. There was, however, a ‘lack of an 
authoritative standard guiding the business and human rights discussion,’62 and a 
‘patchwork of uncoordinated schemes competing vigorously for adherents, 
resources, legitimacy, and public notice.’63 Ruggie evaluated that what was needed 
was ‘a new regulatory dynamic under which […] governance systems become better 
aligned in relation to business and human rights; add distinct value; compensate for 
one another’s weaknesses and play mutually reinforcing roles out of which 
cumulative change can evolve.’64 Ruggie explicitly recognised, therefore, that 
opportunities can arise when different initiatives are pulling in the same direction.  
To a certain extent, following the adoption of the UNGP, different actors and 
organisations have attempted to support or integrate various aspects of the global 
policy instrument into their operations. For instance, the OECD Guidelines on MNEs 
have incorporated the UNGP into their own normative standards.65 The  website on 
guidance for the UNGC’s human rights principles (Principles 1 and 2) was updated 
to refer to the UNGP,66 while the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights has issued guidelines on the corporate responsibility to respect and 
remedy.67 At the international level, the Principles have influenced the current 
design of International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 26000.68 Following the 
endorsement of the UNGP, in 2011, the International Petroleum Industry 
Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) launched a three-year business 
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and human rights project, which has since served as an authoritative reference body 
for the oil and gas industry on business and human rights issues.69 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) has also updated its Performance 
Standards making direct reference to Ruggie’s due diligence recommendations.70 
The International Bar Association (IBA) went so far as to issue official guidance on 
what the UNGPs mean for law firms as businesses in their own right, and in their 
role as wise counsel to clients,71 while FIFA, the governing body of international 
football, has endorsed the UNGPs.72 Conglomerates like Nestlé have partnered with 
organisations such as the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) to conduct a 
human rights gap analysis of its corporate policies and procedures.73 Moreover, 
other organisations are using the principles as the basis upon which to develop 
further guidelines for business. Efforts in this respect have included those 
undertaken by such organisations as Shift and Oxfam. In the case of Shift, this has 
involved, amongst other things, developing reporting frameworks to help inform 
companies as to how to relate the efforts that companies are making to 
stakeholders,74 while Oxfam has detailed its position on how best to advance the 
UNGP.75 The Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) has also 
developed guidelines for civil society to provide concrete support, guidance and a 
consistent reference point for civil society organisations (CSO) to use the UNGP.76 
Thus, regardless of the fact that numerous actors can be involved in influencing how 
and whether businesses respect human rights, the UNGP can be regarded as 
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providing a common reference point through which different actors have been able 
to galvanise around a common aim- improving corporate respect for human rights. 
Not only does the text of the principles directly reference other actors capable of 
playing regulatory roles, as an authoritative reference point, the Principles provide 
other actors with a basis from which to inform and develop their own approaches. In 
short, the UNGP at least help to strengthen the corporate responsibility to respect 
rights by aligning different actors around a common set of standards. This is useful 
when considering how a policy document can attempt to draw on a range of actors 
and forms of influence to pursue specific objectives. 
6.3.2.1.  Discussion  
The discussion about has suggested that the UNGP are insightful in showing how a 
global policy instrument can include different actors in pursuance of shaping 
corporate conduct. They reflect the centrality of the state but also acknowledge the 
limitations of relying only on states to shape the behaviour of businesses. This is 
expressed in the plurality of hard and soft options available to the state, the 
importance of providing guidelines to business, and the salience of drawing on other 
actors with capabilities to influence business decisions. Moreover, reflecting the 
difficulties of developing a global instrument that remains locally relevant, the UNGP 
underline the importance of process-focused guidelines through the concept of DD, 
while also benefitting from other initiatives, such as NAPs and baseline 
assessments that seek to ensure state approaches are equally context-specific.  
Nevertheless, despite the substantial contributions that the UNGP have made to the 
business and human rights debate, it is equally important to acknowledge that few 
regard them as a panacea. As the discussion below will suggest, a host of criticisms 
have emerged against the UNGP. I examine some of these concerns below before 
illustrating how these limitations have helped to progress many facets of the 
conversation about business and human rights.  
6.3.3.  The Limitations of the UNGP 
The literature identifies a range of constraints associated with the UNGP. Some 




achieve. David Bilchitz77 and Florian Wettstein,78 for instance, suggest that Ruggie 
failed to reflect the position of international law by asking only that businesses 
respect rights. The UNGP have also been criticised for being too vague and weak, 
allowing businesses too much leeway with terms such as ‘should’ in place of 
‘shall’.79 This is particularly pertinent in contexts where, as outlined, states are 
unwilling or unable to assume their obligations to protect human rights. Moreover, 
others note that the loose language of corporate responsibility rather than obligation 
implies an acceptance of a ‘world where companies are encouraged, but not 
obliged, to respect human rights.’80 Some argue, therefore, that the UNGP still ‘lack 
sufficient scale to truly move markets.’81 Some blame the lack of wider consultation 
when formulating the UNGP for these failures,82 others state inactivity.83 
Bonnitcha and McCorquodale’s main issue with the UNGP is alleged confusion and 
uncertainty about the extent of businesses’ responsibility to respect human rights 
and about how that relates to the responsibility to provide remedy.84 Confusion is a 
recurring theme throughout the business and human rights literature. For Lagouette, 
for instance, by associating corporate social responsibility discourse and actual legal 
obligation in the same instrument, it becomes more difficult to distinguish the 
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mandatory elements from the voluntary ones within the field of human rights and 
business.85 McCall-Smith and Rühmkorf suggest that while the reinforcement of 
existing commitments by the UNGP is welcomed, it does little to resolve the barriers 
of applying public international law due to the limited international legal personality 
of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and the principle of extraterritoriality.86 This 
critique draws on the persisting limitations associated with relying on a state-centric 
approach to business and human rights when businesses are increasingly global in 
nature. Some contend that the linkages between the UNGP and due diligence are 
too frail. Human Rights Watch has argued, for example, that human rights due 
diligence should be mandatory.87 
For others, the UNGP do not reflect the position of international human rights law as 
regards the extraterritorial obligations of states.88 This aspect of the UNGP is viewed 
as problematic, particularly in areas of weak governance. As Albin-Lackey notes: 
Weakly governed developing countries like Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh, 
Mozambique, and Guinea continue to welcome massive new foreign 
investment in industries with an immense potential for environmental 
destruction and human rights abuse. If companies are not going to get 
meaningful human rights oversight from the governments of the countries in 
which they operate, they need to get it somewhere else.89 
Others argue that notwithstanding the contemporary position of international when 
the UNGP were drafted, an opportunity was missed to further human rights 
protections by not mandating extraterritorial regulatory obligations.90  
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There are those consider that state obligation to protect is diluted under the UNGP, 
particularly in regards to the obligation to provide remedies.91 In Albin-Lackey’s view: 
[W]ithout any mechanism to ensure compliance or to measure 
implementation, they cannot actually require companies to do anything at all. 
Companies can reject the principles altogether without consequence- or 
publicly embrace them while doing absolutely nothing to put them in 
practice.92  
The failure of the UNGP to provide adequate remedies and justice to victims is a 
significant limitation.93 As a final example, except for the case of project finance, 
where the direct relationship between the financier and the specific project is 
straightforward and resembling complicity, others suggest that the talk seems to be 
more about roles rather than responsibilities.94 
There are, therefore, numerous limitations associated with the UNGP. However, as I 
develop below, when pushing the idea of a policy instrument on business and 
peacebuilding, the ability of any proposed instrument to galvanise these sorts of 
debates is to be welcomed. In particular, the UNGP illustrate that, based on the 
limitations of an existing approach, numerous responses and ideas emerge as 
regards what to do better. 
6.3.4.  Responding to these Limitations  
While only scraping the surface of a significant body of critical scholarship on the 
UNGP, it is evident that the Principles have invoked a range of perspectives 
regarding the merits and demerits of the policy instrument. As was noted, Ruggie 
himself acknowledged that the Principles were the end of the beginning. By igniting 
wide-ranging discussions on business and human rights, however, the UNGP serve 
as the reference point for more in-depth debates regarding how best to advance the 
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business and human rights agenda and the numerous actors and issues involved in 
promoting human rights-compliant corporate behaviour. As such, Van der Ploeg and 
Vanclay assert that ‘the endorsement and publication of the UNGP have activated 
much high-level policy debate amongst government, academic, NGO and corporate 
actors interested in human rights.’95  
For instance, given the limitations of the relying on the state to protect human rights, 
particularly in fragile or conflict-affected settings, scholars have debated the 
possibility of expanding the functions of National Human Rights Ombudsman 
Offices.96 Some look to widening the roles of National Human Rights Institutions.97 
Noting what some consider to be the limited guidance on the corporate responsibility 
to respect human rights in the UNGP, others have sought to develop more in-depth 
understandings about the roles and responsibilities of multilateral institutions,98 
international financial institutions,99 and civil society actors in promoting socially 
responsible business.100 There are those who elaborate on the potential linkages 
between procurement and human rights,101 the role of Export Credit Agencies, in 
promoting human rights-compliant corporate conduct,102 while others have 
considered how best to develop and improve state-based due diligence 
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requirements.103 These scholarly contributions all attempt to flesh out the roles and 
responsibilities of different actors and initiatives to advance the business and human 
rights agenda.  
Others stress the importance of applying pressure to different groups to continue to 
monitor how businesses address human rights concerns, while at the same time, 
thinking creatively about how to promote the business and human rights agenda.104 
Such arguments explicitly build on the importance of a pluralisation of methods and 
actors that can influence businesses. As Nolan assesses: 
Reasserting the role of the state in improving workplace conditions does not 
necessarily mean, as one commentator puts it ‘a return to traditional 
command control regulation [as] the limits of that approach are well 
known.’105 What is needed, is some level of involvement by the state to 
harden the ‘societal expectations’ foisted on some companies…: a blending 
of public and private regulation or re-regulation.106 
Some have taken up the challenge to think creatively further. For instance, McCall-
Smith and Rühmkorf argue for the development of a ‘hybrid regulatory approach to 
the promotion of CSR, which transcends the limitations of public and private 
international law in supply chain management.’107 Based on the difficulties 
associated with regulating global supply chains and in the absence of an 
international binding framework on business and human rights, they suggest that the 
strategic use of domestic law can particularly rely on corporate criminal law and 
transparency regulations.108 These authors suggest that the model of the UK Bribery 
Act, which makes the failure of a commercial organisation to prevent bribery by a 
person associated with it a criminal offence,109 could be used for severe human 
rights violations in global supply chains, such as forced labour, child labour and the 
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exposure to very unsafe working conditions.110 In some respects, this approach 
mirrors that of mandating due diligence through legal instruments, albeit in a more 
complex context of regulating businesses throughout global supply chains and 
extraterritorially. It also offers a useful way of thinking for those who have critiqued 
the relatively limited use of procurement for the purposes of extraterritorial 
regulation.111 Some respond to the weak stance taken under the UNGP regarding 
extraterritorial obligations by focusing on specific sectors, examining how home 
states might close governance gaps for specific industries.112 Surya Deva, for his 
part, develops an ‘integrated theory of regulation’ in which multiple regulatory 
measures are employed in a cumulative and coordinated manner so that different 
initiatives could counter each other’s limitations.113 Others contemplate the scope for 
regional human rights courts to address corporate human rights violations.114 
Substantively, scholars also look to how the UNGP can be extended to cover such 
groups as refugees,115 women,116 children,117 and indigenous peoples.118 Others 
adopt a more targeted approach in regards to promoting business and human rights 
in different sectors and industries. What has followed is discussions about business 
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and human rights in such sectors as oil and gas,119 apparel,120 tourism,121 
agriculture,122 and the electronics industry.123 To this end, others have discussed 
metrics for measuring business performance in the context of respecting and 
remedying human rights.124 As Michael Posner notes: 
The Guiding Principles must be our foundation but must develop practical 
application in having industry-specific content and substantive standards…. 
We need to define responsibility to respect in the extractive industries, in the 
manufacturing sector. We need to come up with benchmarks, key 
performance indicators. It is not acceptable for every company to define 
these individually. No more pilot projects, no more go it alone; there has to 
be a collective response in each industry. This challenges companies 
because they seek to avoid risk to reputation or additional resources.125 
Such metrics, some argue, ‘can help firms link the conceptual discussion about 
human rights to actual implementation.’126 In particular, noting the lack of definable 
benchmarks in the UNGP, these efforts seek to progress how we might improve the 
extent to which human rights are respected across different industries and sectors. 
As a final illustration of how the business and human rights debate has blossomed 
since the UNGP, there are those who debate the possibility of constructing 
alternative frameworks. On 25 June 2014, the HRC passed a resolution that 
establishes ‘an intergovernmental working group on a legally binding instrument on 
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transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human 
rights.’127 It was sponsored by Ecuador and South Africa-both of whom have 
historical experiences with business violating fundamental rights within their states- 
and garnered 20 votes in favour, 13 abstentions, and 14 votes against it. Since then, 
scholars have considered the potential breadth and depth of such a treaty.128 For 
instance, Rodriguez-Garavito considers the possibility of a binding treaty addressing 
specific violations of human rights by corporations. Among several other options for 
the treaty, this author considers a binding agreement regarding corporate 
involvement in gross human rights violations and extraterritorial jurisdiction.129 
Others question what lessons can be learned from other areas of law to help inform 
the substance of a treaty on business and human rights.130 In other cases, new 
ideas around the possibility of a world tribunal on business and human rights, have 
emerged.131 
The discussion could go on. Although some criticisms levelled against the UNGP 
are somewhat suspect,132 the primary point is that, as Ruggie predicted, the UNGP 
did constitute the end of the beginning. This beginning, however, is one where the 
UNGP has proved to be the catalyst for detailed discussions and debates regarding 
how and in what ways to move the debate forward. Therefore, as César Rodríguez-
Garavito has stated, we should evaluate the UNGP, ‘not as a static text, but also in 
their dynamic dimension (such as their capacity to push the development of new 
norms and practices that go beyond the initial content…).’133 From the perspective of 
developing a policy instrument on business and peacebuilding, the ability of an 
instrument to invoke these sorts of responses is to be welcomed on two levels.  
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Firstly, the driving force behind this study was not simply that we should look to the 
role of other actors in requiring, persuading or incentivising businesses to engage in 
peacebuilding processes. It was also borne by the fact that at present, few are 
considering the ways that different actors might do so. In other words, we have not 
even begun to have this debate. The trajectory of the discourse on business and 
human rights post-UNGP suggests that a global policy instrument, however, flawed, 
can serve to galvanise interdisciplinary discussions, among academics and 
practitioners, from different industries, countries, occupations, and points of view, as 
to how to develop the agenda going forward. Indeed, to a certain extent, some 
believe that UNGP have already shaped the business and peacebuilding discussion. 
Graf et al. note, for instance, that: 
The dynamism in the business and human rights debate created by the 
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) 
and subsequent implementation processes by states and businesses has 
generated heightened interest in responsible business conduct in conflict-
affected areas.134 
Secondly, and in some ways directly linked to the above point, it is entirely correct 
and necessary that any such instrument is challenged. Not only does push back 
help to develop any subsequent instrument that might be adopted but the limits of 
the case study findings require such opposition. In the discussion that follows, I use 
the findings of the case studies of South Africa and Northern Ireland to develop a 
number of ways in which different actors might give life to a policy instrument on 
business and peacebuilding. Nevertheless, these contexts, as the methodology 
section suggested, are often far different from that of other settings. Similarly, the 
case studies did not address differences across and within industries, and a host of 
other issues. Thus, it is necessary that others join the conversation and contest it.  
                                                            
134 A. Graf, A. Iff, and R. Alluri, ‘The Business of Conflict Sensitivity’, in S. Handschin, E. Abitbol and R, 




6.3.5.  Discussion  
 
Above, I presented the argument that the UNGP are a useful reference point for 
considering what form a policy instrument on business and peacebuilding might 
take. Firstly, they define and elaborate on the role of the state and the possibility of 
adopting different regulatory methods when attempting to pursue a particular set of 
objectives (A1 of the diagram above).135 They also reflect the importance of states 
taking context-specific approaches, an effort supported by the work of others on 
NAPs and baseline assessments. At the same time, the UNGP also reflect the 
limitations of states by promoting guidelines for business. The concept of due 
diligence takes centre stage in these guidelines and underpins the importance of 
companies developing context-sensitive approaches (A2 of the diagram above).  
Alongside reflecting the possibility of pluralised regulatory methods at the state level, 
the UNGP also echo the importance of other actors in promoting these guidelines 
(A3 of the diagram above).136 This aspect is more process-oriented, asking that 
actors attempt to require, persuade and/or incentivise businesses to develop due 
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diligence processes. Moreover, the UNGP have managed to achieve a degree of 
consensus, which has led to subsequent developments with such organisations as 
the OECD incorporating the UNGP into their own policies and procedures. Thus, as 
a template, the UNGP have much to offer any effort to develop a policy instrument 
on business and peacebuilding that attempts to integrate different actors, as 
regulators, through a ‘smart-mix’ approach. 
At the same time, there are limitations. The UNGP are not and should not be 
regarded as a panacea for business and human rights. They have received 
significant criticism, most of which is well grounded and only a fraction of which is 
discussed above. Nevertheless, there are arguably successes in the limitations of 
the UNGP, most notably the degree of debate and discussions that the UNGP have 
managed to invoke. Given the nascent and early conceptual nature of thinking about 
a policy instrument on business and peacebuilding, these discussions highlight what 
can be achieved from a public discourse perspective from a somewhat lacking 
global policy instrument.  
6.4.  A Global Policy Instrument on Business and Peacebuilding?  
Based on the above discussions, below I consider what a global policy instrument 
on business and peacebuilding might look like. Drawing on the case study findings, I 
suggest that there is scope for contemplating a policy instrument along the same 






Figure 2: Overview of Business and Peacebuilding Policy Instrument 
6.4.1. Three Pillars of a Policy Instrument on Business and Peacebuilding 
Drawing on the template provided by the UNGP, I outline three pillars that could 
potentially serve as the skeleton of a policy instrument on business and 
peacebuilding. Such an instrument could have a state-focused pillar, outlining 
different ways in which states could promote business-based peacebuilding (A1 of 
the diagram below) and a set of guidelines geared towards business (pillar 2) (A2 of 
diagram below). These guidelines should seek to inform businesses as to how to 
contribute to peacebuilding efforts in context-sensitive ways. Pillar 3 of the UNGP is 
primarily concerned with remedying victims of company-based human rights 
violations. By contrast, pillar 3 of a policy instrument on business and peacebuilding 
could focus on attempting to encourage different actors to promote business 
contributions to peacebuilding by adhering to the guidelines under pillar 2 (A3 of the 
diagram below). 
6.4.1.1.  Pillar 1: State Roles in Promoting Business-Based Peacebuilding  
Under the UNGP, the state duty to protect rights requires that states adopt various 
measures geared towards improving the overall regulatory framework. In the context 
of promoting business-based contributions to peacebuilding, pillar 1 should focus on 




based peacebuilding. The case studies suggest that there are various different 
approaches that might be adopted.  
For instance, states can incentivise businesses to contribute to aspects of a 
peacebuilding process. A useful example is the B-BBEE framework in South Africa. 
In this case, the government of South Africa identified salient issues that could 
contribute to peace in the context, such as promoting the integration of black people 
into the workforce, empowering black-owned businesses, and improving the skill set 
of the same population of people marginalised under the system of apartheid. The 
components of this instrument, such as promoting ownership in companies and 
empowering black workers, were direct responses to the legacy of marginalisation 
and discrimination against black South Africans. To promote these objectives, the 
South African Government sought to incentivise businesses by linking procurement 
opportunities to how businesses implemented the criteria defined in the Codes of 
Good Practice.  
In doing so, the approach adopted in South Africa is reflective of industrial policy 
planning elsewhere.137 As Sen notes: 
Industrial policies are used by governments to alter the structure of 
production towards the sectors that offer the best prospects for sustained 
economic growth based on innovation and structural transformation. 
Industrial policies, through which the state creates (and withdraws) 
opportunities for profitable investments in certain activities, are shaped by 
state-business relations, and the ability of the public sector to work with the 
private sector for a common purpose, without being captured by the latter.138 
Often, governments develop these policies to promote inclusive economic growth.139 
Raniere and Ramos suggest that inclusive growth considers the impact of the 
growth process among different ethnic and gender groups and across geographical 
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regions.140 This understanding of inclusive growth incorporates the concept of 
horizontal inequality, or inequalities between culturally formed groups, in addition to 
vertical inequality, which is inequality among households or individuals. In the 
context of pillar 1 of a policy instrument on business and peacebuilding, states, 
having identified areas that businesses could help to address, could develop policies 
focused on addressing historical inequalities in the economic sphere.  
A few further examples expand upon these possibilities. For instance, in the context 
of gaining access to mineral resources, states could require that businesses 
contribute to specific objectives. This is the basis, for example, of the Mineral and 
Petroleum Development Act (MPRDA) 2002 in South Africa, which sought to link the 
granting of licences to the B-BBEE criteria. In other contexts, the same process of 
incentivising businesses is readily identifiable. For example, in post-conflict 
Zimbabwe, mining projects must comply with Indigenization Policies established to 
empower local communities.141 This includes the Community Share Ownership 
Trusts, which attempt to encourage the provision of employment opportunities to 
residents, project and company ownership and benefits sharing.142 Because gaining 
mining contracts is subject to the extent to which businesses have complied with 
these requirements, this approach arguably creatively induces companies into 
contributing to elements of the peacebuilding processes, such as empowering those 
previously marginalised.143  
Similarly, the Government of Peru requires mining projects to establish a Social 
Trust Fund, jointly administered by the company and the government. The required 
amount of investment in the trust fund is based on a percentage of the purchase 
price of the mining concession, rather than a percentage of the production or 
earnings.144 Guinea’s mining code has introduced the obligation to contribute to a 
local development fund up to 0.5% of the turnover for permits covering bauxite and 
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iron ore and 1% of the turnover for licences covering other substances.145 In other 
cases, tax incentives are offered to businesses that act in a socially responsible 
manner. Perhaps one of the best examples of this approach can be seen in 
Malaysia. While not a post-conflict context, Malaysia, like many post-conflict 
settings, suffers from high levels of horizontal inequalities. To engage businesses in 
helping to address these inequities, the Malaysian Government indirectly provides 
tax incentives to businesses that implement broad CSR programmes.146  
The Northern Ireland case study also demonstrates the possibility for using orthodox 
approaches to regulation to require business contributions to peacebuilding. 
Reflecting the historical marginalisation of Catholics, in particular in the private 
sector, an affirmative action approach was adopted and pursued. While, as 
developed below, it is primarily through collaborations that this objective has been 
achieved, the example nevertheless highlights the possibilities for using hard law as 
a means through which to require business contributions to peacebuilding. In other 
contexts, states could, in theory, promulgate similar legislation that requires 
businesses to positively engage in promoting equality in the workplace.  
As suggested, based primarily on two case studies, the possibilities are somewhat 
limited. However, and drawing back to the UNGP, the purpose of considering a 
policy instrument on business and peacebuilding, and in particular, the ways that 
states could promote business contributions to peacebuilding could raise further 
discussions. While both procurement and command and control-based methods are 
traditionally understood in the context of preventing harms from being caused, the 
case studies demonstrate that similar approaches can be utilised in pursuance of 
more proactive contributions. This raises the question, therefore, as to how and in 
what other ways states might develop strategies focused on doing so.  
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6.4.1.1.1. Inspiring further initiatives 
As was suggested, despite the significant limitations raised by various scholars and 
practitioners in regards to the UNGP, there is evidence of a substantial degree of 
their uptake by a range of different actors. The importance of coherency is that, 
notwithstanding the numerous ways that businesses might be influenced, different 
actors and methods can pull in the same direction. Another benefit of the post-
conflict state taking the lead on developing policies focused on engaging companies 
in peacebuilding efforts is that similar levels of convergence can occur.  
For example, in the context of South Africa, it was argued that the B-BBEE 
framework serves as the basis for other regulatory developments. This is the case, 
for instance, with regards to legislation such as the Skills Development Act 1998 and 
the Preferential Procurement Act 2000, which both build on early attempts at 
promoting Black Economic Empowerment. Similarly, the Social and Ethics 
Committee requirements under the Companies Act 2009 include adherence to and 
promotion of B-BBEE, as do listing requirements under the JSE, with companies 
also asked to report on how they are implementing B-BBEE under the King Codes.  
In Northern Ireland, the work of the Equality Commission Northern Ireland (ECNI) 
around assisting businesses to implement the requirements stipulated under FETO 
is further evidence of how a centralised strategy can help other actors promote 
business-based peacebuilding. In this case, while the ECNI is mandated to sanction 
non-complying businesses, it has adopted, in most cases, a more collaborative 
approach.  
There are additional possibilities. As suggested, in some cases, states can adopt 
deliberate approaches to engage businesses in peacebuilding efforts. In other 
cases, however, the existence of a broad policy can have indirect consequences in 
other areas. For instance, it was suggested in the context of South Africa that some 
authors perceive efforts on the part of businesses to engage in B-BBEE as attempts 
to manufacture consent. For such authors as Figg,147 the linkages between 
businesses and the apartheid regime, and thus the negative publicity which 
businesses attracted, has been a significant factor in pushing businesses to engage 
in corporate social investment (CSI), a crucial component of B-BBEE. Nevertheless, 
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we can understand accountability-based mechanisms such as the unsuccessful 
litigation before US Courts, as serving an important purpose- persuading businesses 
to do more. In cases like this, state-based policies can provide objectives for firms to 
work towards in ways that define the types of roles that businesses could undertake, 
irrespective of their motivation.  
At the same time, when such an approach is not adopted, the case studies also 
illustrate the possibilities of conflicts between initiatives and non-action. In regards to 
the latter, despite the fact that the St Andrew’s Agreement specifies that the 
Northern Ireland executive should seek to involve businesses in helping to integrate 
former political prisoners, the state has thus far not only made little effort to do but, 
through legislative barriers, has weakened the willingness of businesses to assume 
these roles. The result is that important opportunities to contribute to peacebuilding 
through reintegrating former ex-prisoners are missed. Identifying and adopting 
policies geared towards building on the capacities of businesses to contribute to 
peacebuilding could help to ensure that salient peacebuilding opportunities are not 
lost.  
6.4.1.1.2. Motivating States 
When considering the efforts that States might adopt, two additional factors emerge. 
One relates to persuading a post-conflict state to pursue objectives focused on 
integrating businesses into peacebuilding efforts and the second relates to how 
states might develop context specific policies.  
In regards to the former issue, it would be naïve and incorrect to assert that states 
will always adopt approaches that seek to involve businesses in peacebuilding 
efforts. As the discussion in chapter 3 suggested, states are often unwilling and 
unable to engage in regulatory improvements. Thus, ‘getting to regulation’ is often a 
barrier to overcome. Again, however, the case studies offer some useful insights 
into how different actors can influence regulatory developments at the level of the 
state. 
Firstly, the case studies suggested that different actors played important roles in 
pressurising both the Northern Ireland and South African Governments to adopt 
legislation. For instance, in the case of Northern Ireland, there are those that would 
argue that pressure from the US, institutional investors, and shareholders, had a 




galvanised to advocate for change was the result of civil society campaigns focused 
on ending the discrimination of Catholics in Northern Ireland. In South Africa, similar 
trajectories emerged. For instance, some consider that the Sullivan Principles, 
consumer boycotts, and sanctions were also instrumental in raising the need to 
confront economic inequalities. These examples demonstrate a range of actors that 
can influence the decisions of states to adopt measures.  
Another vital component in galvanising the state to adopt policies focused on 
integrating businesses into peacebuilding efforts was that of peace agreements. In 
the case of Northern Ireland, for instance, it was suggested that the Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA), as a significant peacebuilding moment, was instrumental in the 
subsequent promulgation of the FETO. Underpinning the importance and centrality 
of equality to the peacebuilding process, FETO can, in turn, be understood as a 
logical addition to the regulatory landscape in Northern Ireland. In South Africa, the 
1996 peace agreement Constitution was also salient in putting equality firmly on the 
peacebuilding agenda. One can argue that the inclusion of equality principles, 
coupled with the efforts of others to highlight economic inequities, was an essential 
driver in the development of B-BBEE. 
In other cases, we can identify examples of peace agreements helping to highlight 
the potential for peace agreements to serve as the basis for inspiring states to 
integrate businesses into the peacebuilding fold in ways that are more direct. For 
instance, along with the provisions of the 1996 peace agreement Constitution, the 
1991 peace agreement stresses that ‘[t]he National Peace Committee shall appoint 
a chairperson and vice-chairperson, who shall be drawn from the religious and 
business communities.’148 In this case, the peace agreement outlines that 
businesses have roles to play in the peacebuilding effort. Similarly, in Somalia, the 
Decision on the High Level Committee, Djibouti Agreement expresses ‘[a]n intention 
by the Parties to reach out to those who are outside the process ... including ... 
business community…’149 In Myanmar, The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) 
between The Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic 
Armed Organizations (EAO) stipulates that ‘[t]he participation of ethnic 
representatives, civil society organizations, scholars,  dialogue will be discussed and 
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determined during the drafting of the Framework for Political Dialogue.’150 Similarly, 
in Guatemala, the Basic Agreement for the Search for Peace by Political Means 
('Oslo Agreement') outlines that: 
The National Reconciliation Commission shall, by mutual agreement with 
URNG, create the mechanisms required for the convening, preferably in 
June 1990, of the necessary meetings between the Unidad Revolucionaria 
Nacional Guatemalteca and representatives of the country's popular, 
religious and business sectors, as well as other politically representative 
entities, with a view to finding ways of solving the nation's problems.151 
Peace agreements, therefore, can be necessary not only in setting the foundations 
upon which more progressive regulation can arise but also by directly including 
businesses in the peacebuilding effort. 
When thinking about how states might adopt policies and processes to engage 
businesses in peacebuilding processes, it is often necessary for other actors and 
initiatives to put pressure on businesses to do so. The case studies raise numerous 
possibilities in this regard.  
6.4.1.1.3. Informing Regulatory Efforts 
On the assumption that states are willing and able to adopt measures that attempt to 
integrate businesses into peacebuilding processes and notwithstanding the fact that 
there different ways that they might do so, how is the state to identify what issues to 
address? As suggested, in the context of the UNGP, states are asked to adopt 
measures that respond to issues of salience or gaps in their regulatory systems. To 
facilitate these processes and to promote changes that are context-reflective, NAPs 
and baseline assessments have been offered as a particularly useful measure to 
adopt.  
Following on, we might suggest that states seek to identify salient issues to address 
through similar processes in the context of promoting business contributions to 
peacebuilding. For instance, baseline assessments could be undertaken by states to 
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identify the causes of conflict and to locate specific contributions that businesses 
might make to peacebuilding. In South Africa, B-BBEE evidences an approach, 
which not only seeks to address past inequalities, but also one that builds on the the 
ways that businesses might best contribute to peacebuilding processes. For 
instance, that employment practices are targeted under the Codes of Practice 
reflects the fact that through their core business activities, this is an area where 
businesses can make a significant contribution. 
As has been suggested, truth commissions (TCs or TRCs) seek to provide a 
narrative of the causes and consequences of conflict. TRCs can also identify the 
roles that businesses have played and, in some cases, specify areas for reform. The 
TRC in Liberia, for example, recommended that corporations play a role in providing 
reparations.152 Amongst other things, the TRC endorsed the establishment of a 
reparations truth fund to compensate victims or economic crimes.153 It suggested 
further that rather than paying into this on a voluntary basis, funds should instead be 
received from civil and criminal ‘judgements against economic criminals.’154 The 
recommendations included: 
(1) Recovering tax arrears from timber, mining, petroleum and 
telecommunications companies that evaded tax liability under the Taylor 
regimes;  
(2) obtaining funds from economic criminals that are sentenced by Liberian 
courts to pay restitution or other fees; and 
(3) utilising criminal and civil confiscation schemes in foreign jurisdictions to 
repatriate Liberian assets.155 
The Liberian TRC also recommended that the Government of Liberia aggressively 
seek restitution from individuals and corporate actors that perpetrated economic 
crimes.156 According to Liberian law, convicted criminals, whether individuals or 
corporations, can be fined double their illicit gains.157 
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Similarly, the final report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
in Timor-Leste asserted that corporations have a legal obligation to provide 
reparations to victim’s158 and recommended that this obligation is fulfilled through 
corporate contributions to a domestic reparations programme.159 This was a more 
explicit reference to the fact that businesses responsible for human rights were 
liable to pay reparations and can be distinguished from the Liberian approach of 
requiring companies to contribute to the programme of reparations.160 It further 
suggested that the scheme should be jointly funded by a number of actors, including 
state and privately own Indonesian business, as well as international and 
multinational corporations that ‘profited from war and benefitted from the occupation’ 
and that profited from selling weapons to Indonesia.161 Drawing on the past, these 
respective Commissions have sought to include businesses in reparations 
programmes. 
We might also suggest that TRCs could be more proactive in the recommendations 
issued. Indeed, scholars have also argued to this effect. Nelson Camilo Sanchez, in 
a chapter in Michalowski’s Corporate Accountability in the Context of Transitional 
Justice, promotes a transformative justice approach to the issue of corporate 
accountability and TC recommendations.162 As summarised by the author, ‘this 
concept is an effort to combine the dominant concept of reparations, which in 
current legal theory is backward looking and founded in corrective justice, with the 
concept of distributive justice, which is forward-looking and takes into consideration 
current needs of the population.’163 Given that TRCs focus on understanding the root 
causes of conflict and in some cases in identifying the roles that businesses play 
before and during conflict, it is possible that they could help to inform state-based 
policies through their findings and recommendations.  
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A second option might be to consider involving businesses in the development of 
state-based policies. As the example of the EU Funding approach suggests, 
businesses can and are often willing to engage in governance-related issues. 
Moreover, as the discussion in Chapter 3 suggested, numerous regulatory and 
governance initiatives have been developed with the involvement of business 
participation. Businesses are often highly apt at identifying areas that require reform. 
Consider, for instance, the above discussion on industrial policy. One of the driving 
factors for government intervention in the economy is the reality of market failures. 
As suggested, one such market failure is that of negative externalities, which require 
states to intervene to correct these failures. At the same time, the primary argument 
against government intervention is that it can lead to government failure. This often 
arises in contexts where governments lack the knowledge and information to guide 
and direct interventions. As Alberto Lemma, and Dirk Willem te Velde note, 
‘Governments can fail, as they are unlikely to have perfect information and perfect 
foresight, suffer from moral hazard problems or are captured by elites.’164 
For this reason, a body of scholarship has, in recent years, took a closer look at 
state-business relations (SBRs).165 Along with measuring when state-business 
relations contribute to economic growth, authors suggest that certain underlining 
characteristics define effective SBRs.166 One example is the presence of effective, 
transparent, and accountable lines of communication between public and private 
actors. In particular, authors suggest that these lines of interaction can help private 
actors inform government policy. Rodrik argues, for instance, that the right model for 
industrial policy is one of strategic collaboration between the private sector and the 
government, with the aim of uncovering where the most significant obstacles to 
restructuring lie, and what type of interventions are most likely to remove them.167 As 
an example, some countries such Ghana, Tanzania and Senegal in 2002, and in 
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Mali and Uganda in 2004, have developed Presidential Advisory Councils (PACs).168 
The primary purpose behind the establishment of the councils is to enable 
presidents and governments to talk with experienced business leaders to identify 
obstacles to investment, generate recommendations for concrete action, and 
accelerate continuing policy reforms to improve the overall investment climate. By 
drawing on the expertise and inputs of businesses, governments could identify 
important areas of the economy on which to focus reforms. At the same time, the 
involvement of businesses could help develop future relationships on which to build 
more proactive contributions to peacebuilding on the part of business. 
Thus, alongside TCs, developing productive relationships between post-conflict 
states and businesses is another possible avenue for identifying not only the issues 
to address but also understanding how and to what extent businesses might 
participate in peacebuilding efforts.  
6.4.1.1.4. Discussion: Merits of a state-based Limb? 
There are, it follows, different benefits associated with developing a state-based 
component in a policy instrument on business and peacebuilding. Firstly, states, as 
central authorities, should bear the primary responsibility for integrating businesses 
into peacebuilding efforts. As the discussion has suggested, this can be achieved in 
different ways. From legislative approaches to incentive-oriented policies, 
persuasive mechanisms to developing guidelines, states can employ a range of 
different approaches to engage businesses in peacebuilding processes. Moreover, 
when states take the lead in developing such programmes, alignment of different 
regulatory methods and actors can occur.  
However, getting businesses to do so is no small feat. For this reason, the 
discussion also considered a number of ways that states might be persuaded to do 
so. This can include pressure from stakeholders, as well as writing in such 
requirements in peace agreements. A further difficulty is defining the specific areas 
to address. In both South Africa and Northern Ireland, examples such as B-BBEE 
and FETO demonstrate the possibilities of using regulatory approaches to address 
what can be considered important elements of these  peacebuilding processes. It is 
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necessary that in other contexts, states seek to ensure that they are adopting 
context-relevant measures. Thus, along with the possibility of taking a baseline 
assessment of areas that businesses could contribute to, other methods such as 
drawing on the findings and recommendations of truth commissions, asking truth 
commissions to adopt more proactive-focused recommendations, and engaging in 
constructive dialogue with businesses, are all possibilities. Of course, these 
possibilities are somewhat limited, drawing only on two case studies. Nevertheless, 
the purpose is to inspire thinking about different ways to construct and deepen a 
state-based limb to any policy instrument on business and peacebuilding.  
6.4.1.2. Pillar 2: Localising the Global: The Advancing the SDGs Document 
While the discussion above suggested a number of ways in which states could 
attempt to involve businesses in peacebuilding efforts, it is also often the case that 
states, despite efforts to persuade them otherwise, will remain unable or unwilling to 
adopt efforts to engage businesses in peacebuilding processes. Moreover, as early 
discussions on Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) suggest, it is perhaps often 
undesirable to rely on states, given the potential for corrupion to occur. For this 
reason, it is necessary to consider what the second limb of a policy instrument on 
business and peacebuilding might look like. The discussion on the UNGP showed 
that the due diligence guidelines are directed towards businesses. They seek to 
outline processes that businesses should adopt to ensure that they are not causing 
harm. One of the primary reasons for these guidelines is to help ‘fill governance 
gaps’ when states are unable or unwilling to do so.  
Pillar two of a policy instrument on business and peacebuilding should speak 
directly to businesses. As touched upon, one of the difficulties in thinking about a 
global instrument on business and peacebuilding is how to make sure it is locally 
relevant. The UNGP attempt to do this through the concept of due diligence which, 
as outlined in the text of the Principles, asks businesses to adopt approaches to 
help identify and mitigate against risks in the contexts in which they are operating. 
To this end, in this section, I examine a document produced through a collaboration 
between the UNGC, B4P and the CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, entitled 
‘Advancing the Sustainable Development Goals by Supporting Peace: How 
Business Can Contribute’.169 The document produced ‘complements existing 
                                                            




materials such as the UN Global Compact’s Guidance on Responsible Business in 
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas with a new perspective on deliberate 
contributions to peace by companies.’170 The stated purpose of the document is ‘to 
advance the discussion on how the private sector can make positive contributions to 
peace in conflict-affected and high-risk areas around the world and, as a result, help 
to the realization of SDG16.’171 I suggest that this document acts as a useful 
illustration of some of the crucial components that a set of guidelines might include. 
The usefulness stems from the fact that the document outlines a process that 
businesses could adopt to help inform how to go about making positive contributions 
to peacebuilding processes. Moreover, reflecting the realities of contextual 
differences, they concentrate specifically on developing a process that businesses 
should undertake in order to intervene in context-sensitive ways. For ease of 
reference, I refer to this document interchangeably as the ‘Advancing the SDGs 
document’ or ‘Advancing the SDGs’.   
6.4.1.2.1. Overview of the Advancing the SDGs Document  
The Advancing the SDGs document describes business-based peacebuilding as 
‘deliberate measures undertaken by business actors to (i) end violence and address 
the key driving factors of conflict, and (ii) forge alliances and partnerships to 
coordinate and advocate for comprehensive and multi-sectoral strategies to promote 
peace.’172 To inform how businesses might contribute to peacebuilding, the 
guidelines outline five steps businesses should take. These steps are namely: 
commit, assess, define, implement, and communicate.  
Committing to peacebuilding is the first step that businesses are required to take. 
This process includes ‘understanding why contributing to peace is important for 
business.’173 After committing to contributing to the peacebuilding processes, 
businesses are asked to adopt conflict analysis to help ‘determine how to make a 
positive contribution to peace.’174 The purpose is to help pinpoint underlying causes 
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and drivers of violence and tension.’175 Key drivers of conflict are described, in turn, 
as those factors that influence heavily the existence and nature of the conflict. 
These can include grievances, resources and capacities to wage violent conflict, 
relationships and attitudes, and structures (social, economic, political and cultural) 
that drive conflict or peace, and the dynamics among them.176 
To this end, the Advancing the SDGs document outlines questions to help direct the 
conflict analysis process. In some respects, these questions pertain to 
understanding the broader context and include:  
What is the general socio-economic and socio-political context? What are 
important regional, cross-border and international dynamics that influence 
the situation? What areas/regions/communities are particularly affected by 
violent conflict?177 
Businesses are also asked to better understand the structural underpinnings of 
conflict, conflict drivers and triggers. Questions helping to drive these efforts include:  
What are deep-rooted structural causes of violent conflict? Which events and 
conflict triggers could further exacerbate tensions? What are the patterns of 
behavior and strategies that fuel violence? What is the relationship between 
different conflict factors, how do they interrelate?178 
The essence of the ‘assess’ phase of the process is that businesses are asked to 
understand the contexts in which they operate. 
It is in the ‘define’ component that Advancing the SDGs can be distinguished from 
other similar documents. It was suggested in the introductory chapter that context-
sensitivity is perceived by some to be in itself a peacebuilding contribution. Those 
advancing this position suggest that by acting in a context-sensitive manner, the 
externalities that can arise when businesses are not sensitive to the context in which 
they are operating can be avoided.179  
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In ‘Advancing the SDGs’, by contrast, context-sensitivity is not viewed as a 
contribution to peace but as the basis upon which to inform how a business might 
choose to intervene in more proactive ways. In other words, it is based on the 
knowledge accumulated via conflict analysis that businesses decide how best to 
contribute to peace subsequently. The distinction is explained by Chigas and 
Woodrow who assess the following: 
[Context sensitivity] is a fundamental principle of good and responsible 
practice that is applicable to ALL programs. In this way, it is most useful in an 
adjectival form: “conflict sensitive,” rather than as a noun, which implies that 
it is a type of programming in its own right. As an adjective, it can (and 
should) be applied to humanitarian assistance, development efforts, 
peacebuilding, peacekeeping operations, human rights advocacy, security 
sector reform, demobilization of combatants, work with women and youth, 
and so forth.180 
Context-sensitivity, in other words, is the process of accumulating knowledge 
necessary to determine how best to intervene. While in contexts where states 
assume the responsibility of developing frameworks, in those cases where they do 
not, this approach is useful in helping businesses identify how to make context-
specific interventions.  
Based on the knowledge accumulated by the conflict analysis, businesses are then 
asked to adopt a ‘theory of change.’181 A theory of change is an ‘explanation of how 
and why an action is believed to be capable of bringing about its planned objectives, 
i.e. the changes it hopes to create through its activities, thereby revealing underlying 
assumptions.’182 Amongst other things, the guidelines suggest that ‘a clear theory of 
change helps to articulate the logical flow from the starting point (analysis) to the 
action (goal) to the change the company wants to make.’183 
As in the case of the assessment phase above, guiding questions are offered to 
help direct business approaches. These include:  
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What drivers of conflict or peace is the business aiming to influence—
through specific core business operations, social investment, government 
relations or stakeholder relations? In other words, what is the goal in relation 
to peace? Is it clear, concrete and grounded in the context? How will the 
business policies, practices, operational and social investment activities and 
relationships lead to the desired change? In other words, what is the theory 
of change of how the activities will contribute to peace?184 
The distinguishing feature and thus the progressiveness of Advancing the SDGs is 
that they do not merely seek to prevent businesses from causing harm, but rather to 
identify a process that companies should undertake to decide how and in what ways 
to contribute positively to peacebuilding. The fourth phase of the process focuses on 
implementation. This involves monitoring and evaluating programme effectiveness 
and peace effectiveness. Finally, businesses should communicate which means 
reporting on impact and progress towards peace. Companies are encouraged, 
therefore, to build into their communication and reporting to stakeholders the effects 
of their actions and contributions to peace. 
6.4.1.2.2. Discussion  
The Advancing the SDGs document is a particularly forward-looking addition to the 
broad range of existing guidelines that attempt to shape business behaviour in post-
conflict settings. They push beyond ‘do no harm’ or limited approaches to 
developing ‘context-sensitivity.’ Instead, reflecting the growing attention directed 
towards business and peace and the possibilities identified by scholars and 
policymakers alike, ‘Advancing the SDGs’ seeks to inform businesses as to how 
they might go about ‘doing peace’ or ‘doing peacebuilding.’ Moreover, reflecting the 
fact that all conflict-affected settings are in some ways unique, the focus on process 
rather than objective standards attempts to ensure that any contributions that 
businesses might make are context-relevant. Thus, they take what might be 
regarded as a global or abstract objective of contributing to peacebuilding and 
attempt to make interventions locally applicable by developing a process centred on 






example of what form a set of guidelines under pillar 2 of a policy instrument on 
business and peacebuilding might look like. 
Nevertheless, Advancing the SDGs is also limited in one fundamental respect. 
When considering why it is that businesses would assume these responsibilities, the 
present document does not engage with the possibility that other actors have roles 
to play in promoting their uptake. For instance, among the only justifications offered 
for why businesses would assume these roles is the statement that ‘[c]onflict and 
instability not only impact people and the environment; they also pose risk to all 
parts of the business sector.’185 It is also noted further that:  
Peaceful and stable operating environments are conducive for business; 
they feature more and better investment opportunities, and reduce 
operational and security costs and risks. Companies operating in conflict-
affected contexts require a solid understanding of conflict dynamics to create 
shared value, recognizing that societal needs ultimately define markets.186 
In other words, ‘Advancing the SDGs’ requires that businesses commit, assess, 
define, implement, and communicate the guidelines solely on their own accord. In 
some cases, businesses might opt to adhere to these guidelines on their own 
accord. However, relying solely on businesses to assess the impacts of conflict or a 
sense of moral moral or social responsibility to do more is limited in a number of 
ways. As I have argued, these urgings presume, amongst other things, that conflict 
affects all business equally and that all companies are inspired to contribute to 
peacebuilding. They also take for granted that irrespective of the particular efforts 
that businesses are being asked to make, similar arguments are often different in 
terms of the persuasive pull that they exert.187 
Against these limitations, I suggest that a third pillar should focus on the role of other 
actors in promoting the uptake of these guidelines.  
                                                            
185 Ibid., at 16. 
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6.4.1.3. Pillar 3: Including other Actors  
The third pillar is one, which should focus more on how different actors can improve 
the uptake of the guidelines. In this sense, it is similar to a type of responsive 
approach to regulation. Regulation that is responsive promotes ‘active’ (positive) 
rather than ‘passive’ (negative) responsibility, clearly signalling to businesses that 
the onus is on them to identify and avoid or mitigate risks or to rectify harms once 
occurred.’188 According to Doorey, responsive regulation ‘involves… the regulation 
of the ‘contextual conditions’ of self-regulation, or the ‘regulation of self-regulation,’ 
but with the instrumental intent of achieving state objectives.’189 Rather than setting 
out the agenda and issues that are to be addressed, the process-driven approach 
would concentrate on ensuring that businesses adhere to the peacebuilding 
guideline process.190 Again, whether or not the influence that different actors exert 
on business amounts to regulation is a complex conceptual issue. Nevertheless, the 
example of responsive regulation helps to frame the type of process-focused 
influence that different actors might exert on business. 
There are also some advantages to this approach, which should be briefly 
highlighted. Firstly, in those contexts where states are unable or unwilling to develop 
full programmes or policies on business-based peacebuilding, other actors can step 
in to promote business-contributions to peacebuilding. At the same time, there are 
difficulties associated with doing so. For example, in the context of prosecuting 
extraterritorially, it was suggested that courts often defer to states where a human 
rights violation or tort occurred, in part out of respect for the sovereignty and 
competences of host states. The notion that a home state would and should 
stipulate peacebuilding outcomes in another country, something, which pushes well 
beyond assessing whether states are protecting rights adequately in their own 
jurisdiction, is highly contentious. In the context of societies attempting to transition 
from conflict to peace, for example, the degree of intervention and policy shaping by 
other countries could significantly undermine the legitimacy of the new political 
order, keen to re-establish its authority. A process-based approach, by contrast, is 
more concerned with ensuring that businesses adopt processes rather than 
                                                            
188 J. Ford, Regulating Business for Peace: The United Nations, the Private Sector, and Post-Conflict 
Recovery, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2015, at 189.  
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outcomes. That is and linking the discussion to the peacebuilding guidelines, such 
an approach would see other actors, using a range of methods, to promote the 
practices and processes identified in the guidelines. 
Secondly, this allows a more flexible approach to be adopted. It is not always helpful 
to set an agenda. Such is the dynamism and fluidity of post-conflict contexts, that 
change is a constant. A process-oriented approach allows businesses to respond to 
these changes over time. By outlining how different actors could help to promote this 
process, a policy instrument could help to move the peacebuilding guidelines from 
those whose implementation is reliant on the whims of business, to instead 
guidelines that are supported by other r actors requiring, incentivising or persuading 
companies to adhere to the process defined in them. Below, I consider how different 
actors might promote processes.  
6.4.1.3.1. Promoting Processes  
The examples of South African and Northern Ireland illustrate how such actors as 
shareholders and investors can influence positive contributions from businesses. In 
these cases, pressure was put on businesses, primarily through threats of 
divestment, to alter their conduct in these respecting settings. In other cases, the 
influence came from institutional investors. In both case studies, it was suggested 
that various actors are able to use their influence to shape corporate conduct. While 
the focus was on altering employment practices, it is equally possible that the same 
actors could ask businesses to adopt processes like those identified in the 
guidelines.  
Similarly, the example of the EU PEACE programmes demonstrate that sub-regional 
organisations can incentivise businesses to pursue particular objectives. In this 
case, companies were incentivised to play proactive roles in Local District Councils 
(LDCs) to gain access to decision-making processes regarding the allocation of 
funds. Broadly stated, there was a perceived economic self-interest for businesses 
to participate in these collaborations. It is again wholly possible that businesses 
could be incentivised to comply with a set of guidelines.  
Perhaps a better example of the possibilities of other actors to promote adherence 
to processes is that of the IFC’s Social and Environmental Standards. While the 
standards are primarily concerned with limiting adverse harms that businesses 




oriented regulation. As suggested, in order for businesses to access finance from 
the IFC, they are required to identify any risks and to remedy them accordingly. This 
entails process specifications that businesses undertake social and environmental 
impact assessments. Similar processes are asked of companies that benefit from 
the granting of export credits and in some cases, public procurement. Again, the 
examples demonstrate the possibility that businesses can be influenced to follow 
specific processes. It is wholly conceivable that these actors could also demand or 
incentivise compliance with peacebuilding guidelines. 
A question that necessarily follows is why these actors would do so. One answer is 
that there might be a sense of moral responsibility. Alternatively, we might suggest 
that promoting business-based peacebuilding is an essential component of the 
broader agendas of these groups. The IFC, for example, is part of the World Bank 
Group, which seeks to promote development in less-developed contexts. Similarly, 
ECA’s, as state-based agencies, could be regarded as development-promoting 
organisations, particularly when understood in the context of a state’s foreign policy 
objectives. Given that conflict can undermine development, there is arguably a 
justification for these actors requiring that businesses follow the peacebuilding 
guidelines.  
There is, however, a stronger reason. Whether it is shareholders, investors, export 
credit agencies or financiers, it is often in the economic self-interests of actors to 
resolve conflict. For instance, political risk insurers are entities that provide 
insurance to businesses operating in often politically high-risk contexts. A difficulty 
associated with providing insurance is moral hazard, which occurs when someone 
or entity increases their exposure to risk when insured. Businesses might be less 
concerned with ensuring that they are not adversely affecting the setting in which 
they operate because it is not their money at stake. Given that approaches to ‘doing 
no harm’ can in some cases nevertheless contribute to harm, there is an economic 
self-interest to ask that businesses actively do more. Thus, for those providing 
financial support to firms, there is often a clear business case for ensuring that 
businesses positively contribute to peacebuilding, to reduce political risk exposure. 
Building on, we can think of other creative possibilities. For example, truth 
commissions could recommend that businesses adhere to the guidelines. So too 
could MSIs. Indeed, MSIs could form around the peacebuilding guidelines. For 




focused on developing programmes aimed at peacebuilding initiatives. Civil society 
actors could also use the principles as the basis to demand that businesses, 
particularly those which have operated in a socially irresponsible manner, repair 
harm caused by engaging in some particular peacebuilding objective. Alternatively, 
businesses could be asked to report on how they have or are attempting to 
implement the principles. This could be mandated under legislation or form part of a 
set of conditions for access to public contracts. Additionally and building on the 
creativity of McCall-Smith and Rühmkorf, home states could require that businesses 
report on how they are attempting to integrate the guidelines into practice. This 
could lead to the possibility that larger, more powerful businesses, will require that 
companies throughout the supply chain in conflict-affected settings adopt some 
measures to this end. As mentioned, one of the underlying strengths of a process-
based approach is that, as in the case of due diligence under the UNGP, businesses 
must adopt processes focused on identifying context-specific strategies that they 
might adopt.  
Thus, inspired by the UNGP, we can begin to think creatively about the possibility of 
a global policy instrument on business and peacebuilding. The starting point must 
be with the state, which can, through a range of instruments and initiatives, promote 
business contributions to peace. It should also include a business limb, one that 
reflects the fact that post-conflict states will often not assume such a role. These 
guidelines should focus on process to ensure that interventions are context-specific. 
As discussions on self-regulation often suggest, relying solely on business can be 
limited. To this end, a policy instrument should also seek to draw on other actors, 
capable of influencing businesses in a range of ways.  The primary focus of the third 
limb should be on promoting uptake of the guidelines.  
6.4.2. Unanswered Questions 
The above discussion has presented aspects of what could amount to the 
development of a policy instrument on business and peacebuilding. This multi-
pronged approach would engage the state, businesses, and other actors in 
promoting business contributions to peacebuilding.  
However, numerous questions emerge. For instance, it is not clear how a policy 
instrument on business and peacebuilding would sit alongside other initiatives 




initiatives in South Africa and Northern Ireland ‘gap fill’ for more proactive 
approaches. As an illustration, the King Committee Codes attempt to promote 
socially responsible behaviour, adopting a reporting-based approach. Similarly, 
legislation such as the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act (2000) and the Employment Equity Act (1998) attempt to ensure that businesses 
are not discriminating against employees, even when promoting B-BBEE objectives. 
By existing alongside the more progressive B-BBEE, they help to ensure that even 
more proactive businesses are not causing harm. In Northern Ireland, similar 
approaches have been adopted in the form of legislative initiatives like Employment 
Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2003 and Special 
Educational Needs and Disability Order (Northern Ireland) 2005. At present, how 
and in what ways a global policy instrument would interact with other approaches is 
unclear. For instance, would adherence to the UNGP suffer because of a policy 
instrument on business and peacebuilding?  
Secondly, how would we monitor compliance with such an instrument? Should we 
develop vectors and indicators for adherence to the guidelines or the impacts of 
state-based approaches? Following on, how do we learn from positive approaches 
adopted or negative outcomes, which emerge? For example, using the B-BBEE 
framework as an example of a useful way of thinking about how states might seek to 
include businesses in peacebuilding, should not be interpreted as claiming that this 
approach is an outright success. Indeed, B-BBEE has been plagued with issues of 
corruption and ineffectiveness from the outset. However, it is still a useful example 
to invoke. For one, it reiterates that any interactions between states and businesses 
have the potential to turn corrosive. As such, at the forefront of the mind when 
further developing any such policy instrument on business and peacebuilding must 
be monitoring and regulating these relationships. Secondly, for all its flaws, the B-
BBEE framework does highlight that improvements can be made over time, and that 
ongoing monitoring and feedback is important.  
Thirdly, while both state-based approaches and process-oriented approaches might 
contribute to coherency, what about when these two conflict? For instance, how 
would we resolve a situation wherein the state adopts a particular policy focused on 
promoting economic inclusion of one section of society but businesses, based on 
their own appraisal of a context, determine that another group should be prioritised? 
How important is a dialogue between different constituents for any such instrument 




pressing concerns, include how and in what ways different businesses might 
contribute to peace, in different settings and how do we operationalise process 
requirements in practice.  
There are, in other words, a whole host of limitations and unanswered questions 
associated with developing a global policy instrument on business and 
peacebuilding. Recognising the difficulties and limitations of any policy instrument 
on business and peacebuilding is essential. However, it is here that we must draw 
attention back to the UNGP. Despite its many limitations, UNGP have invoked 
difficult questions regarding the relationship between business and human rights. 
The many shortcomings of the UNGP have created a cacophony of discussions 
regarding, for instance, the development of metrics, the roles that other actors can 
play, how to improve business respect for human rights in different contexts, and for 
different industries. In some senses, the limitations of the UNGP have been one of 
their most significant successes. In much the same way, a policy instrument on 
business and peacebuilding raises difficult issues, only some of which are touched 
upon above. Moreover, the true extent of difficulties and indeed, perhaps the 
unworkability of such an instrument are as of yet, unknown. In many senses, this is 
the point. 
The purpose of thinking broadly about a global policy instrument on business and 
human rights is simply that, to think about it. The intention of putting it out through 
the channels of scholarship is to attempt to generate a discussion and further 
research about its potential possibilities, both negative and positive. If nothing else, 
the UNGP illustrate the power and usefulness of discontent.  
6.5. Conclusion  
This thesis set out to examine how different actors might influence businesses to 
engage businesses in contributing positively to peacebuilding efforts. The driving 
force behind this study was a growing body of literature that continues to explore the 
ways that businesses might play more proactive roles in transitions from conflict to 
peace. These scholars and practitioners are recognising that addressing many of 
the ills of the day requires the participation of business. Discussions on business 
and peace are, therefore, part of a much larger conversation that touches on how 
businesses might actively contribute to development, state building, and the 




In ways, however, the discourse is suspended in a state of ‘optimistic uncertainty’. 
On one level, the potential for businesses to make more proactive contributions is 
touted widely. On the other, it is not clear precisely if, why, when, and how 
companies might opt to engage positively in peacebuilding processes. It is in this 
space of optimistic uncertainty that this thesis explored the possibilities that different 
actors might require, persuade or incentivise businesses to contribute to 
peacebuilding. The intention was to illustrate the opportunities for progressing the 
discourse from one that is mostly driven by and reliant on the whims of business to 
instead one that might be shaped by other actors.  
To do this, I drew on the pluralisation of regulation. As I have argued, regulation is a 
dynamic concept, which some suggest emerges in different forms and through 
various actors. These discussions on regulation pluralism illustrate that different 
actors can influence businesses in a range of ways. Based on the initial mapping of 
different forms of regulation and key regulatory initiatives, I illustrated that this 
influence can emerge from such initiatives as public and private procurement, 
guidelines, truth commission reports and recommendations, multistakeholder 
initiatives, shareholders and investors and civil society organisations, as just a few 
examples. This plurality of influences, while primarily approached from the twin tests 
of efficiency- how they prevent harms from occurring and hold businesses 
accountable when they do- might also be used for more proactive ends. 
To this end, the case study chapters asked how different actors have attempted to 
influence business contributions to peacebuilding in Northern Ireland and South 
Africa. In some instances, businesses were required to contribute positively to 
peacebuilding. In other cases, businesses were persuaded to do so. Still again, the 
case studies suggested that businesses can also be incentivised through economic 
instruments. These can include public and private procurement as well as financial 
penalties in the form of shareholder resolutions, again as just a few examples.  
Different factors dictate the particular approach adopted. In South Africa, for 
instance, tensions between socioeconomic transformation objectives and the need 
for market growth led to the B-BBEE experimentation, an initiative that seeks to 
achieve a delicate balance between the two aims. Similarly, in Northern Ireland, the 
more collaborative in nature approach under FETO attempted to respond to the 




elsewhere, what particular regulatory approach is adopted cannot be defined in the 
abstract but must be sensitive and applicable in the context.  
Along with identifying different possibilities regarding how different actors might 
influence businesses, other findings emerged from the case studies. Firstly, direct 
regulation of companies can lead to institutional change. That is, in directing 
regulatory attention towards the deleterious activities of businesses, governments 
can be pressurised to alter the regulatory environment. Similarly, in ‘getting to 
regulation’ different trajectories emerge. In some cases, the pressure from civil 
society groups can be used to engage such actors as investors and shareholders to 
assume regulatory-type roles. In turn, these actors can leverage businesses to 
contribute to conflict transformation efforts. Moreover, significant peacebuilding 
moments, often in the form of peace agreements, can be important in setting 
broader agendas upon which regulation directed towards business can be 
developed.  
The case studies arguably succeed in showing that different actors can shape the 
decisions of businesses as to when and how to intervene in peacebuilding 
processes. How, though, might findings be relevant to other settings? While the 
discussions in South Africa and Northern Ireland are illuminating, it has also been 
stated repeatedly throughout the journey of this thesis that post-conflict contexts are 
usually unique. In peacebuilding contexts, given the variations that exist across 
conflict divides, how can or could these findings be of relevance?  
To this end, I considered what a global policy instrument on business and 
peacebuilding might look like. As outlined, the type of device envisioned is one that 
seeks to involve other actors to put pressure or incentivise enterprises to contribute 
to peacebuilding processes. It should respond to the limitations of relying solely on 
the individual decisions of companies as to when to intervene and how to do so. The 
first port of call, in this regard, should be post-conflict states. Such an instrument, 
recognising the various difficulties that face those transitioning from conflict to 
peace, should outline the broad range of possibilities and methods that the state 
could employ. In other words, the state-limb of a global policy instrument should 
reflect the plurality of options available to the state. Pillar two, the business limb of a 
business and peacebuilding policy instrument, should focus on outlining processes 
that businesses should adopt to identify how to engage in post-conflict settings, not 




actors that might be able to influence business contributions to peacebuilding. I 
suggested that pillar 3 of any instrument on business and peacebuilding should 
focus more on promoting adherence to pillar 2 guidelines. That is, adopting a 
responsive regulatory-type approach, such actors as investors, financiers and civil 
society, as examples, should seek to promote adherence to the guidelines set.  
I argeud that the UNGP offer a useful template for thinking about a global policy 
instrument on business and peacebuilding. That is, they provide a valuable example 
of how a policy instrument can achieve these different objectives. I also argued that 
the UNGP is helpful in another way. The trajectory of the business and human rights 
debate following the UNGP illustrates how a policy instrument can inspire debate, 
and interdisciplinary discussions, with the aim of progressing the ultimate objective 
of improving corporate conduct. In this light, the UNGP has been a conversation 
starter; one which has led to to more substantial efforts to advance how and in what 
ways to forward the business and human rights agenda, and the role of different 
actors in this effort. As an area of research, which has yet to attract significant 
discussions, a policy instrument, however provocative or limited, might serve a 
similar function of galvanising the debate. Thus, this chapter and thesis are offered 
as an example of a potential solution to the current stalemate in the business and 
peacebuilding debate, one that is admittedly far from perfect and unrepresentative of 
the vast majority of peacebuilding environments. Nevertheless, it is, hopefully, the 
start of a conversation. 
Finally, while not the focus of this thesis, underlining this research is a conceptual 
matter, one which continues to resurface but which is difficult to adequately address- 
what do we mean by regulation and how far can the boundaries of regulation 
extend? In one way, there is a significant risk and difficulty in suggesting the 
initiatives discussed in this thesis are ‘regulation.’  
In some cases, the examples discussed above cannot be regarded as regulation. 
For example, the EU PEACE initiative demonstrates the possibility for creative 
thinking and shows that businesses can be leveraged in ways that promote active 
contributions to peacebuilding processes. While useful for the purposes of 
developing discussions around the possibilities for different actors to influence 
business contributions to peace, we cannot intelligibly argue that such approaches 




In other cases, the distinction is less clear-cut. If one embraces the argument of 
regulatory pluralists that there are numerous forms and approaches to regulation, 
can we then argue that this pluralisation might extend beyond doing no harm? If one 
agrees, for instance, that public procurement is a form of regulation that emerges, 
partially, in response to the failures of orthodox regulation, what then do we term it 
when procurement is used to promote developmental objectives? In this example, 
actors normally regarded as regulators- the state, employing a method understood 
by some to be a form of regulation- procurement, simply alters the objectives from 
limiting harm to promoting another, albeit more progressive objective. Is this to push 
‘regulation’ too far, or is it a necessary consequence of the gradual pluralisation of 
regulation more generally? That is, in much the same way that regulatory actors and 
methods of regulation have expanded, perhaps so too have the objectives of 
regulation?  
Complicating this matter further is the fact that, as is the case of the B-BBEE, 
processes well recognised as falling under ‘regulation’, such as standard setting, are 
also incorporated into these mechanisms. In the case of B-BBEE, this emerges in 
the form of criteria, according to which, businesses are assessed. Much like other 
regulatory initiatives, business conduct is judged according to defined criteria. 
Whether businesses avail of economic opportunities is determined according to the 
extent to which these standards are met.  
This thesis, as largely concerned with how different actors might influence 
businesses, has not fully addressed these questions. Attempting to do so would 
have detracted from the central purpose of this thesis, which was to consider how 
different actors might influence businesses to contribute to peacebuilding. However, 
it is important to recognise that underneath the discussions on influence is a deeper, 
more complicated facet that pertains to how we define regulation more generally. 
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